EVALUATING THE WORLD BANK’S CONCEPT OF SOCIAL CAPITAL: A CASE STUDY IN THE POLITICS OF PARTICIPATION AND ORGANIZATION IN A RURAL ECUADORIAN COMMUNITY

By

ANTONIO DE LA PENA

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To family and friends in Mexico, the U.S., and Ecuador
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This dissertation examines the theoretical and methodological implications of the use of the concept of social capital in community oriented rural economic development. It argues for a reconceptualization of the concept and examines how the World Bank has defined it and applied it. Current definitions of social capital at the World Bank are mostly based on cultural variables, such as trust and cooperation, which are for the most part disassociated from the social organization, economics and politics of rural societies. In order to make social capital more attuned to the political realities of rural development, the concept needs to redefine trust and cooperation and think of them as part of people’s history and relations of power.

In order to sustain the above claims, I assessed the differences in participation between agricultural producers associated in formal organizations and those who were not. The results show that there is a limited difference between the participatory attitudes and behaviors of those who are members of producers associations and those who are not. The results support the idea that it is an individual’s position in the social structure of the community that predicts more accurately who is more likely to become a member of an association and who is not. In other words, it is not that members of associations are more participative, they simply have more opportunities to participate. Nonetheless, some results indicate that those producers who are
members of associations do tend to participate more in community-oriented projects; indicating that participatory attitudes are mainly a result of structural opportunities as determined by how individuals are located in the social structure of their community, but also by cultural attitudes towards participation for the common good.
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

John Williamson, in a background paper prepared for the World Development Report 200/2001, described the theoretical phases that economic development thinking has experienced since World War II (2002). The first one, lasting from the 1940s to the 1960s, emphasized the accumulation of physical capital as a way to achieve development. In the second phase, running through the 1960s, human capital became the explanatory variable of choice, which explained the unequal growth observed between the developed and underdeveloped world, the latter, lagging behind, despite the adoption of development oriented policies and the beginnings of large-scale aid. Finally, in the third phase, which prevails to this day, scholars argued that institutional performance influenced productivity; in other words, “there was a growing recognition that bad institutions can sabotage good policies” (2002: 261). Compare this historical assessment with one of my earliest observations of Comuna Limoncito, a rural community in Ecuador where research for this dissertation took place:

In the summer of 2002, Comuna officers and community leaders were busy discussing the economic potential of a new Ministry of Agriculture program. The Program for the Improvement of Agrarian Services (PROMSA in Spanish), was designed to allow local producers and agrarian technicians from the Ministry of Agriculture to go into business together in order to create profitable agro-commercial enterprises. In theory, technicians and producers would join forces to commercialize agricultural products under legally sanctioned contracts. This incentives-based program, its designers thought, would be more efficient, as both producers and technical experts would share risks and rewards, generating a more productive and competitive agriculture. President Segundo Castillo and producers of the Comuna were very excited about the idea as, at least in the last few decades, they had not been able to produce cash crops on a large scale. Local government officials and leaders heavily promoted PROMSA in the village, collecting close to 100 signatures from interested producers in order to qualify for the program. Eventually, three formal associations were established, one of them achieving vida juridica (corporate identity status) (De la Peña 2003, personal note).

While Williamson’s review referred to larger, national-level scales when he summarized that institutions affect productivity, rural development experts have applied this paradigm to
community-driven development, theorizing that stronger and more democratic local institutions are fundamental to spark economic development. In this line of thinking, the institutional performance is closely related to local social practices, and how these in turn influence local organizational capacity. At the World Bank, the idea that participation in formal associations is key to the alleviation of poverty has taken considerable hold since the 1990s; legitimizing the idea that micro-level rural development today is about understanding how social relations and cultural values affect institutional/organizational capacity, and how they should be strengthened or transformed in order to achieve development.

As I left Limoncito in 2002, the events I described above left me with a feeling that a new phase of economic change was about to happen in the community. It seemed as if collective action and formal organizations were finally taking hold, despite a long history of economic instability. Nonetheless, two years later, as I returned to carry out research for this dissertation, PROMSA had ceased to function and members of the associations found little reason to meet. I found it contradictory that while the rural development literature, particularly that emanating from the World Bank, was increasingly talking about the importance of social capital - in its many forms, such as community driven development, empowerment, institutional capacity building, and a myriad of communally managed initiatives- national agrarian policy in Ecuador, as in many countries of Latin America, continued to withdraw its support for small-scale agriculture, an policy trend more commonly referred to in the literature as neoliberalism (Brass 2002; Das 2001; North 2003).

This dissertation focuses on the theoretical and methodological implications that the use of the concept of social capital carries for rural community development theory and practice. It
argues for a redefinition of the concept by its most influential proponent, the World Bank, and proposes a theoretical and methodological approach that is centered on history and politics.

Research towards this dissertation was carried out in Comuna Limoncito, Province of Santa Elena\(^1\) in coastal Ecuador. Comuna Limoncito is located in the Peninsula of Santa Elena, a dry tropical and semi-arid region characterized by communal land property, in which Comuneros—individuals who are members of Comunas—take decisions regarding land and other resources collectively. Comunas, in this sense are rural villages with varying amounts of individual plots of lands and communal holdings. Limoncito is, by many wealth indicators a poor community, and the region in general is visibly less affluent than Comunas in the northern coast towards Manabí or those located near the Guayas river basin. Before discussing the region and the Comuna, I start this discussion with a brief description of the origins of the concept at the Bank, followed by a review of the literature on the concept of social capital.

**Background on Social Capital at the World Bank**

As the World Bank became increasingly interested in institutions, organizations, and participation, the concept of social capital rapidly took root at the Bank. Its ascent was without doubt meteoric, reaching the influential Vice Presidency for Development Economics and the Office of the President by the mid-nineties (Bebbington 2006: 16). The publication of Robert Putnam’s *Making Democracy Work* (1994) was pivotal to this sequence of events. In his book, Putnam claims that democracy and development are directly linked to the quantity and quality of civic engagement in a society. In his view, a culture of association sets the ground for democratic governance as it generates and sustains networks of trust. Local ideologies are central to Putnam’s proposition; social capital refers to values—such as trust and solidarity—that live in the

\(^1\) Santa Elena used to be part of the Province of Guayas. It was granted provincial status on November 7, 2007.
historical practices of peoples and that help to build democracy and development. Putnam’s framework was quickly discussed and adopted at the World Bank, and it became the foundational theory of the so-called communitarian view of social capital. Bebbington (2004), himself one of the first non-economist social scientists to support the adoption of the term in policy tells us that the communitarian approach was a compromise between those who wanted to frame social capital in a political economy approach and those who favored the institutional economics language. At the end, the latter prevailed, in part due to pressure from development economists, and as “a concession to the perceived gain of keeping open a discussion with the Development Economics group, ‘enrolling them’ in the social development enterprise and keeping a conversation open with the language of economics” (Bebbington 2004: 43). In the communitarian approach, social capital is comparable to a public good, an intangible tradition that lives in the collective ethos of societies. The communitarian view also has a heavy emphasis on participation, and the way local values such as trust, cooperation, and solidarity, influence the participatory practices of individuals. Missing in the approach are issues of conflict, inequality, and differential access to resources.

In this introductory chapter, I review two different sets of literature on social capital, one that favors the communitarian approach, represented by World Bank’s specialists, and the networks approach, which scrutinizes the absence of politics in the former. First, I describe the design of the study and its objectives.

**Definitions**

At the forefront of social capital studies in community development is the Social Capital Initiative (SCI), part of the Social Development Department at the World Bank (Bebbington 2006: 13). SCI scholars define social capital as the institutions, norms, values, and beliefs that govern interaction among people and facilitate economic and social development (Krishna and
Shrader 2002; Grootaert and van Bastelaer 2002a; 2002b). In addition, social capital is composed of multiple social and cultural phenomena, including values that predispose people to cooperate, such as trust and reciprocity, and institutional forms that facilitate cooperation, such as local organizations, associations, and the rules that define them. According to the SCI, taken together, these measures can be evaluated to assess the potential of communities to organize for mutually beneficial goals (Krishna and Shrader 2002). These values and norms, in the end, predispose and facilitate the creation and maintenance of organizations, which in turn, provide larger socio-economic benefits.

Of the many forms that social capital can take, World Bank specialists argue that membership in organizations is the most successful form available to improve household welfare, in particular that of poor households (Grootaert 2001; 2002). Grootaert, one of the main architects of the concept at the Bank, tells us that when people belong to organizations composed of members of diverse occupational and educational backgrounds they have an opportunity to exchange information and knowledge, not only about matters related to the organization, but also about social and economic opportunities outside of it. In other words, organizations link people to opportunities through social ties. This is undoubtedly true, as most people who belong to an organization will develop friendships and acquaintances that could potentially provide information about jobs, services, business opportunities, and so on. Grootaert’s assertion, as we will see later, is in some ways similar to the claims of Social Network Analysis scholars interested in social capital: the more diverse your network, the richer the information available to you. Nonetheless, in the networks approach, the potential benefits of the information received by an individual also depend on the economic and social characteristics of those in the network, and the specific ways contacts and “ego” are connected. In social networks, some people are better
connected than others, and some networks have more assets than others. This approach has the potential to provide significant insight as to the roots of differential development at the community level; nonetheless, it plays a minimal role in the World Bank’s paradigm, as I explain in the following chapters.

**Theoretical Goals**

This dissertation focuses on socially structured differences that exist among residents of a small rural community in Ecuador, and how these differences render certain aspects of the World Bank’s definition of social capital limited in their explanation of the causes of rural underdevelopment. Taking a cue from the heavy emphasis the World Bank puts on membership in organizations as a form of social capital, I focused on two types of associational opportunities available to villagers in the Comuna Limoncito; the first one is membership in agricultural producers associations; the second one is membership in the Comuna. As I mentioned above, Limoncito is a Comuna, a legal entity sanctioned by the national government in which its members have communal title to the land. Together they make decisions regarding their natural resources by majority of vote. While all families in the village live in the territory of the Comuna, not all of them are members of it, as some families decided not to join it when it was established or rescinded their membership. In Comuna Limoncito there are four active agricultural producers associations. Who belongs to these associations and why provides important empirical data analyze the theoretical foundations of the communitarian view of social capital and provide a new synthesis.

Departing from these two types of membership, the main goal of the study is to describe and analyze the positions of actors in the social structure of the village (the Comuna) and to understand how their positions, meaning how they are connected to others and how central they are in the social structure of the village, relate to their membership choices in either the Comuna,
in agricultural producers associations, or both. The structural position of actors was determined by ethnography through participant-observation in the village, structured and unstructured interviews, and by social network analysis. Structural position was defined through anecdotal accounts that focused primarily on the power relations—the politics—of village life, and by quantitative techniques, namely, social network analysis, a World Bank questionnaire designed to assess social capital, and statistical tests of these two instruments.

**Conceptual Departure**

Central to my argument is the idea that the establishment and practices of associations are inextricably related to the way resources are accessed and distributed in the larger society in which they exist. In the particular context of Limoncito, access to resources was highly politicized, meaning two complementary processes; first, that access to resources such as credit, jobs, agricultural inputs, social services, and non-governmental assistance flowed through vertical channels of social relations, in other words, through a reduced number of leaders who acted as political and cultural brokers and had the power to distribute and re-distribute resources. Secondly, that this kind of social organization implies a negotiation between unequal actors seeking to access and distribute resources which many times are scarce or difficult to get—such as loans, jobs, and membership in associations. In addition to the peculiarities of its social organization, Limoncito is embedded within larger ecological, economic, and political opportunities and restrictions. I analyze three in this study: (1) its limited natural resources, in particular water for irrigation; (2) government withdrawal from small-scale agriculture support, and (3) contradictory development strategies by non-governmental organizations, which reproduce a system of vertical allocation of resources.

By including these factors in the way associations operate in a community a different picture of what it means to build or maintain social capital emerges, and ultimately it leads to the
inevitable question of whether social capital is a useful concept in development policy, a question that has been constantly debated in the development literature. Using the data collected in Limoncito, I argue that for the purposes of policy social capital should be theoretically understood, first, as an individual’s asset, not as public good, secondly, as differentially and unequally distributed in a social group. Even then, this approach will only work if we think of social capital as a metaphor in which social relations are not the same as capital. Social relations lose their explanatory complexity when they are reduced to accounting units, to relations of equity and debt, or when they are defined as assets that depreciate like machinery, just to mention some of the qualities of capital in economics. Borrowing from Bordieu, I argue that the word capital -in social capital- should be understood as a symbol indicating, primarily, inequality in the ways that people accumulate and reproduce wealth. In order to further my argument, the communitarian view of social capital needs to be tested. In concrete terms, the theoretical goals of this dissertation are as follow:

To point out the strengths and limitations of the communitarian social capital approach as an analytical tool intended to explain the causes of participation and organizational capacity in rural communities.

To discuss the consequences of the communitarian view of social capital on economic development policy and theory.

To argue that, for the purposes of policy, associational life in rural settings is better explained by a theory and a method that primarily sees associations and participation as struggles to access and negotiate resources in the context of national and international structural inequalities.

Using Multiple Methodologies to Test Social Capital

In order to provide an empirical analysis, I gathered data using a World Bank instrument designed specifically to measure social capital called the Integrated Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SOCAP IQ). Its results, in turn, were compared with
ethnographic findings and social network analysis. The SOCAP IQ\(^2\) was designed to: (1) inventory the levels of social capital in a community; (2) uncover how social capital is distributed among socioeconomic groups; and (3) measure the potential for a community to engage in mutually beneficial collective goals (2002a). In their social capital literature, The World Bank has put considerable emphasis in promoting participation in local associations as a way to improve incomes, therefore, one of the main goals of the SOCAP IQ is to understand the levels of participation of households. The SOCAP IQ is a somewhat large questionnaire intending to probe many aspects of social capital, from degree of trust in a village to the workings of local associations; chapter 4 describes it in more detail.

The foundational hypothesis of this study is that the structural position of households in a community -as defined by social networks variables and ethnographic data- are a better predictor of who is more likely to become a member of a rural producers’ association than most measures in the SOCAP IQ. If that is the case, the data gathered with social networks and ethnography would provide a more robust causal explanation for differences in participation among households, this information could be used to redefine social capital and add to current measurement techniques of the concept. While the SOCAP IQ provides an exhaustive look at social capital measures, the data that it generates provides limited knowledge on the issue of differential access to resources, including the differential opportunities that individuals experience in order to join an association in itself. The politics of allocation of resources in the village, which extends to the workings of local associations, are embedded in larger networks of friendship, kinship, financial and emotional obligations, and locally defined values such as trust. The SOCAP IQ is unable to uncover many of these factors for a simple reason; it is a survey,

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\(^2\) The Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) was the original instrument designed by the World Bank and is longer in scope.
which by definition is not designed to provide such information. This brings us to a central theme of this dissertation, namely, the different and incompatible ways in which development anthropology and institutional development policy define their goals, theory, and methods. The anthropological focus is usually in-depth and centered around a specific locale. Its goal is to gain considerable knowledge about the specificities of thought and behavior from which more universal patterns can be explained. The policy approach requires the production of concrete and comparable results, many times at large scales. It also requires a degree of abstraction in order to sift through details and produce results that answer specific goals. Research of this kind is under administrative limitations in time, money, and institutional interests, which make statistical analysis also appealing. Most ethnographic data, in this sense, has limited uses in policy, as it cannot provide easy to compare data across large populations, nor does it provide a level of abstraction and generalization that can be retraced mathematically if necessary.

Having this challenge as a background, I propose a multi-methodological approach to the issue of social capital in rural community development. Acknowledging the importance of survey generated data, I propose the addition of two techniques to strengthen the conclusions derived from issues of organization and participation (social capital): social network analysis and ethnography. The former serves to identify the positions of actors in the social structure of a community, as well as the resources they derive from those positions. Ethnography contextualizes those resources culturally and historically through in-depth description of practices and beliefs. The end result is a stronger social and cultural explanation of participation and associational practices.

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3 Understood as the collection of data through participant observation, including unstructured (conversation), semi-structured (open-ended questions), and structured interviews.
Hypothesis of the Study

By contextualizing social capital I mean that the concept needs to be politicized. Participation and association, I argue, are heavily influenced by the economic and political resources households command, how they obtain and distribute them. Resource command and distribution are in turn defined by position of households in the social structure of the community, and its relationship to larger regional and national politics and policies. Therefore:

1. Household membership in a rural producers’ organization is more likely to be determined by the structural position of households in a community than by most of the social capital measures described in the SOCAP IQ.

2. The more powerful the structural position of a household is in a community, the less likely it is to become a member of a rural producers’ association; and vice versa: as the structural position of the household becomes less powerful the likelihood of participation in a rural producers’ association increases.

Households that command resources in agricultural production, such as access to credit or commercialization channels, may not want to share them with others by joining an organization. The fear of losing those benefits by sharing contacts or information with others would keep them away from associations. After all, agriculture is a very risky and uncertain business in Limoncito. Difficult environmental conditions, poor commercialization channels, extremely limited governmental assistance and intricate webs of influence in non-governmental support have made agriculture a difficult way to earn a living. The results I present below support hypothesis one but contradict hypothesis two. Conversely to what hypothesis two predicted, it is those households who are better positioned in the Comuna that belong to associations. There is one exception; the wealthiest households are not members.

Social Capital: Definition Disagreements

A major obstacle to design a study that attempts to provide answers to the problem of participation and membership is the concept of social capital itself. There are dozens, perhaps
hundreds of definitions of the term, most of them molded to the needs of the question at hand. Most of these definitions fall within two opposite theoretical frameworks: the communitarian and the social networks approaches. The former defines social capital as a public good, as the sum of collective benefits derived from civic participation. The latter, as those resources an individual can get from his or her network of social relations. I define these concepts in greater detail below. In this dissertation, the term social capital means two interrelated phenomena. First, it refers to the material and emotional resources a person is able to obtain as a result of who they know and the resources available in his or her network. Secondly, it refers to the ability of individuals to organize and participate in associations for both collective and individual gains. The former definition provides a larger conceptual framework based on networks theory, the latter is based on a specific form of social capital –participation and organizational capacity- identified by specialist as one of the most important.

The scholars associated with social capital at the World Bank believe that social capital brings together the socio-cultural –context-specific features of behavior- and the economic –universal, rational economic thinking. In this frame of mind, the metaphor social capital seems appropriate, for the word capital denotes a return on an investment, in this case, social relations. Equating social relations with capital has generated debate amongst economists, adding to an already heated debate. Nobel Prize recipient Robert Solow calls social capital “an attempt to gain conviction from a bad analogy” (1999: 8). He goes on to say:

It seems to me that this is what we should be studying: what is the available repertoire of behavior patterns in this situation or that, and how does one of them come to be entrenched as the standard? More generally, what kinds of institutions and habits make an economy or a society better able to adapt to changing circumstances by finding and imposing appropriate norms of behavior? I do not see how dressing this set of issues in the language and apparatus of capital theory helps much one way or another. (Solow 1999: 8)
Kenneth Arrow, also an Economics Nobel winner argues that social capital misses a fundamental characteristic of capital: it requires “deliberate sacrifice in the present for future benefits” (1999: 4). To believe “the social” in social capital fulfills this requirement is to think that all social relations are forged as a conscious calculation for a future return; even the most orthodox neoclassical economist would agree friendship and kinship have affective components beyond economic calculation. But since the “social” in social capital does not only include relations but also larger social and cultural variables, it would erroneously imply that we are all socialized from childhood to engage in social relations for a return (1999: 4). This issue brings us to the epistemological crux of the matter, what is the advantage of equating social and cultural practices with capital? Why do we need to think of social relations as economic wealth? Robert Solow engages the problem from a slightly different perspective:

If I told you that the rate of return on social capital had fallen from 10 percent a year to 6 percent a year since 1975, would that convey any clear picture to you? I have never asked so many rhetorical questions in my life; but that is the quickest way to explain why I doubt that “social capital” is the right concept to use in discussing whatever it is we are discussing— the behavior patterns I mentioned earlier, for instance. (1999: 7)

Solow is more concerned with the analytical and quantifiable aspects of social capital. His approach does not answer the larger epistemological dilemma of reducing the complexity of values and social practices to an economic measure. Part of the problem is that development theory depends on mathematical modeling to advance ideas. Efficient, universal models of human behavior provide the parsimony and retractable mathematical analysis necessary to make economic theory work, and in turn development policy. Social capital at the World Bank seems to be an example of this process, as Bebbington tells us, the communitarian view of social capital was a compromise between theoretical schools at the World Bank (2004). As I mentioned previously, economists insisted on couching the term on econometric language, in order to
legitimize it, while scholars of a political bent attempted to frame it in a political-economy line.

Ultimately, the latter failed:

The process of the (social capital) group was revealing. Two external academics were invited to join – political scientist Jonathan Fox and economist Mancur Olson. As the group progressed, the argument that a discussion of social capital should be linked to themes in institutional economics (a` la Olson) more than to themes in political economy (a` la Fox) slowly won the day. Certainly there were pressures from development economists to shift the discussion in this direction – and it is also notable that in the end two of the three authors of the final report of the Social Development Task Force were economists. There were then clear efforts to ‘tame’ these reports, but this was accepted… on strategic grounds, a concession to the perceived gain of keeping open a discussion with the Development Economics group, ‘enrolling them’ in the social development enterprise and keeping a conversation open with the language of economics” (Bebbington et al. 2004: 44).

The compromise is revealing in that it reveals that econometrics is the most prestigious language of analysis and communication of results in social issues. On this issue, is worth quoting Bebbington again:

Significantly, at the same time as this report was being produced, in the same corridor of the Social Policy Division a study was being completed by Deepa Narayan (formerly active in the Participation Group) that used data from a participatory poverty assessment in Tanzania to suggest that social capital (a composite of measures of participation in local organizations and trust) was a powerful determinant of household poverty. Narayan invited Lant Pritchett, a respected economist in the Development Economics Vice presidency, to assist with the more formal data analysis partly in order that the argument and evidence be more legitimate within the Bank [Narayan and Pritchett, 1997]. This study, econometric in focus and quite heavily advertised within the Bank, began to consolidate the argument that social capital ought to be talked about econometrically; that it ought to be understood as an asset affecting household welfare; and that any chance of succeeding in making a case for social capital within the Bank would have to be made by linking it econometrically to a discussion of its impacts on household poverty” (2004: 45).

Social capital it appears is a compromise between the need to acknowledge that social externalities affect economic performance and the need to make a complex social concept universal, comparable, and generalizable in its application. This introduction to the history of the concept provides us with a background to examine how different disciplines understand the collection and use of knowledge and the dilemma that these differences posse for this research.
In the next sections I further explore the debate between the communitarian and the networks approach to social capital.

**Theoretical Foundations of Social Capital**

A number of researchers have argued that the idea of social capital was initially conceptualized as a cultural and social condition exercised at the individual level (Lin 2000; Portes and Landolt 2000). The two most influential contemporary scholars on the subject, Pierre Bourdieu (1986) and James Coleman (1988), believed social capital was an investment individuals made on social relations in order to derive some type of benefit. Bourdieu thought this benefit would be the maintenance and reproduction of domination by elites (1986). Coleman theorized that the sum of individual gains could translate into solutions to the problems of larger social groups (1988). Arguably, Coleman’s approach serves as the theoretical foundation for uses of social capital in economic development (Fine 2000; Harriss 2002; Harriss and de Renzio 1997; Portes and Landolt 2000). We can think of Coleman’s as a communitarian approach to the way groups operate. An idea that influenced Putnam’s work on civic life in two Italian regions.

As mentioned above, for Putnam, democracy, and as a result, development, are heavily influenced by cultures or traditions of civic participation. Taking the example of northern versus southern Italy, Putnam noticed that economically developed societies (like northern Italian towns) have a stronger culture of civic association. People in this part of Italy are more free to join associations and have a more vibrant associational culture, both in terms of the number of informal associations they belong to and the strength of their performance. On the contrary, southern Italian towns, less developed economically, do not exhibit a rich tradition of civic association. In fact, joining groups and doing things collectively seems to be heavily dependent on hierarchical social relations that limit who can participate where.
Putnam’s linkage of poverty to democratic participation. It established the foundations for the development of a theory of social capital as a cultural and collective property with the capacity to transform economic conditions.

**Social Capital: The Communitarian View**

A common application of the Putnam approach is the idea that social relations have a spillover effect on economic activities. Grootaert, for example, has shown that membership in associations in Bolivia, Burkina Faso, and Indonesia generates higher returns for poorer households, whether by expenditure per capita or land ownership (2001 in 2002a). Narayan and Pritchett in their study of social capital in Tanzania conclude that generalized trust in a community is a function of village cohesion and norms, independent of household income (Grootaert 2002a). Grootaert (1999) also concluded that access to credit is positively associated with membership on both economically and non-economically oriented organizations in Indonesia.

In other words, scholars associated with the World Bank have statistically shown that social capital is a causal factor in household welfare (carefully controlling for other explanatory variables). Once again, this is proof of the spillover effect that social relations have on economic activities, as information is transmitted from economically oriented groups to other groups in society. From this results the next logical conclusion is to think of social capital is a cultural property, as something that some communities posses as part of their historical development. It is part of a community’s norms and values.

**Bridging and Bonding Capitals**

A more nuanced version of how social capital operates is provided by Woolcock and Narayan (2000). They introduce the idea of bridging and bonding capitals. The latter refers to the levels of cohesion that social groups have at local levels, for example villages, associations, and
clubs. The former indicates the ability of these groups to transcend their local environment to reach groups and institutions different from them and operating in different institutional spaces. For example, second degree organizations that link village-level associations, and non-governmental organizations. This version of social capital argues that it is a combination of both types of capital that generates economic and social development as local organizations are able to more effectively lobby policy makers.

**Social Capital: The Networks View**

A common critique of the use of the Coleman-Putnam communitarian approach is that it results in tautological explanations of what causes differential economic and political performance among groups. The argument points out that by defining social capital both as a structural attribute (e.g. organizations and associations) and as a cognitive form (e.g. trust and reciprocity); the sources of social capital become indistinguishable from its outcomes (Fine 2000; Harriss 2002; Lin 2001a; 2001b). For example, an organization such as a rotating savings and credit association is a collective manifestation of social capital, yet, the trust and reciprocity that make it work are also forms of social capital, thus, a circular explanation results as causal factors (i.e. trust) are defined by their effects (i.e. associational life) (Fine 2000; Harriss 2002; Lin 2001; Woolcock 1998).

The networks view of social capital, usually associated with social network analysis (SNA), argues that conceptualizing social capital as an asset held at the individual level allows scholars to differentiate its causes from its outcomes (Lin 2001a; 2001b). Valued resources are embedded in social structures characterized by distributional and rank differences (Lin 1999; 2001b). The higher the rank, the greater the concentration of valued resources. In other words, the better the position of origin in a social network, the more likely the actor will access and use social capital (Lin 2001b). SNA researchers have shown that differences in gender, ethnicity, and
status, in individuals influence their ability to obtain benefits derived from membership in a social network (Campbell, Mardsen and Hurlbert 1986; Lin 1999; Lin and Dumin 1986; Silvey and Elmhirst 2003).

Bourdieu, perhaps the best known of the networks specialists, argued that a person’s social capital could be asserted by aggregating: 1) the size of his or her network and 2) the volume of social, cultural, and economic capital of the network members (1986 in Zhao 2002). Embedded resources such as information, and the influence of its members, he argued are social capital. Lin (200a; 2000b) has further refined this conceptual framework by seeing social capital as assets located in networks which can be measured through two main categories: 1) as embedded resources and 2) as network locations. The first one refers to the power, wealth, and influence available in a network (something not explicitly acknowledged by Bourdieu) and the resources that each contact in the network can provide. The second is more concerned with the structure of the network and how certain characteristics of a network, such as actors acting as bridges facilitate or impede returns to other actors. This study uses both structural and embedded resource measures in order to determine social capital.

**Inequality and Social Capital**

Several researchers have pointed out that by defining social capital as a (free), public good, two misleading ideas about the nature of social relations are conveyed: 1) that social capital can be converted into any tangible outcome (Natrajan and Ilahiane 2002); 2) that societies are classless, and everyone has the same access to resources (Durrenberger 2002; Edwards and Foley 1997; Harriss 2002). Furthermore, it downplays the possibility that social capital might be unavailable to those located outside certain networks (Burt 1992; Lin 2000; Silvey and Elmhirst 2003).
As economist Ben Fine argues, as economic development theory and practice aim to inject cultural values into traditional economic development models, there is a risk that the cultural and the social become another tool to explain economic performance within the confines of neoclassical economic theory, meaning all individuals are equally endowed (Fine 2000; 2002). As defined by the World Bank, social capital is equated to social relations and cultural practices, none of which can be appropriated by any one individual since values and relations belong to all members of society. As mentioned above, not only does this represent a methodological and theoretical problem, but also can have negative consequences in rural development policies.

**Social Capital as Social Organization**

To talk about social capital implies a discussion about theories of social organization. Social capital is, in many ways, a renewed take on classic debates on the nature of social life, like: reciprocity (Mauss 1954), status and role (Linton 1935), individual-society responsibilities (Gluckman 1972), and how individuals manage their community-level obligations, be they ritual, kin-related, or economic, with the demands exerted on them by the outside world (Firth 1963, Foster 1961, Mintz and Wolf 1959). The debate, in other words, has a robust pedigree, one which is taken for granted in the social capital literature. This is an unfortunate problem given that one of the goals of organizational-centered rural development is to understand the cultural and social variables at work in differential economic performance across human groups. Classic studies of peasant societies, for example, asked many of the same questions that social capital specialists ask today about the relationship between social relations and rural development. Eric Wolf (1966), for example, theorized about the type of social relations and coalitions that peasants create in order to respond to the many selective pressures they face. George Foster, on the other hand, focused mainly on the peasant character and sought to understand why peasants thought of living in a world of limited and finite resources, what he called the image of the limited good.
(1965). In mentioning these two authors, I also call attention to two differing schools of thought in peasant studies, both of which are reflected in social capital studies. The first one, here represented by Wolf, focuses on environmental and political-economy influences. The second one, represented by Foster, is concerned with peasant world views and personality. While considerable debate has surrounded the explanatory power of each position (see for example Kearney 1996), when it comes to the economic and political challenges peasants face, both, nonetheless, were interested in showing that behavior was contextual and logical given the circumstances faced by individuals and communities, and secondly, that, what many students of human groups saw as distinct analytical spheres of social life, were in reality interconnected. Whether the focus was cognitive or materialist, these authors provided valuable empirical data showing that economic roles and social relationships intersected at different levels (Foster 1967; Firth 1963), that religious beliefs and social support were complexly related to each other (Foster 1967; Mintz and Wolf 1950). And that environment, ideology, and social structure played each other to influence productive outcomes (Cole and Wolf 1971).

In order to convey the idea that the social capital debate is rooted in older and larger theoretical debates on social organization, I focus on the work of Wolf on peasant coalitions (1966) and Foster’s “limited good” principle in peasant societies (1965). Wolf believed that the peasant household faced constant and ever-changing pressures. They faced uncertain environmental conditions, such as drought, pests, and floods, usually outside their power to control. The peasant household also faced local social pressures, sometimes as a result of a growing population with limited amounts of land, or differences in access to capital and resources. Finally, there were pressures emanating from the larger society (1966: 77), many of them coming from the state, such as relocation, taxation, and even persecution and
extermination. To these, we can add increasingly limited government support towards small-scale agriculture. These pressures, nonetheless, are selective, as some households will have better access to water, more available labor, have fewer children and more land, or sustain less damage after a flood. Therefore, there is an internal differentiation of households that the community as a whole has to deal with it. Two options are available to them, the first one is to let selective pressures take its course and weed out those who cannot make it as small-scale producers. The second is to establish mechanisms intended to help those households in distress. In other words, communities enact ways to re-distribute resources from those who have more to those who are in need. As Wolf tells us, most peasantry fall somewhere in between the two options, nonetheless, the reason why households and communities develop support mechanisms is because peasants know that fortunes can be reversed from one season to the next (1966: 80). Today’s winners can be tomorrow’s losers, and vice versa. In Wolf’s words:

Peasants everywhere are therefore likely to enter alliances, but alliances which remain sufficiently loose structured to exempt the participants in a period of severe trial. Although peasant households tend to increase their security by widening their resources in goods and people, they must also retain functional autonomy to guard their own survival. Therefore, I shall call such alliances coalitions, in the sense of “a combination or alliance, especially a temporary one between persons, factions, states” (1996: 80).

Wolf did not frame the problem of uncertainty in peasant livelihoods –in terms of differential levels of household welfare– as strictly related to levels of organizational capacity; something of central importance for social capital experts. I dare say that, for him, it would be of limited value to understand differences in poverty levels in a community by isolating variables like “organizational capacity” or “willingness to participate”. The reason for this lies in the way he, like many other students of peasant societies, understood their social relations: sometimes as serving a single purpose, most times as interweaving several purposes in one relationship.
Peasant Coalitions

According to Wolf, two main types of coalitions define peasant social relations: those that bring people together around a single interest, and those in which its members share multiple interests (1966: 81). The first he called singlestranded, the second one, manystranded. In single stranded coalitions, two or more persons join forces with the purpose of advancing a specific goal. An example is rural associations such as funeral groups, irrigation and producers associations. Members of this type of coalition are usually bound by a particular interest which does not necessarily demands that its participants be involved with one another beyond this interest. A manystranded coalition, on the other hand: “is built upon through the interweaving of many ties, all of which imply one another” (1966: 81). Economic transactions may be influenced by kinship relations, kinship relations, in turn, may require specific obligations and rights, these in turn night limit the range of options in other spheres of life. Each type of relation is like a strand; together they provide great security to people at different levels. On the other hand, this interlocking of strands is the source of its own weakness as they tie people together into inflexible relations that are difficult to disentangle.

A second characteristic of peasant coalitions is the difference in status between participants. Coalitions with people in the same level of the social order are horizontal. Those with members of unequal positions in the social scale are vertical. Finally, coalitions may be dyadic when they involve two persons or two groups of persons, or polyadic, involving many persons or groups of persons.

Forty years after its publication, this classification may seem too obvious for rural society students; nonetheless, social capital specialists could derive considerable insight from its theoretical and classificatory applications. First, because it places cultural values (or peasant character, as some of Wolf’s contemporaries would have said) as part of a larger social universe,
one in which the material conditions of peasant life (environment), the political inequalities faced by them, and the symbols that reinforce the system (such as those found in religious ceremonies) feed each other. The moment Wolf forces us to look at interrelated character of multi-faceted roles, class, and environmental factors, it becomes very difficult to think of social relations as an investment that promotes economic growth, or at least, higher welfare levels. Two examples of manystranded coalitions may elucidate this point. The first one is a manystranded, polyadic, and horizontal coalition also referred by Wolf as closed corporate community. This type of community restricts membership to certain types of persons, and is common in most of Latin America. A comuna, for example, is in many ways a closed corporate community. It restricts membership to those who are born and raised in the Comuna; it retains the rights to land and restricts the individuals right to sell or rent its parcel to outsiders; it has a mechanisms to level differences between members -accusations, gossip, fiestas, among others- and it tends to fight off changes and innovations that threatened the perceived, ideal order. Limoncito exhibits all of these characteristics listed by Wolf (1966: 86). As we will see in the following chapters, they all play a part in the way people understand and practice participation and associations in Limoncito.

A second example from Wolf is the manystranded, dyadic, and vertical relationship. Its characteristic form is the patrón and a client coalition (1966: 86). This involves a relation between individuals of unequal command of economic or political resources. It is an asymmetric relation that contradictorily, is based on trust. Despite differences in status, both parties need to trust each other to make this type of coalition work. The patron offers economic aid and political protection against legal and illegal actions exerted on the peasant, and in exchange, the client offers political support in the form of his or her vote. The client might also organize people on
the patron’s behalf for electoral or labor purposes. This relationship is further interlaced when patrons and clients in the economic and political spheres become 
*compadres* (co-parents). The patron usually being asked to be the god-father of the client’s son or daughter. Further rights and obligations that influence the totality of relations emerge, intersecting with economic and political issues. In this sense, the patron-client dyad is also called a lop-sided friendship (Pitt-Rivers 1961), because regardless of the differences in status and wealth between individuals, which often include exploitative labor relations, clients and patrons develop emotional ties, they refer to each other as friends or as brothers or sisters, creating roles that are called upon in economic exchanges, for example. The relation of patron-client relations and the concept of manystranded coalitions to organizational issues will become clear when we explore the relation that producers in Limoncito and municipal officials and non-governmental organization employees engage in order to advance their agendas.

**Associations as Singlestranded Coalitions**

The rural association for productive purposes is a singlestranded coalition. It stems out of the growing influence of the market on peasant livelihoods. In Limoncito, like in many parts of the world, comuneros have created producers associations to compete in a the highly elastic market; prices, demand, and output are always fluctuating, and marketing channels are not always secured. Limoncito’s households in this sense are exercising “mercantile domain” over their own resources, as Wolf would put it, meaning that the household is becoming more individualized in its relations with individuals, many times pursuing specific goals to advance its position. As the market penetrates the community, some households would become more autonomous and develop short-lived relationships with others over specific economic exchanges.

Limoncito, therefore, is constantly negotiating the demands that the social structure makes on members of a Comuna as a closed corporate community and those of a community composed
of singlestranded, single interest groups trying to advance their positions on a highly fluctuating market in a difficult environmental and political context. In other words, the association, in Wolf’s scheme, is inseparable from the historical, political, and environmental context where it came from. Equally important is the fact that those in the association do not live in a social vacuum. Although the association for productive purposes is the result of single-interest coalitions, of producers who have transformed part of their social universe to become more autonomous, they still have to fulfill many other roles. As I will point out in chapter three, the association is not only a place were individual producers and households engage the market in order to advance their welfare, it is also the center of a multitude of patron-client type relations as well as collective action strategies to improve personal and communal lifestyles.

**The Image of Limited Good**

A classic anthropological model that I see as closer to the theoretical approach behind the communitarian view of social capital is George Foster’s “image of limited good”. Foster thought peasant societies were guided by an overarching cognitive orientations (1965: 293). “An unverbalized, implicit expression of their understanding of the “rules of the game” of living imposed upon them by their social, natural, and supernatural universes” (1965: 293). Normative behavior in a society, in other words, was a function of people’s “unconscious acceptance of the “rules of the game” implicit in their cognitive orientation” (1965: 294). Foster was ultimately interested in developing explanatory models that accounted for these cognitive, patterned regularities. He wanted to generate principles that showed the relationship between behavior and cognition. In developing the image of limited good principle, Foster’s was also interested in how values and social norms affected economic development: “the implication of this orientation and related behaviors to the problem of the peasant’s participation in the economic growth of the country to which they belong (1965: 296). In addition to his interest in economic development,
Foster’s approach is closer to the communitarian view in the ways that both parties define culture.

As previously mentioned, the image of limited good refers to a guiding principle of peasant societies in which, simply put, all good things in life come in finite quantities. Land, money, health, love, the things that make life better come in a finite supply in a community. Furthermore, there is no way for a peasant to increase their availability (1965: 296). Since these goods are in limited supply, it follows that individuals or families can only improve their position in their village at the expense of others (1965: 297). If someone is getting richer, someone else in the village is becoming poorer. The ultimate consequence of this behavior is envy, mistrust, and lack of cooperation, behaviors that many anthropologists observed in peasant societies around the world4. Edward Banfield, for example, observed all these traits in southern Italy, as did Geertz to a certain degree in Java. Banfield, like Putnam decades later, was interested in this permeating distrust in southern Italian villages. He called it “amoral familism”, a suspicion of the motives of individuals outside the immediate family which incapacitates southern Italians peasants to engage in collective action for the common good (1958). In Banfield’s scheme, these amoral familists could not go beyond the interests of their nuclear families to engage in politics and advance community needs. They were politically incapable and disengaged. Putnam went on to expand Banfield’s idea that mistrust was also the result of vertical social and political relations between peasant and patrons. As poor peasants were tied up in unequal but necessary relations of exploitation for their survival, the consequence was lack of cooperation among them.

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4 Foster’s article on the image of limited good (1965) provides several examples of these issues, including Clifford Geertz’s early work in Java and his explanation for the lack of cooperation among peasants outside specific labor arrangements.
In the image of limited good, Foster did not focus on political relations, yet he was concerned with the increasingly “unrealistic cognitive orientation” of peasants in relation to the modern world (1966: 295). Interestingly, he said he agreed with Banfield’s position in rejecting psychology to explain rural underdevelopment:

the primary task in development is not to attempt to create $n$ Achievement at the mother’s need but to try to change the peasant’s view of his social and economic universe, away from the Image of Limited Good toward that of expanding opportunity in an open system, so that he can feel safe in displaying initiative. The brakes on change are less psychological than social. Show the peasant that initiative is profitable, and that it will not be met by negative sanctions, and he acquires it in short order (1965: 310).

Foster, like Banfield, was critical of those who thought of peasants a lacking achievement and initiative skills. He thought that the problem of the peasantry was primarily social, interacting with limited technology, capital, and environmental factors. More interesting is the fact that, while Banfield was also critical of psychological determinism, today, his amoral familism thesis is seen as one of the most common examples of the peasant personalitiespsychology literature. The point to keep in mind is how the debate on the causes of rural underdevelopment oscillates between those who begin their analysis with structural factors (environment, technology) and move to describe how these variables interact with social relations, and those who focus on value systems and how these are expressed in social behavior. I am interested in the fact that the World Bank has chosen to frame research informing policy under the communitarian view of social capital. An approach which strongly relies on value systems and their transformation to achieve its goals. In the anthropological literature, the work of Foster is in many ways reminiscent of this position, nonetheless, it differs in one important aspect, he also believed that observed social behavior entangles individuals at many levels, political, economical, and ritual, therefore, to isolate variables without knowledge of how they operate in the totality of the system in order to induce social change is of limited value in peasant societies:
In national development programs much community–level action in agriculture, health and education is cast in the form of cooperative undertakings. Yet it is abundantly clear that traditional peasant societies are cooperative only in the sense of honoring reciprocal obligations, rather than in the sense of understanding total community welfare, and that mutual suspicion, seriously limits cooperative approaches to village problems (1965: 311).

In this study I am not interested in cognitive systems as a causal explanatory variable. I am more interested in contributing to the debate delineated above by focusing in similar questions as those posed by Banfield, and Foster: Are there features of social organization that determine economic development at the rural level? Why do some small-scale agriculturalists encounter so many problems to work collectively? Because we are ultimately dealing with knowledge intended to change rural development policy I believe that a stronger focus on social relations as relations of power is necessary. This is so because by making value systems the determinant factor in social change we run the risk of reducing the unit of analysis to the peasant mind. The state, its economic policies, its political agenda, local arrangements over labor and capital, and the overall negotiation between local needs and national and international pressures may be reduced to the moral, psychological, and ideological profile of individuals, regional, or rural cultures.

**Moral and Rational Peasants**

Many of these arguments were reworked in the 1980s by Scott in *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (1976) and Popkin in *The Rational Peasant* (1979). Scott’s thesis was in many ways similar to that of Wolf and other students of peasant society who saw economy and social structure as intimately related. Scott ultimately wanted to explain why peasants revolt. In his view, market pressures and state policies undermined the mechanisms that made peasant communities secure a minimum level of subsistence. Peasants tend to avoid risk, therefore they define floors and ceilings to assure their existence. Beyond these, their well-being is threatened by the highly unstable nature of making a living under small-scale agriculture. Patron-client relations and re-distributive mechanisms that seem exploitative or limiting individual choice are
part of a repertoire intended to minimize risk and maximize individual and communal safety. In terms of the social capital debate, we can think of these as forms of collective action and membership that do not fit maximizing principles of market capitalism. Scott, in this sense provided an explanation for the preference of peasants for exploitative forms of taxation. In addition, he believed that the penetration of state forms of rent and taxation, in conjunction with market pressures led peasants to revolt.

Popkin (1979) on the other hand, put forward the idea that peasants are rational maximizers; that they favor their individual interests over those of the community. In the long term, peasants seek to maximize their individual gain, on the short term they might invest in community-level obligations as a safety net. For him, the same investment logic that operates in markets exists in villages, exchanges between patrons and clients are guided by an investment logic in which individuals rationally make decisions about risk and opportunity.

The debate is not really one of political economy against moral economics. Both approaches incorporate elements of political economy, and in fact, moral economists, make a point in showing that seemingly irrational decisions by peasants have a coherent reason behind them. For the purposes of our discussion, it is more useful to think of the debate as one of structure and agency. To what degree do decisions made by small-scale producers are guided by community obligations? And conversely, to what degree do they make decisions that benefit them as individuals? In a way, the study of participation and collective action can provide answers to these are questions as it uncovers the reasons behind embracing of rejecting participation in formal associations.

**The Peasant in Historical and Political Perspective**

I would like to conclude this partial review of the literature on peasant studies by bringing attention to the relationship between the peasant community and “the larger social order”, as
Wolf* called it (1966). Unlike most of the personality literature, historical materialists, like Wolf were interested in placing the peasant in larger historical contexts. For Wolf, understanding the peasant in the larger political agenda of nations (and global histories) was of crucial important to understand its social organization and value system. He paid particular attention to the role given to peasant in the revolutionary agendas of politicians and intellectuals such as Lenin, Marx, Mao, and Stalin, and he seek to understand how the peasant coalitions he described, interacted with larger political contexts. In a way, it is not too far-fetched to think of international development as a new social agenda debating the role of the peasant in the contemporary global order. If that is the case, rural development is not exclusively a cultural, or economic problem. It is also a political one. The problem of participation and collective action is not mainly or exclusively explained by cognitive determinants. It is also an issue of rural social organization and its interaction with the larger social order, as Wolf would say. As a result, in order to generate models of social and economic change that can have some degree of explanatory universality, the politics of rural livelihoods need to be explored. The goal of this dissertation is to provide an avenue in this direction.

**Organization as Category of Study**

Before moving on to contextualize the problem of social capital in rural Ecuador, it is important to define the term organization. I define organization as a group of actors with common interests and with explicit goals they wish to achieve. Its members gather and discuss in person their interests, usually at scheduled meetings. Soccer clubs, fiesta committees, irrigation associations, and savings and loans cooperatives, are all examples of associations. For analytical purposes, the literature divides them in formal and informal types. Formal associations are those with explicit, usually written rules that give their members rights and obligations they pledge to follow. They have elected officers, regular, scheduled meetings, and a system of enforcement of
regulations. Informal associations on the other hand, may not have written rules, and their leaders may not be elected by vote; the rights and obligations of its members are decided verbally or are implicit in its historical tradition. In Limoncito this was the case for some of the barrio committees organizing the annual religious fiestas. The formal associations analyzed here deal with issues of local and national governance, government services, health, economic development, and natural resource management. The data on organizations in this study concentrates on organizations with economic development and agricultural production goals. All of them are formal associations.

Social Capital and the Privatization of Rural Development

In order to understand the rapid rise of social capital in economic development, I find it useful to put it in the context of actual development projects. In Ecuadorian rural development policy, for example, structural economic reform is no longer considered a viable strategy to alleviate poverty. Land reform, arguably the most contentious example of structural reform, has no place in current conceptualizations of social and economic change (North and Cameron 2003) neither in Ecuador nor in much of the developing world. Development, in fact, has turned towards the privatization of social services (Bretón Solo de Saldivar 2002; Martinez Valle 2002), meaning efficient institutional performance, including healthy financial standards make it necessary to tackle poverty alleviation by building (Uquillas and Van Nieuwkoop 2006: 160) coalitions between national governments and the non-governmental sector, in many cases financed by international development institutions like the World Bank.

This chapter reviews three experiences of development in Ecuador and concludes with a theoretical commentary on indigenous movements in Ecuador and its relationship to development policy. The first example deals with the response of indigenous groups to the Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project -PRODEPINE. The second
example is a critique of the National Development Program –PRONADER. The third discusses the problem of thinking of indigenous organizations as successful examples of social capital.

**PRODEPINE and Ethnodevelopment**

The Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian Peoples Development Project (PRODEPINE 1998-2003), was the first operation funded by the World Bank that focused exclusively on indigenous peoples and other Ecuadorian ethnic minorities. According to a recent historical review, two issues are salient. First, from its conception, government intervention was designed, and successfully kept at a minimum, secondly, indigenous federations were involved in applying “a vision of “development with identity”, or “ethnodevelopment” (Uquillas and Van Niuewkoop 2006:145). A form of development that builds on the “positive qualities of indigenous cultures and societies -such as their sense of identity, close attachment to ancestral land, and capacity to mobilize labor, capital, and other resources for the attainment of shared goals… it is an effort to build social capital for the poor” (2006: 146). PRODEPINE belongs to what are called “second generation reforms” (North 2003: 18), an approach that attempts to distance itself from perceived structural adjustment practices and where social capital plays a pivotal conceptual role.

In 2003, the National Council of Ecuador’s Indigenous Peoples (Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador -CONAIE), the most influential indigenous political organization in Ecuador, and one of the main designers of the project declined an offer to have PRODEPINE renewed for a second phase. A review of project publish in an edited volume on social capital of the World Bank, Uquillas and Van Niuewkoop (2006: 145) point out in an endnote, that, “the enabling conditions for a successful project …where no longer present, among other things, the coalition of indigenous organizations had dissolved (a large coalition of indigenous federations which included CONAIE), increasing oil revenues apparently made an external loan for indigenous development less critical (shifting national government priorities),
and CONAIE’s leadership had radicalized its stand and decided to oppose the project” (parenthesis added). Although the authors of the review provided a detailed history of the institutional negotiations leading to the establishment of PRODEPINE, there is no mention, other than the endnote quoted above, of the politics that led to its ending, which seems as important for understanding how social capital works as the way the project was conceived. My point is that this is common in the literature on social capital published by the World Bank, there is very rarely mention of political conflict. There are no explanations for failure because that would imply to talk about national politics, which The Bank is not suppose to interfere with.

An editorial in the Indigenous Sciences and Cultures Institute (ICCI in Spanish) Bulletin (2002), (an organization associated with CONAIE), offers an explanation for the refusal of CONAIE to continue working with PRODEPINE. First, a number of indigenous groups felt the World Bank was using the project as a springboard to promote a neoliberal economic approach to rural development, namely, advancing the deregularization, liberalization, and privatization of rural economic activities. Secondly, while the discourse of the project was based on the management of development from the inside and from the indigenous community up, indigenous peoples had no say in its theoretical and epistemological foundations, therefore, no challenge could be made to its neoliberal foundations.

Finally, the editorial notices that the indigenous leadership associated with PRODEPINE never offered any political, humanitarian, or symbolic support to those who were actively involved in advancing indigenous causes in the difficult period between 1998 and 2001. “Neither was it involved in the local elections, nor has it supported local authorities that the Indigenous movement won. It did not support the February 2001 uprising or even the ensuing dialogues between the Movement and the government. On the contrary, from 1998 the project has been a
point of conflict that impeded strategic unity between the main national indigenous organizations until February 2001” (ICCI 2002).

The editorial claims that the project had installed a new kind of clientelistic politics in the heart of the Ecuadorian indigenous movement. This conclusion resonates with my findings in Limoncito (chapter 3), as well as with the study of second degree organizations advanced by Bretón discussed below. Clientelism in this context means that many of the technical experts of the project, the agronomists, accountants, and microfinance specialists of PRODEPINE were indigenous actors, many of them were local leaders which ended up establishing clientelistic favors and alliances among local communities, second degree organizations, representatives of the national ministries involved in the project, and perhaps World Bank representatives. This does not mean that indigenous leaders were co-opted or duped. It means that they decided to strategically enter a political process. In which both personal benefit and collective goals played a part in their decision to participate in PRODEPINE.

**PRONADER and Macroeconomic Context**

The second example I provide comes from the National Development Program – PRONADER (1993-2000) “the last of the grand agrarian projects of standardized design in Ecuador”. PRONADER failed to meet the majority of its goals, Luciano Martínez Valle believes this was the result of a conceptually flawed agrarian reform oblivious to the need to redistribute resources more equitably. PRONADER is closely related to the Agrarian Development Law of 1994, which effectively ended land redistribution in Ecuador, and to a considerable degree closed campesinos’ access to other essential agrarian assets, such as credit, marketing support, and technical assistance (Martínez Valle 2003).

Not surprisingly, the narrative thread that unites PRONADER and PRODEPINE in this chapter is the origin of its funding, the World Bank (North 2003:14; Martínez 2003). From that
perspective, CONAIE’s “radical position” towards PRODEPINE (see above) makes sense. Throughout the nineties, the experience of Ecuadorian small-scale producers was one of receding support through the dismantling of agrarian institutions, while at the same time, generous incentives were offered to large exporters of bananas and flowers.

PRONADER, at the end, incurred in the mistakes of large-scale rural development projects: minimal or no attention to its own background studies on feasibility; complete disregard for heterogeneity in rural economic strategies by groups and regions; and disregard for local micro-enterprises, while at the same time imposing micro-business strategies that disregarded local markets needs (2003: 141). Finally, PRONADER was intended to fit very diverse geographical regions: the northern Andes, the southern Andes, and the dry and tropical coast. In general terms, the program failed to improve peasant livelihoods in the projected areas, including income and employment generation (2003b: 98). This despite the fact that the regions targeted were chosen because their viability to adapt to the new macroeconomic policies. On that note, I emphasize one last point of Martinez’s analysis: the project itself was meant to favor larger commercial producers; therefore, the rice growing regions of the Guayas basin saw family incomes raise moderately, while indigenous areas of the Andes, where the poorest populations live, saw their per capita income drop in the period when the project was under operation (2003:136).

Second Degree Organizations and the Perils of Social Capital

Martínez is also interested in the role of social capital in cementing organizational capacity and sees potential in it to avoid the problems of PRONADER (1997; 2003). Martínez focuses on the formation of second degree organizations (SDOs). Indigenous SDOs are prominent development institutions in the Ecuadorian Andes (Carroll and Bebbington 2002). In recent years they have also become favored recipients of aid by international donors. SDOs are entities that
group local associations and institutions -such as village governments, cooperatives, and NGOs- under an umbrella organization where common economic, social, and political goals are put forward. The idea behind the formation of SDOs is that they are uniquely position to advance local demands at the national level while still being close to its bases. SDOs, in that sense, articulate, from the bottom-up, three levels of social life: the household, the village, and the region. SDOs are considered an important example of structural social capital (Bebbington and Carroll 2002), meaning they go beyond communitarian values to produce organizational norms, codes, and structures that can advance specific economic, social, and political agendas.

Social capital as a process that can potentially strengthen institutions and organizations and link bases to national policies and markets seems appealing to the development solutions seek by Martinez, nonetheless, he himself warns us of the dangers of applying social capital ideological constructions to indigenous and peasant societies “where supposedly there is great potential for it, as there is fertile ground for the practice of relations of reciprocity, cooperation and solidarity” (my translation) (2003: 149). He takes the example of the SDO Tucayta in the Province of Cañar, in the southern Ecuadorian Andes. He sets out to test the idea that SDOs represent the accumulation of social capital -meaning in this case sustainable organizational capacity- by local groups, associations, and village governments. A thesis, he tells us, relies in a neat bottom-up approach of organizational practice and which tends to ignore the economic and social dynamics of each level of interaction (2003: 149).

In fact, Martinez tells us “the larger communities associated with TUCAYTA are in a straightforward process of internal disruption” (2003: 153). Among the causes he observes are: divisions over access to land, irrigation, and water; absent local government officials unable to carry-out their duties as they do not reside in their villages; and an economic context that is not
favorable to maintain reciprocal ties in labor due to migration or transition to mercantile activities. These features of rural communities lend reason to believe that the SDOs do not democratically represent the needs of the bases. Nor that the presence of organizations means a strong organizational culture. The theoretical construction of the SDO as the equitable accumulation of community demands properly channeled through its local government and associations comes into doubt when seen through the lens of its political economy. Society and economy are being transformed in such a way that the idea of the small indigenous community as naturally endowed with reciprocal ties and cooperation in economic and political activities is simplistic. People in small communities do have strong ties of cooperation nonetheless; these are negotiated and transformed by out-migration, wage labor in agribusiness, and increasing social stratification, in part accelerated by national rural economic policies.

**Neoindigenismo and Etnofagia**

Another way to look at the issue of SDOs politics comes from Víctor Bretón Solo de Saldivar’s analysis of the relationship between SDOs and NGOs in the Ecuadorian Andes. Bretón’s study (2002) shows three interesting points. First, NGOs concentrate in municipalities with high numbers of SDOs. Secondly, poverty does not seem to be the variable guiding the establishment of NGOs in a region, poverty indicators are as high in places with high numbers of NGOs and SDOs as in those without them. They both operate in very specific regions, even though there are other places where poverty is as high. Since there is no correlation between poverty indicators and the places NGOs’ and SDOs operate, what seems to guide the establishment of NGOs is the presence or absence of indigenous populations regardless of need. Bretón labels this trend as *neo-indigenismo* and *etnofagia* (2002: 55). The former a current version of past attempts to assimilate the indigenous into the larger society, this time with the added notion that multiculturalism does not have to be in opposition to the logic of neoliberal,
capitalist accumulation (2002: 55). The latter because indigenous actors are involved in the negotiation and execution of many aspects of development programs, which eventually leads to complex clientelistic relationships as those pointed out by CONAIE in the PRODEPINE project.

The ethnographic data I present in the next chapters supports certain aspects of Bretón’s analysis. Two of his observations in particular reverberate with this study. First, that SDOs compete with other SDOs to maintain and increase their clients. The end result is the formation of leadership elites that compete for resources; in particular funds coming from financiers. Second, development is converting many SDOs in what he calls “verdaderos cacicazgos de nuevo cuño” (true political bosses of a new mint) (2002: 54). Leaders have become the new administrators of resources and projects emanating from donors. “As it is natural, distribution is not equal, it obeys to clientelistic logics… today, those with the most possibilities to access administrative positions are those better trained to communicate with external agents, using the prestige derived from their capabilities to attract resources for their bases, with whom they end up consolidating a complex web of favors made in exchange of future support” (2003: 245) (my translation). As we will see, this is similar to what I observed in the coast of Ecuador, with the difference that there was very limited NGO and SDO assistance.

**Theoretical Synthesis: Approaches to Indigenous Movements**

The political and organizational histories offered above provide a rich context in which to contribute to explanations about the reasons why people organize, a topic usually debated in the social movements literature. In this section, I offer a brief review of social movements theory by focusing on two theoretical paradigms commonly used, new-social-movements (NSM) and traditional Marxist theories. New-social-movements (NSM) scholars claim that people create a sense of identity and solidarity based on shared experiences, sometimes in opposition to dominant forces. Through a process in which people give meaning to their own condition, they
articulate political responses to inequality or oppression (Alvarez et al. 1998). NSM, in other words, has an emphasis on meaning, affect, and cultural content as mechanisms that generate group identity, which transcend economistic explanations based on class. Indigenous movements are usually cited in support of this thesis, as they bring together people of different classes and in some cases different ethnic backgrounds.

A traditional Marxist view of social movements is mainly concerned with internal class differences within ethnic groups, for example large coalitions of indigenous movements, such as in Ecuador. Marxist scholars ask questions such as “On whose behalf is resistance exercised? For whom, and what for, do indigenous people fight?” (Brass 2002). In the course of class formation and its accompanying struggle, Marxists scholars believe that groups tend to differentiate, and that this differentiation, understood mainly through how people organize their labor and the value extracted from it, better explains the reasons behind people’s demands. In addition, as rural (and indigenous) communities become more stratified in the course of history, their political demands also become antagonistic, even if the discourse of resistance does not reflect it. The debate in social movements arises when researchers, out of explanatory necessity choose to give priority to certain variables, for example, subordinating ethnic identity to class identity (Petras and Veltmeyer in Otero and Jugenitz 2003). However, the same way that class conflict can exist within ethnic groups, ethnic conflict arises within classes (Otero and Jugenitz 2003).

The Movement

Ecuadorian social movements showcase the interplay between ethnicity and class. Throughout the 1990s, the indigenous movement in Ecuador showed its strength with a series of massive mobilizations that paralyzed the country and reinserted indigenous politics in national politics. Of these contemporary, national uprisings, the initial 1990 movement is considered by some scholars, including Amalia Pallares (2002) as the definite transition form campesinismo to
indianismo, a panethnic movement based on a common identification as Indians, rather than campesinos. According to Pallares, the Ecuadorian left, while sharing demands over land and material conditions with indigenous populations, was unwilling to incorporate issues of political autonomy, discrimination, and cultural revival in their agendas, therefore, it lead indigenous groups to separate and establish their own organizations. Not only was the left unable to fit the indigenous livelihood strategies within a Marxist class struggle scheme, their very practices and discourse were embedded in the racial subordination of Indians, the heart of the claims of indigenous groups. While unable to build a broad, popular coalition, the Indian movement did integrate material concerns traditionally associated with class struggles, but reflecting specific cultural demands, land tenure issues for example, were intertwined with notions of territorial autonomy, while capitalism was linked to ethnocide and assimilation (2002: 182).

At this point I want to link Pallares explanation of how a pan-ethnic movement is created with the issue of development as exemplified by Bretón and Martínez. By doing so I argue that development triggers differentiation among participants of social movements. Some CONAIE members, for example, believe that the purpose of PRODEPINE and other development programs at this juncture in Ecuador’s political history is to weaken CONAIE by breeding internal fights over financial resources:

When the Indians emerged in the 90s, the development projects also began. The development NGO's are terrified at heart of the movement in the province of Chimborazo, where Leonida Proaño had worked — the Ecuadorian force behind liberation theology. Ten years later, that province has been politically destroyed. Chimborazo was a nucleus of indigenous resistance during the 90s and became the object of a political intervention of cooperation projects that transformed the indigenous people into the economically poor. Cooperation for development projects break up solidarity and breed rivalry between communities by creating second-degree organizations that fight over available resources. (Zibechi 2006).

Victor Bretón is also suspicious of the timing of PRODEPINE’s conception in 1995 “a year after the 1994 Indigenous uprising in Ecuador shook up the foundations of the Ecuadorian state and
way up north, Maya Indians took arms against the Mexican state” (2002: 56). The economic model was openly resisted by Indigenous populations “and it was in that precise moment that the planners of development turn their interest towards organizational strengthening as a strategy in the fight against poverty, and on its way, as an in direct path to co-opt and limit the reach of the new social movements (2002: 56).

As a way of conclusion I would like to make two points. First, I believe Indigenous and non-indigenous rural actors enter development programs fully aware that projects are politically charged, meaning they know that a project is immersed in the politics of funding, execution, and international development agendas. Some participate in them either as executers or as recipients, and many times as both; in all cases, they have diverse goals in mind. Some of them involve personal gain, some include the good of the collective, most of the time both are intertwined. Secondly, today, in Ecuador, Indigenous organizers and activists of the movement occupy Congressional seats and other national government positions; concurrently, the Ecuadorian state has incorporated in its economic and cultural rights discourse class-based and indigenous demands formerly associated with the disenfranchised. One is left to wonder how discourse and praxis will meet in development policy in Ecuador.

In the next chapters I present data to contribute to further test the above theoretical points. The case study I present comes from the Ecuadorian coast, a region considerably different in its political demands and organizational experiences from the Andean region. In the description and analysis that follow I hope to contribute to our understanding of how politics at different scales of analysis influence development at the community level.

5 Bretón himself makes a similar point in the article cited (2003).

6 Rafael Correa became President of Ecuador in 2007 under a political platform labeled socialist as it makes continuous reference to the need to redistribute wealth in the country.
CHAPTER 2
THE SETTING

Research leading to this dissertation was carried out in the Comuna Limoncito. Located in the north-central part of the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE), comuneros in Limoncito, and this part of the peninsula in general, define themselves as *campesinos* and *Comuneros*: people who work the land and who own it collectively. While the ideological side of Comunero culture provides a unified identity in which live people ideally live-off the land, the economic context of Limoncito points to a community highly embedded in the national, capitalist economy of Ecuador. Located 3 hours by bus from Guayaquil, and hour from the commercial port of La Libertad (see figure 1), Comunero households commonly complement their income through wage labor. Factory work, usually in fish processing plants, or temporary jobs in a variety of economic activities like construction, shrimp farming, and house keeping in the region provide much needed funds to survive and when possible funnel to agriculture.

Small-scale agriculture survives in Limoncito because it is supported by multiple sources of wage labor. Comunero agriculture, therefore, lives in a contradictory relationship with the surrounding market economy. It depends on wages for its survival, yet it is also threaten by it. In other words, agriculture serves as a symbol of Comunero identity and independence in the face is continuous pressures exerted by national economic policies to stop supporting small-scale agriculture. An example of this is a new line of micro-business credit offered to Comuneros in the PSE by the National Agricultural Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento). A Comunero who attended the meeting in a neighboring Comuna would later tell me that Bank representatives did

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7 I do not make an argument on whether Comuneros are in a process of becoming proletarians or whether they are still in control of the means of production for opposing sides of the issue see Warman 1982; Bartra 1983.
not say agricultural credit is unavailable, but they certainly made it sound that business oriented credit was easier to get (Hurtado 2004 personal communication).

Agriculture exists in a delicate balance between environment and economy in the PSE. The region is composed of several micro-climates operating within a larger semi-arid environment that has, historically, offered very challenging conditions to make a living. Environment, economy, and politics relate to each other in a complex relationship in the PSE; for even though Comuneros in Limoncito have plenty of land, they depend on irregular rainy seasons. At the same time, their lands lie on the path of a newly constructed network of irrigation canals, which in the case of Limoncito do not carry water due to extended draught since it was opened in 2005. The issue of the irrigation canals will provide an entry point to the politics of rural development in Limoncito in the following chapter. In this chapter I provide an introduction to the ecology, history, and social dynamics of Algarrobos- Tres Mangos and the PSE in general.

**Geography**

The Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE) is located in the southern end of the Ecuadorian coast. To the north, it borders the Province of Manabí, to the south, it follows the contour of the Gulf of Guayaquil (see figure 2.1). The PSE has an extension of 6050 Km² (605,000 ha) and is characterized by a tropical, semi-arid climate with low precipitation. The rainy season runs from December to May, draughts are common, sometimes followed by torrential rains associated with El Niño phenomenon. The vegetation of the PSE is a mixture of tropical dry forest, and closer to higher elevations, in the northwest, wet forest. Limoncito itself is characterized by dry-forest, mostly populated with mesquite trees, a leguminous spiny tree, very resistant to drought called *algarrobo*. On the northern edge of Limoncito begins the transition to the higher elevation ad more humid forests of the Cordillera Chongón Colonche, although these lie outside its boundaries.
The cordillera Chongón-Colonche has played a central role in the ecology of the PSE and in the diversity of resources available to its inhabitants. The cordillera runs from the northwest coast of the PSE, on the border between the provinces of Manabí and Guayas to the southeast near Guayaquil, where in some places its peaks reach 800 m, providing a variety of soils, flora, and fauna that have played a critical role in the diversified subsistence strategies of inhabitants since pre-Colombian times (Alvarez 1999).

Today, the southern half of the PSE is heavily deforested, particularly the slopes that open up to the valleys in the southeast. In general, the region is very unstable due to the extreme oscillations between dry and wet seasons, which have historically demanded from its inhabitants a diverse use of micro-climates. As Alvarez points out (1999), even before the considerable human changes effected on the Peninsula in the 20th century, colonial sources described the need
to complement extractive activities in relation to rains and vegetation zones. Since colonial times, the PSE seems to have been characterized by droughts of unknown duration, followed, sometimes by floods. Fishing, hunting, gathering, short and long cycle agriculture, and cattle raising were traditionally practiced by households in order to make a living in an unpredictable environment. Today, many households still engage in agriculture, hunting, gathering, gardening, and fishing depending on location. Wage labor, as I mentioned previously, is crucial to the survival of the household. An important point made by Alvarez is that today, the articulation of short cycle agriculture in the lower areas with long cycle in the higher zones has been severed as the temperate conditions of the mountain have been altered due to deforestation and the ensuing run-off of rain waters (1999:72). Expanding on this observation, next, I offered an overview of the environmental and political dimensions of water use in the PSE.

**Water Management in the PSE**

The enumeration of bio-physical conditions in the PSE is not a mere descriptive formality in this dissertation. The very social organization, and as a result the organizational practices of Comuneros has been drastically affected by national government attempts to change the ecology of the region. In 1999, the need to ameliorate the consequences of El Niño, along with plans to improve the agricultural production in the PSE resulted in the construction of a large irrigation infrastructure project called Hydraulic Project Santa Elena Aqueduct (PHASE - Proyecto Hidráulico Acueducto Santa Elena). The project called for a network of irrigation canals potentially benefiting over 40,000 ha of agricultural lands. The nature of the design represents an ambitious challenge to the hydrology and the climatic conditions of the region and defies the highly variable nature of water availability. Technically speaking, one study has already shown widespread economic and technical inefficiencies in the use and cost of agricultural production (Cornejo 2003).
Socially, the project ignores the economic and social costs to those whose lands were on the path of the canals. In 1989 it was calculated that 80% percent of the potentially irrigated lands were lands under the possession of Comunas in community owned lands managed by Comuna members. PHASE will become central to the analysis of the economic and social organization of Comuna Limoncito. It is a clear example of the interrelated nature of macroeconomic decisions at the highest levels of government and local social, political, and economic practices.

**History of the PSE**

Colonial times in the peninsula reflect the particular ways in which different human groups meet the challenge of making a living under environmental and political stress. During most of its colonial life, PSE was considered a region not only environmentally unfriendly but also politically peripheral. The main point of this brief review is to provide a background to understand current social and economic conditions in the peninsula. Secondly, to show that the limited economic gains permitted by the local biophysical conditions created different economic and political relationships as compared to those in the Andean region. The hacienda system of social relations of the Ecuadorian *Sierra* did not take place in colonial Guayas, including the PSE.

Following the establishment of Portoviejo in 1534, Santiago de Guayaquil was founded in 1536 and reestablished by Francisco de Orellana in 1537 after its destruction in the hands of Indigenous inhabitants. An important point to keep in mind is that the colonial record for the *Corregimiento de Guayaquil*, and later *Gobernación de Guayaquil* (from 1793 onwards) is limited in comparison with that of the Andean region of the *Real Audiencia de Quito*. As Alvarez (1999) points out, there are considerable gaps in our knowledge of labor, relocation, and taxation of indigenous peoples in the coast. It is only in the 18th century that records become more
available. Nonetheless, we know that by 1677 only two encomiendas -owned by rich Guayaquil families- survive in Manabí (1999:186). This undoubtedly has to do with the fact that the Corregimiento of Guayaquil was considered by most Spaniards an isolated and inhospitable environment, prone to tropical diseases and unsuitable to produce basic sustenance for the Spanish way of life; wool, wheat, and grapes did not grow in this region. In addition, extracting labor might have been problematic, the province was large in extension and had a smaller Indian population than the Sierra. In addition to the environmental and economic constraints, the Crown’s primary concern in the Corregimiento de Guayaquil was the protection of sea trading routes, centered on the port of Portoviejo, now part of the Province of Esmeraldas, and north of Manabí. The harsh and unpredictable environment of the PSE proved difficult for both encomenderos (Spanish grantees of land and Indian labor) and authorities to manage it.

Reducciones and Economic Activities

In her exhaustive review of colonial history of the PSE, Alvarez (1999) tells us that there is no record on the establishment of reducciones in the PSE. Reducciones in colonial Latin America refer to the allotment of Indians and the lands they were confined to in order to provide encomenderos with labor. Similarly, we do not know how native populations reacted to this new political geography in the early decades. Nonetheless, by the late 16th century, the indigenous populations of the PSE, referred to as Guancavelicas or Huancavilcas, had been relocated to reducciones where they produced the highly valued pardo or chiao cotton, which they used to pay taxes, and which was highly valued in the Sierra until mass production of wool cloth was introduced. Salt and cattle production and commerce became important indigenous activities early in the colony generating important surpluses among certain sectors of Huancavelicas in the

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8 Most of the information that follows comes from Alvarez’s work and from sources she cites.
region. Colonial sources, for example, stress the wealth amassed by the cacique of the Island of Puna in the Guayas river delta, most of it coming from salt mines and cattle. Records also describe the Guancavelica Indians around Chanduy in the southern part of the PSE as growing considerable quantities of cattle, eventually leading the groups to expand their grazing grounds beyond their reducción lands. It is interesting that cattle raising was identified in the region as an indigenous activity, one in which Indian caciques had the authority to enforce and provide branding irons on behalf of the Crown.

From the middle of the 18th century and well into the 19th century Huancavilcas would take advantage of royal decrees to purchase lands beyond their reducciones, solidifying their rights to land and subsistence. As Alvarez points out, this comes in clear contrast to the economic and political conditions of the Andes, where indigenous groups would have to wait until the agrarian reform of the 1960s and 70s to acquire productive lands. I find it important to point out that the economic strength of indigenous enterprises was to a certain degree associated with the fact that the PSE was a large region with very a low population density, and therefore, little taxation revenue for the crown. Indigenous groups were able to retain control of lands because they were producing highly demanded products (in highly unstable ecological conditions), in particular cotton, which in turn allowed them to compete in the cattle and salt businesses. A look at the proportion of inhabitants by region for the Real Audiencia de Quito further strengthens the idea of the unique situation faced by colonizers and Indian groups in the coast. In 1780, the Sierra region had 90 percent of all inhabitants of the Audiencia, followed by the coast region with 7.4 percent; and in third place the Amazon region with 2.6 percent. As further reference, in Santa Elena, the parroquia where this research took place, “the number of Indians increased from 1,281 in 1765 to 4,052 in 1814” (Alvarez 1999). This dramatic change was in part fueled by the
expansion in production of cacao in the late 1700s. Nonetheless, the PSE proper, including Chanduy and Santa Elena were not cacao plantation regions.

A few decades previous to independence, another significant economic factor in the transformation of social life in the PSE was the introduction of cacao and tobacco plantations in the now Province of Manabí and in the Guayas river basin. The Bourbon reforms allowed exporting cacao by 1774 to other regions of the New Spain and Spain. The spectacular population growth and migration from *sierra* to *costa* of laborers and entrepreneurs had an impact on the fragile balance of natural resource exploitation in the arid lands of the PSE.

**The Republic**

While Huancavelca groups found a number of environmental and political junctures to negotiate their territorial and economic independence during the colony, “the laws of the republic generated one of the worst threats to the territorial, political, and productive autonomy so far achieved” points out Alvarez (1999: 262). After independence from Spain was declared in Guayaquil in 1820 (1809 in Quito) the 19th century seems to be characterized by indigenous communities resisting state demands to transform tenure rights from royal and local legislative forms to individual-like ownership enforced by municipal and national government authorities. Communal land was abolished and the authority of indigenous cabildos was bypassed by municipal councils. “Unused” lands became property of municipalities with landowners expected to register their lands with municipal offices in order to protect their rights.

While the Bourbon reforms brought a period of crisis in which Indigenous populations took advantage to consolidate their autonomy and territory, the Republic was characterized by heavy subjugation (or homogenization) of its members, all masked under principles of citizenship, progress, and equality (Alvarez 1999). The result was a growing number of invasions in the indigenous territories of the PSE and limited institutional avenues to contest them.
Recent Economic Changes

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Guayaquil had become the economic center of Ecuador. Its prominence as a port, in addition to the agricultural vitality of the Guayas river basin and neighboring Manabí province made it possible. It is under this great economic expansion that further land loss among indigenous communities occurred in the PSE. Political and economic pressures over land rights, tenure, and fluctuating environmental conditions led some indigenous inhabitants to migrate to urban centers or to incorporate trades to their subsistence. In addition, the beginning of oil production in 1911 in the PSE represented further challenges to indigenous territorial integrity and subsistence. Proletarianization was perhaps unavoidable for many as the following two decades saw the financial crisis of 1930 and the collapse of the cacao industry.

The Law of Cooperatives and the Law for the Organization and Regime of Comunas were born in 1937 in the midst of the political and economic crisis of the 1930s. In a governmental climate that revolved around military dictatorships of varied approaches to social justice, some of them sympathetic to workers’ rights, others opposed to it, Marxist ideologies and workers unions also became important political actors (Alvarez 1999). In the midst of capitalist expansion, exemplified by the banana boom, the establishment of the Law of Comunas helped preserve the territories of indigenous communities throughout Ecuador, as well as the PSE. Nonetheless, as Striffler (2000) points out, it also forced them to adopt specific governmental and administrative procedures and practices, whose ultimate consequence was the subordination of the Comuna and the old Indigenous Cabildo to the prerogatives of the national government. Elections in a Comuna are a clear example of this. The selection of local government officials (the Cabildo) is supervised by representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Political Lieutenant (Teniente Político) of the parroquia. They validate the election. In addition, in the weeks
previous to the election, the representative from the Ministry corroborates that the list of
members of the Comuna held by the Cabildo matches the one at the Ministry. In Limoncito, they
have not matched for years, generating considerable conflict, as we will see in the next chapter.

**Political Geography**

The PSE lies within the political boundaries of two provinces, the Province of Guayas, and
the newly created Province of Santa Elena. The municipalities or cantones of Guayaquil and
Playas are part of the former. Salinas, Libertad, and Santa Elena are part of the later. Cantones
are in turn made up of parroquias which agglutinate barrios, comunas, and pueblos. The
Guayaquil and Playas cantones cover the eastern most parroquias of the Peninsula, such as
Chongón and Posorja, the latter, an important center for fish processing and canning which
provides an important source of wage employment to communities throughout the PSE. Cantón
Salinas and its government seat, the City of Salinas, is a popular tourist destination for Guayaquil
families of all social classes. Canton La Libertad hosts the bulk of the commercial activity of the
region. It acts as a central market for most settlements in the PSE. An oil refinery is also located
here, making it the most economically dynamic region east of Guayaquil. Canton La Libertad is
confined to La Libertad’s urban area, its population is 77,000.

This study takes place in the Parroquia Colonche in Cantón Santa Elena. Overwhelmingly
rural in character, Santa Elena contains 121 settlements, including its municipal seat Santa Elena.
It is divided in 5 rural parroquias: Atahualpa, Chanduy, Manglaralto, Simón Bolívar (also known
as Julio Moreno), and the aforementioned Colonche where Limoncito is located. The PSE is
home to 80 Comunas. Comunas, as previously mentioned, are political units organized under the
Law of Comunas of 1937 sanctioned by the national government through the Ministry of
Agriculture. They are characterized by a communal land tenure system, meaning its members
hold possession to individual parcels of land, but they do not have title to them. Decisions
regarding land use are decided by vote by its members in general or extraordinary assemblies. Comunas are made up of one or several small pueblos or barrios, in addition to individual parcels and communal territories.

**Limoncito**

Limoncito is divided in eight settlements called *recintos*: Algarrobos, Tres Mangos, Huancavilca, San Sebastián, Loma Alta, El Ceibo, Las Palmas I, and Las Palmas II (see figure 2.2). The first two are the most populated and comprise the political center of the Comuna. Individuals and families from these two settlements have been historically prominent in local government and leadership roles. Huancavilca is the oldest settlement, it predates all others in the Comuna but it is not as politically or economically influential. Huancavilca does hold the oldest patron-saint fiesta in the Comuna which attracts people from all neighboring towns. San Sebastián is geared towards small commercial activities; it faces the paved road that connects the main coastal highway with northern Colonche, ending in neighboring Comuna Manantial, the transportation hub and commercial center of the region.

All the settlements predate the formal reestablishment of the Comuna in 1971. On this date, the Comuna confirmed its legal status with the national government in order to avoid its possible disintegration. This move had two significant effects. First, it protected the communal land tenure system in the face of threats of land expropriation. Secondly, it transformed a system of social relations from extended family compounds gathered in villages who took autonomous decisions about land management and production to a centralized political system with elected officers. This new central government, in turn, made the Comuna fully integrated into the policies of the national government. As I discuss in the next chapter, this change had considerable effects in issues of participation and collective action.
Economy and Society in Limoncito

Limoncito, like most of the surrounding communities in Santa Elena can be defined as a highly articulated peasant economy. While most people, in particular men, identify themselves as agricultural producers, Limoncito is connected to urban and corporate-capitalist sources of income for its survival. It is an economy that continually struggles to preserve a commercially viable agricultural production, and where the vast majority of families are dependent upon rain and credit to buy inputs. As I mentioned previously, agriculture is not only a highly unreliable as a source of income, it is in fact subsidized by wage labor and depends on various sources of
income to subsist. In one agricultural cycle, the vast majority of households in Limoncito are involved in the following activities: agriculture, husbandry, gardening, hunting, gathering, lumbering, charcoal making (in cases of extreme need), small retail, short term municipal employment, wage work in urban cities, and wage work in the fishing industry.

Wage work is in fact fundamental to the well-being of the Comunero family and agriculture as an activity. As Feliciano Mendez said of the 2004-2005 growing season: “It hasn’t rained a bit. If this goes on people are going to have to leave to find work somewhere. A bunch of people are already gone since last year, because they know it’s not going to rain again” (2005). To engage in agriculture, a complex network of economic and social support has to be in place. Having one or two unmarried sons or daughters working in fish plants or in Guayaquil as housekeepers to contribute to household expenditure is not enough for families in the late stages of their life cycle to invest in agriculture. That is the case of the Rio family. Augusto and Juanita have six children. The five boys range from ages 3 to 15. The girl, Lidia, is 17. Lidia went to work in the fish processing plant in Monteverde (30 minutes by bus from Tres Mangos) for the first time soon after she turned that age. She provides the only stable source of income in the household. Roberto, her father, is the local municipal health brigade representative making approximately 40 dollars a month. A job that does not last the entire year, and that rotates among several local residents every year. Lidia leaves her house at 5am and returns between 6 and 10pm, Monday through Friday, depending on the size of the catch delivered to the plant on that day or week. She makes 120 dollars a month, no extra time paid.

At some point, Lidia had to stay at home, for a month, unpaid, as tuna capture dropped and processing came almost to a complete stop at the plant. Juanita stays at home and takes care of the kids, household chores, the garden, and school and community functions. Until to 2003,
Roberto and Joaquin, the oldest of his boys, joined Roberto’s father, mother, his two brothers, their wives and her sister, along with four of Joaquin’s cousins to plant corn in Roberto’s father parcel (approximately 4 hectares), sometimes they also planted a small extension of pumpkin, yuca, beans, and occasionally chili peppers and peanuts. All this is dependent on rain, for even if they had a water pump to irrigate by gravity (with acequias), the source of water is the river, which is dry unless the rainy season is favorable.

At the end of a successful growing season, the family decides how much to sell and to keep for consumption. Roberto cannot engage in agriculture by himself, growing maize requires a minimum of inputs like pesticides and sometimes herbicides, in addition to labor. The Rio family as a whole can do it because Roberto’s sister and one of his sisters-in-law work in the fish plant. The other sister-in-law works for the NGO operating in the area, and his brothers hold a series of temporary jobs, including fish processing, refereeing in soccer tournaments, and selling chicken meat and ducks. Roberto is in fact the only of the four siblings of the Rio family with young children. The others have teenagers, most of who have dropped out of junior high-school, reducing household expenditure and adding sources of income to it.

In conclusion, families at later stages of their life cycle (particularly with no educational expenses) are more likely to engage in agriculture. Not only for traditional cultigens like maize but also cash crops. Cash crops, like watermelon or tomatoes, impose considerable financial strains on households, mainly because growers depend on market conditions at the time of harvest to sell. The case of watermelon producers is an interesting one in that they do not receive credit from the government, and have not received credit from the NGO in at least 3 years. They receive inputs on credit from commercial stores and loans from middlemen, yet they always need to have cash to pay for labor. Watermelon growers not only have an extensive
family support network who earns wages. Their kin is also usually involved in larger retail
commerce and have a network of commercial relations that go well beyond the village, many
times reaching middle-men coming from cities in the Sierra.

**Making a Living from a Historical Perspective**

In the same way that rains, agriculture and wage work are interrelated we can also say that
local social organization is isomorphic with the environment and larger corporate-capitalist
economic interests. Life in the Comuna cannot be understood apart from the dynamic
relationship between natural environment and the national market economy, as Miguel Hurtado,
former cabildo officer pointed out to me:

> When we were kids we used to go to pick cotton up in Manabí. Sometimes the entire
family would go for weeks at a time. We were ranch hands and people from all over the
region would go to the *fincas* [to live there] and work during the harvest season… We
thought that would never end, but it did. Before that, my dad told us that this whole region
had very large tomato farms. There was a market for that. They also thought that would
never end, and nonetheless, it was over too….Right before the shrimp farms were created,
all the people, in the entire peninsula, and further north, used to camp on the beach during
the shrimp larvae harvest season. We would stay there on weekends or during the week to
catch larvae to sell to the buyers that would sell it to the laboratories. We had to do it at
night, on the water, it required some skill, but on good days we could sell entire jars filled
with larvae. It was a very good source of money during those months, and what fun we
had, a family could live on that for weeks! Doing nothing else. We thought that would
never end, but like everything else, it also ended. Today we believe this or that could not
end but it will (Hurtado 2005).

Under such contextual dynamics, how do people organize their labor in the face of change? What
is the role of collective action? What is the role of the “capacity to achieve collective action”, in
other words, social capital? These are some of the questions that start to emerge as we acquaint
ourselves with Comunero society.

**Agriculture**

Agriculture is thought of by Comuneros as a defining characteristic of a Comunero
lifestyle. Agriculture is a source of identity that is closely tied to the idea of the Comuna as a
territory that belongs to all and that is meant to be taken care of collectively. As previously mentioned, the vast majority of Comuneros producers rely on seasonal rains to grow crops, which limits their choices of crops. Maize, yuca, savila, and pumpkins are common crops grown without irrigation. Some producers even water their crops by hand, with buckets; usually these are small extensions of less than one hectare. In addition, approximately 70 maize growers in the Comuna are organized into agricultural associations sponsored by a non-governmental organization offering credit, technical, and marketing assistance.

Comuna agricultural producers face considerable production and commercialization challenges further aggravated by the growth of agribusiness in the region, the virtual disappearance of governmental agricultural extension services, and the gradual disassociation of the one NGO working in the region with agricultural production. Under these circumstances, the Comunero household depends on the ability of its members to engage in multiple jobs, and to pool resources when possible. I do not believe the political-economy of the household is characterized by all-encompassing harmony, yet, in an economic and environmental context in which individuals experience considerable instability in their jobs and resources of production, mutual support is given and expected from the nuclear and extended family. In that sense, as I will mention throughout this study, Comuneros have very high levels of social capital. A type of social capital that does not necessarily translate into higher production rates, organizational capacity, or income but that allows families to survive throughout extended draughts, El Niño induced environmental destruction, and economic adversity. As previously mentioned, this research is particularly interested in the associational behavior of agricultural producers. The ways in which they decide how to mobilize social resources to engage in agriculture will be examined in detail to provide an analysis of how social capital might, or might not work in a
particular socio-cultural context. For descriptive purposes, I have developed a typology of agricultural producers in Limoncito composed of the following four categories:

**Commercial Maize Growers**

Usually located in the village of Algarrobos, these producers cultivate as much as 20 hectares per family. None of them have irrigation systems and rely on rain for irrigation. Land is worked by agreement between members of extended family units. Usually a father and his married and unmarried sons and daughters labor collectively on conjoined, yet, individually marked tracts of land. One of them, usually the father, is member of one of the maize growers associations, and will share, if possible, inputs (pesticides, seeds) obtained through the association with the rest of the family. In addition, these families tend to grow yuca, beans, pumpkins, and fruit trees as well as other household consumption products in smaller quantities. All other barrios have maize growers but unlike Algarrobos their parcels are smaller.

**Commercial Watermelon Growers**

I identified 10 nuclear families specializing in watermelon production for the regional market. In addition, they grow other crops for consumption, such as maize, yuca, pumpkins, beans, and other fruits like papaya and mangoes. Watermelon growers use water pumps and hoses for irrigation and work in extended family units. Some of them receive inputs on credit from middlemen who deduct the cost from the total price paid at harvest. The price paid is that of the market at the moment of purchase. In the 2005 harvest, the largest family of growers claimed they were barely able to pay for the inputs given in advance.

**Commercial Vegetable Growers**

Tomatoes, onions, and hot and sweet peppers are the most common crops produced by this group. They possess water pumps, though they irrigate by gravity through *acequias* and hoses. The costs associated with these crops are higher in terms of pesticides (particularly for
tomatoes), fertilizers, and water consumption. In addition, commercial channels for these crops are usually more adverse, as the demand for their production depends on what recent agri-business established in the area produce. Unlike watermelon growers, I have no record of them selling their harvest in advance to middle-men. Although some of them had received credit from an agricultural inputs store owned by a former mayor of the Santa Elena municipality. The 2005 loss of the former mayor meant that credit was closed for Colonche inhabitants, including Limoncito as producers “didn’t have the face to ask for credit after he lost in the parroquia” (personal communication Mauro 2005).

**Consumption Growers**

The vast majority of households in Limoncito have a *solar* (backyard) that varies from half a hectare to a hectare in extension. In this space, both consumption and some cash crops are commonly found. The former consist of fruit trees, (mangoes, coconuts, tangerines, and papayas), aromatic herbs, and ornamental plants (flowers, *nim* trees) and on occasion, maize and yuca. Cash crops include *higuerrilla* (castor oil seed plant) and savila. The latter has become very popular in the last 10 years after it was introduced by the Catholic priest in Colonche. It requires very little water and it is always in demand by middlemen. While the amount of savila plants in a backyard rarely reaches 100 plants, people grow them for years with the intention of eventually selling them. As mentioned previously all commercial growers are also consumption growers.

**Social Structure and Social Organization in Limoncito**

In this study, social structure refers to the ideal set of rules guiding social behavior, more specifically, conceptual and spatial units of social interaction that members of a society believe frame life in a coherent way, such as the family, the cabildo, or church. Conversely, the actual practices that emanate from the relations occurring within and throughout social units are the social organization of a community. The social structure is an ideal condition, social organization
deviates from this ideal -to a certain degree- through human agency. This conceptualization of
social behavior is fundamental to the theoretical and methodological contribution that this
dissertation attempts to provide in relation to social capital. In this framework, social behavior is,
ultimately, social and cultural practice. While social capital may rest on values that predispose
people to cooperate (see discussion in chapter 1), meaning people carry in their heads a cognitive
orientation that allows or restricts them to cooperate, the theoretical assumption that informs this
dissertation is that organization and collective action are better analyzed as practice, as daily
events produced and reproduced by actors under specific historical, environmental, and political
circumstances. As a number of scholars have pointed out, thinking of social capital as something
a group shares at the ideological level—as a mental condition—runs the risk of reducing poverty
and inequality to a lack of will or mental capacity to overcome them (Fine 2002; Schafft and
Brown 2003). Next, I offer a classification of the social structure of the Comuna Limoncito. My
goal is to provide a general picture of social units before analyzing specific organizational
experiences. Starting from the smallest to the largest, Limoncito can be described as structured
by the following six social units and sub-units:

The Nuclear Family.
The Extended Family.
The Barrio.
Barrio Associations.
The Recinto.
Recinto Associations.
Multi-recinto Associations.
The Comuna.

The Nuclear Family

Comunero families have a bilateral system of descent. Newlyweds usually live with the
groom’s family although living arrangements with the bride’s family are acceptable depending
on economic or other practical matters, such as which side of the family can provide more
support. Newlyweds will eventually relocate to a house of their own, usually close to the
groom’s parent’s house where they will, for a time, share meals and other social obligations.
They might do this until parents pass away, although some become fully independent when
infants grow older and less help is needed in child-rearing. While the extended family lives close
to each other, each nuclear family has a house and a solar –a backyard. It is important to
underline the role of government and non-governmental aid in shaping families' use of space and
social life. All new houses recorded during the study were built with preferential credit rates and
materials provided by a Catholic Church program named Hogar de Cristo –Christ’s home. The
houses were eight by eight meters, built on stilts with wood floors, bamboo walls (traditional
style), without any internal separation and with aluminum roofs. A smaller number of houses
were built with help of the Ministry of Housing. Young couples will usually start out in one of
these houses, and in time build a cement block one next to it.

The Extended Family

Despite the independent use of space, barrios within a recinto are comprised of groups of
extended families. The extended family usually consists of the sons of the patriarch, their
spouses, unmarried siblings, and children. Nuclear families keep their solares independent,
although they do share whatever they grow in it, usually aromatic herbs, fruits, and small
livestock. The patriarch or matriarch might own a larger plot of land located close to the recinto.
Many of these plots predate the re-establishment of the Comuna (1979) and therefore their
dimensions and property titles vary. Adjacent plots are owned by sons or daughters who have
become Comuna members, although this varies, as lands granted after 1979 are located further
away. In the village of Algarrobos, families tend to have larger extensions of land as they are
located farther away from human settlements (the urban core) and as they are dedicated to
commercial maize production.
The extended family is the main form of organized labor for Comuneros. Father and sons and daughters are bound not only by kin obligations but in many cases also by formal membership in associations. In the Maize Growers Association of Algarrobos, two brothers and their father are members of the association. They are responsible for their share of group loans to other members, as they are to each other. Their lands are not together but they are close enough for them to work them as a single unit. As we will see, financial support for agriculture is declining and inputs and loans offered by the local NGO are not guaranteed. By applying as individuals and working as a group, father and children increase their chances of having access to scarce inputs. In more than one occasion, the family I mentioned has had to use lower doses of pesticides and herbicides in order to cover all of their crops.

**The Barrio**

Larger recintos like Algarrobos and Tres Mangos, are made up of barrios. Tres Mangos, for example, is divided into two barrios: *Primero de Enero* –First of January- and Tres Mangos proper. The extended families that inhabit these barrios commonly close ranks in order to advance their goals. An example is the debate that erupted over the location of the Center for Child Development –a pre-school facility sponsored by the national government and RL. The families of Primero de Enero demanded the relocation of the center to their side of the recinto so their children did not have to cross the road to go to class. A child had been recently killed by a bus, prompting this demand. The change would require Tres Mangos children to cross the road, yet, the parents from Primero de Enero reasoned that the majority of children assisting were from their barrio, therefore justifying the change. An old building was adapted as a classroom much to the dislike of the educators in charge of the program who thought of the measure as petty politics, having to do more with reasserting the power of the less influential Primero de Enero. Barrios have informal associations such as the Housing Committee, designed to organize
families with applications for government housing. More common are religious groups associated with the organization of fiestas.

The Recinto

In spatial terms, the recinto is the most distinguishable social unit in Limoncito. Recintos are the small villages or hamlets that make up a Comuna. The recinto as a place for social reproduction predates the Comuna; as we have seen, it is comprised of barrios, sometimes with opposing goals. More importantly, the recinto has taken over some of the functions of the extended family and the barrio in social reproduction. This is because economic and political decisions affecting families are made at this level. Furthermore, the recinto is central to the social reproduction of Comunero life. According to my main informants, local government allocated resources by recinto and so did non-governmental organizations. RL and Plan Internacional, the two NGOs working in the area, have agreed not to work in the same recinto in order to benefit as many recintos as possible. Recintos, in other words, can only receive help from one of the NGOs. Where RL programs operate, Plan does not, and vice versa. Needless to say, this decision has created considerable conflict as their programs’ goals are quite different and the decision to invite one over the other has been controversial. RL works with economic development goals, Plan with education and healthcare.

Recinto Associations

Recintos are constantly lobbying for projects as well as public works from government officials and NGOs as independent political and territorial units, even though they are not as they are represented by the Comuna. The most effective way to do it is by obtaining vida legal (registration as a formal association with the Ministry of Social Development), although this is rare. As I will show in the next chapter, Comuna government fulfills specific roles, such as the defense of the Comuna territory; nonetheless, the history of agrarian and larger political relations
in Limoncito has led recintos within Comunas to compete for resources at the state and non-
governmental level. Maize growers associations and other economic associations promoted by
NGOs are an example of that. Membership in these associations is usually carefully granted by
local leaders with strong ties to the NGOs. In this context, the recinto gains strength as a source
of governance that is enacted by recinto associations with aid from NGOs.

**Multi-Recinto Associations**

Residents from several recintos within one Comuna, or several recintos in neighboring
Comunas might associate formally and independently of NGOs and municipal and national
government authorities. The *Asociación Cultura Huancavilca* (ACH) has as its primary mission
to provide funeral services to its members. ACH is a popular organization with members from at
least three Comunas in the area, including Limoncito. Another popular association is the *Caja de
Ahorro y Crédito Rio Huancavilca* – Savings and Loans Association of Rio Huancavilca;
apparently the longest running formal association in northern Colonche. The association is
located in neighboring Comuna Rio Blanco. These associations provide very specific services
seen by their members as independent of Comuna politics. Meaning they are transparent and
efficient. These associations circumvent local divisions and gather people from different
Comunas with common goals, perhaps making its operation more sustainable. A different
example of a multi-recinto association is the *Junta de Agua de Algarrobas y Tres Mangos*, the
water service committee which finances and maintains the potable water supply to both recintos.
The association in under the supervision of the Ministry of Social Welfare and its creation had
more to do with the practicalities of providing drinking water to both recintos. The junta the
Agua is an interesting case in that it recreates some of the divisions and allegations that both
villages hold against each other, such as denying water to certain households or not charging for
water services to others. The differences between Algarrobos and Tres Mangos are neatly expressed in this organizational context, as they are in Comuna general assemblies.

The Comuna

Limoncito, like all comunas, is represented by elected officials that together form a cabildo, made up of President, Vice-president, Secretary, Treasurer, and a legal affairs officer called Síndico. All of them have to be registered members of the Comuna. The obligations of the cabildo include the resolution of all land related problems in the Comuna, as well as keeping an updated record of members for the Ministry of Agriculture, which, through a representative, witnesses and certifies yearly cabildo elections. The cabildo is usually supported by committees and representatives specialized in particular areas of comuna administration, in Limoncito the “land committee” oversees land related issues, usually territorial disputes between members, neighboring comunas, and recently, corporate, land invaders. In addition, it had a representative to the Federation of Comunas, a second degree organization that brings together the vast majority of Comunas in the peninsula. Cabildo officers do not receive a salary. The Cabildo also pursues social and economic goals for the benefit of its members. One of the most valued functions of the Cabildo is to bring to the community economic and social services; such as agricultural production programs sponsored by the Ministry of Agriculture or non-governmental organizations’ projects. Traditionally, the cabildo also serves as the intermediary between national, provincial, and municipal governments and its members. It is the first instance to apply for housing, health, transportation, and education services. As we will see, in practice, such programs and services have been gradually transferred to recinto committees a result of the disputes that the different recintos have engaged in since the reestablishment of the Comuna in 1979. Nonetheless, the role of the Comuna is still valuable because it acts as a recognized
political entity with power to negotiate with local and national authorities. It has a Cabildo that is recognized by the national government.
CHAPTER 3
AN ETHNOGRAPHIC APPROACH TO PARTICIPATION

This chapter examines the contemporary history and social relations of the Comuna Limoncito. As previously discussed, it argues that participation is inextricably related to context-specific social, economic, and political practices. Theoretically this means that the reasons and ways people organize to achieve common goals is primarily determined by how people construct and reproduce social relations in everyday practices; practices that in turn are articulated with extra-communal politics and economics. In a constantly changing environment, both socially and ecologically, people solve problems by borrowing tools from their culturally transmitted values as well as on-the-ground decisions and negotiations. This is conceptual approach is different from the way the World Bank hypothesizes organization and participation processes work. In their view, there is a significant ideological component, in which tradition and values (culture) determine a good deal of organizational outcomes. It is undeniable that cooperation values exist and that these will affect the way people organize. The problem is not that culture influences organization, it does, the problem is to recognize that development is political and historical in nature. In this way, this work seeks to provide a basic model which incorporates both.

The main point of this chapter is that in certain social contexts, such as the one I present here, participation in production-oriented associations is first and foremost a social practice that reproduces a hierarchy of power relations. People know this, they know they are dependent on charismatic leaders to make groups work, nonetheless they accept the challenge. Why? Because they want to improve their incomes, but also because in joining others they meet people who, like them, like to work in groups and improve their communities. This is the dual component of organizational practices: a political element, which implies inequality and a collectivity element, which seeks the greater good of the community. From this point of view, formal organizational
practices live in a symbiotic relation with a changing social and natural environment. Therefore, it is simplistic to think of culture as a set of beliefs that heavily determines collective action. As I pointed out in the PRODEPINE example, thinking of features of indigenous cultures as congenial with social capital is a precarious analysis. Organization and participation are better understood at the level of practice, in the way actors constantly negotiate, contest, or abide to the social structure they live in; a structure in which different actors hold different command of material and ideological resources. In order to support this idea, I explain organizational practices through four categories of analysis which bring together interrelated macro and micro-level social dynamics. These categories include different spatial and temporal levels, nonetheless, they provide a coherent framework that goes from national-level influences to local issues that influence organization for formal productive purposes. These are: (1) national development practices; (2) local agrarian histories; (3) regional political practices; and (4) local political practices.

**National Development Practices: The Politics of Large Infrastructure**

In the late 1980s the government of Ecuador began the construction of a large hydraulic project intended to drain the higher elevation agricultural lands east of the Guayas Province and into the Pacific Ocean. In its original conception, the project was to allow excess waters, some of them associated with seasonal heavy rains from El Nino phenomenon to be discharged efficiently into the Pacific Ocean through the Peninsula of Santa Elena (PSE). Eventually, the national and international entities financing the project decided to extend the design and objectives of the project to include an irrigation network that would provide water for agricultural production purposes in the PSE. The Hydraulic Project Santa Elena Aqueduct (PHASE in Spanish), also referred to as the *trasvase*, was designed to irrigate approximately 42,000 hectares of land in different areas of the Peninsula.
By 1996, the first phase, projected to benefit the southern half of the PSE, was completed. Over 20,000 ha of land were benefited by the canals, the majority of which were located in Comunas. For Comuneros of the southern half of the Peninsula, the project had immediate social, political, and economic impacts as agricultural and non-agricultural firms, as well as land speculators rushed to buy lands in the projected path of the canals. According to Comuneros, many deals between Comuna local governments and private investors were closed well in advance of the actual construction of the project (De la Peña 2001). By 1996 over 90% of comuna lands to be benefited by the project were sold to private individuals (Castillo 1998). The social consequences of the project generated a heated debate about the nature of Comuna membership among Comuneros. On one hand, PHASE lead to the dispossession of communal lands, making Comuneros shift income strategies further towards wage work and low-capital entrepreneurial activities. On the other hand, despite the rapid process of dispossession, Comuneros were quick to point out that many of the lands sold (or invaded in some cases) had never had an agricultural use. Neither irrigation nor capital were ever available to make them productive, they were simply seen as part of the community’s territory and were used for hunting, gathering, and mining. The loss, some claim, was not really economic but cultural, as it jeopardized the homeland of future generations. Selling the land, nonetheless, was an attractive deal for some. Income was invested in small-businesses, such as taxis, buses, restaurants, stores, and water delivery trucks, among others. Others built homes, sent their children to high school or college, and paid debts.

At the time of my first visit in 2002, several years after the bulk of the land sales, social conflict still lingered throughout the Peninsula. For example, Comuneros in El Azúcar sold approximately 90 percent of the totality of their territory. Those who stayed in the Comuna felt
dispossessed and disappointed with the choices they made in relation to their lands: As one resident told me “That’s the irony; the lands we now work for a wage are the lands that we used to own. Now we are just farm hands that can be dismissed anytime the company wants” (Ortega 2002 personal communication). El Azúcar has become a town of migrant workers. It is an extreme example of the land situation in the PSE after the arrival of PHASE. The land tenure debate also generated a rupture in the political life of some Comunas. Accusations of financial wrong-doings by Cabildo officials were common throughout the nineties. As late as 2002 I witnessed a general assembly meeting in a southern Comuna where members were debating the legality of past attempts to title communal lands. In the northern half of the Peninsula, where the second phase of PHASE is still under construction, Comuneros experienced a different land sales process. In Limoncito, for example, there was ample knowledge of the “mistakes” incurred by southern Comuneros. In general assemblies the debate centered along two ideologically opposite proposals. The first one revolved around the rejection to sell any land. The second looked for strategies to sell land in a fair and profitable way. Comuneros of the first persuasion opposed the sale of lands on the basis that land was the social and cultural foundation of the community. As Doña Crucita of Algarrobos expressed to me: “We are poor; land is the only thing we can leave to those who come after us. If there is no land, what can we leave our children?” (Caiche 2004 personal communication). In addition to the identity issues expressed by some Comuneros like Doña Crucita, there were also pressing material motives behind the refusal to sell communal lands. One of them was the fact that not all inhabitants of Limoncito are Comuna members. Without membership it was impossible to request lands under the influence of PHASE in Limoncito, all of them located in the northwest corner of the community (see figure 2.2). Without land, there was no profit to be made.
The Land Requests and the Sales Process

By 1996 it became clear that the legal and illegal land transactions that overtook the southern PSE had made their way to the northern half. Neighboring Comuna Aguadita, inadvertedly sold Limoncito’s lands to a commercial agricultural firm in a deal where both parties claimed a measurement error led to Aguadita selling land beyond its borders. “The terratenientes (landlords) entered from the Aguadita side, but we quickly found out, they had heavy machinery and had cleared the entire limiting border with Aguadita, about 15,000 hectares … A group of us ran over there with machetes, rifles, whatever we had and we told the workers off”. Eventually, the company sent a letter saying they didn’t want any trouble and they gave us the land back” (Hurtado 2002 personal communication). As the threat of land loss became real in northern Colonche, a number of strategies to protect the land started to circulate in Limoncito. Miguel Hurtado, a Comuna elected official, and local leader explains the strategy most favored by local officials:

The idea was to title communal lands as a way to protect them from land invasions. These lands are out there, no one ever goes over there, we thought the only way to protect them was to make each person an owner of his own parcel. A title gives you legal security… Also, with the arrival of the canal people thought to get title to their lands to get credit from the Banco Nacional de Fomento.” (Hurtado 2002 personal communication).

The strategy, as explained by Mr. Hurtado, is an economic one. As water would finally be available, people would be deemed worthy of credit; yet, the only way to get credit for agricultural purposes is to have good collateral; in the case of Comuneros the only collateral they could offer was land itself, if properly titled. Under the presidency of Jairo Arroyo (1999) the Comuna general assembly drafted and approved a proposal to assign tracts of up to 50 ha of land to interested Comuneros. Applicants had to be members of the Comuna in good standing. Seventy nine members’ requests were granted under the proposal. Mr. Hurtado explained to me what happened after the first plots were granted:
After the adjudication, about 240 ha were sold. Five Comuneros who had plots together sold for 3 million sucres per hectare (20 dollars in 1996); the plots were next to the canal and were bought by a foreigner, most likely an intermediary named Arnaldo. What happened next is that the moment those five sold, everybody wanted to apply for land in order to sell, but not everyone was up to date (with their membership fees) and others have lost their membership rights as they have not attended to assembly meetings. Nonetheless, all petitions were accepted.” (2002 personal communication).

Mr. Hurtado also pointed out that the reason all petitions were accepted was because of the considerable fighting that ensued when it was decided that only Comuneros in good standing would be granted approval of their petitions. In Limoncito is very common to have members who attend to all Comuna assemblies but are years behind in their dues. By the same token, there are a number of families who live in nearby urban areas who are up to date in their dues but rarely attend meetings. The most important characteristics of the lands apportioned were that they were located in the projected path of the canal, which as to the writing of this dissertation has not reached them. Also, the vast majority of the lands in question had no agricultural use. They were used to collect limited amounts of timber, and in some areas, for small-scale pastoral activities. These lands are commonly referred as la montaña meaning they are uninhabited and characterized by wild vegetation. The significance of this agrarian process is the way in which large, exogenous development policies make their way down to the community level. As we will see next, local land tenure histories meet large processes to eventually influence local organization.

**Local Agrarian Histories: The Politics of Land Tenure**

Since the affirmation of Comuna status in 1979, two inter-recinto conflicts have shaped the political life and social relations of the Comuna. The first one arose as soon as the Comuna was formally instituted. In it, the residents of the western most recintos: El Ceibo, Las Palmas I and II and Limoncito, refused to pay dues to a Cabildo controlled by residents of Tres Mangos and Algarrobos. They foresaw a very limited influence in Comuna policy for themselves; they were
geographically and politically peripheral to the new Comuna. A more substantial reason is the fact that many families in these recintos had titles to their parcels pre-dating the original 1939 enactment of the Comuna. In the mind of the peoples of these recintos, the Comuna as an institution designed to protect peasant and indigenous lands was a good proposition that they did not necessarily oppose, yet, they were afraid of being ignored in local policy decisions under a new centralized government in the hands of Tres Mangos and Algarrobos. In addition, they were required to pay membership dues.

More recently, Algarrobos and Tres Mangos, the historical rivals for the control of the Cabildo, engaged in virulent confrontations exacerbated by the 1990s land sales. As of 2004, Tres Mangos had more Comuna members than Algarrobos, and in the eyes of Algarrobeños, these had made them less influential in policy matters. The five Comuneros who sold their lands were residents of Tres Mangos, including then President Paul Noriega. Legally, no wrong-doing was committed by him, yet, many believe it was a clear conflict of interest.

Local agrarian disputes in addition to the recent history of Comuna membership in Limoncito, which I explore next, provide the first avenues into the contextual nature of organizational practices, which do not exist in a cultural vacuum. As we will see, the Comuna, the maximum level of organization, is constituted by factions that navigate a sea of social relations and power struggles linking local concerns with regional and national priorities.

**The Politics of Comuna Membership**

The candid confession made by a former President of the Comuna to a small group of friends exemplifies the ongoing dispute between the two main recintos in the Comuna:
Truth is, I never sent the names and documents of new applicants to the Ministry. I told Doña Vero that I did, but in fact, I never did!... They were a lot of people, had I sent the applications to the Ministry, Algarrobos would have had the majority. Can you imagine what they would have done?” (Castillo 2005 personal communication).

The applicants the former President is referring to were in its majority from Algarrobos and their goal was two-fold; first, to gain membership to the Comuna in order to gain benefits. Second, they wanted to give more votes to Algarrobos, and therefore, the ability to influence policy matters. The group in question was led by Doña Vero and was composed mostly of women. In the eyes of a number of Cabildo officials, her approach was very confrontational, and during a period of time, resulted in physical confrontations during general assemblies. Prior to Segundo Castillo’s presidency, assemblies were characterized by shouting matches and accusations that often ended in verbal and physical aggression between parties. Doña Vero was participant in some of these fights which dealt with land rights, land disputes, unconformities with Comuna finances, the location of governmental and non-governmental projects and services, and accusations that Doña Vero herself was mishandling funds from the PRODEPINE-funded micro-credit women’s association which lasted less than three years. Membership at the Comuna level is politicized, meaning it has excluded some for the supposed benefit of others.

As a result, general assemblies rarely ever have a quorum (half of the members plus one) some members from Algarrobos and people from several other recintos had stopped attending to assemblies at the time of my stay in the Comuna. Business goes on as usual, but officials and members know they are not following procedure, as general assemblies cannot be carried out without the majority of members. The problem is further exacerbated by the relationship of Cabildo officials with outside political authorities. According to Fausto Santisteban, collective benefits at the Comuna level are almost impossible to achieve because the process of collective action goes through a political filter: “The Cabildo is politicized. In the current Cabildo, each of
its officials has a different political affiliation, and a different idea of the needs of the community, there is no consensus” (2004 personal communication). He continues: “that’s why I am never going to participate in the Cabildo; I prefer to work in my local committee. I am more at ease there.” Fausto’s commentary indicates that in Limoncito there is a growing fractioning of organizational practices. Recintos are becoming more independent and requesting municipal and national-level services through their own local organizations. This is both the result of a system of government that centralized what used to be independent recinto under a Cabildo, as well as clientelistic politics at the regional and national levels.

**Regional Political Practices: Municipal Efficiency**

The problem of national politics influencing the social structure and associational life of Comuneros is evident during campaigning and election of municipal officials, in particular the mayor and council members of the municipality of Santa Elena. In many ways, the Comuna’s economic well-being is dependent upon the relationship it develops with candidates running for office, particularly those running for mayor. Supporting a winning candidate means access to services and infrastructure as previously negotiated during election campaigns. Recinto, barrio, and association’s leaders, as well as Cabildo elected officials support candidates based on shared party affiliation or on the candidate’s policy agenda. It is not uncommon for local Comuna officials to campaign on behalf of candidates in exchange for social and economic favors for their associations and/or the Comuna. Adolfo Mendez (2004 personal communication), former President of the Comuna put it this way:

> I have brought (projects) through politician friends that have power. I have made agreements with them to help them, and in exchange they include me in their budgets to carry out projects…. It’s embarrassing to ask politicians for money, But there is no other way! I stick to them (parenthesis added).
As Fausto Santisteban also pointed out, the 2004 Cabildo, was a Cabildo whose officials had promised their support to different candidates, and where the candidates themselves knew that the Cabildo officials were divided in their political commitments. Julio Castillo in his final report to the general assembly as President of the Comuna resumes his experience as the head of the 2004 Cabildo:

As soon as we took office there were political party differences. We never sat down to discuss issues because there were differences, that’s why there was no progress. As I transfer (the presidency) I tell you that the few things we achieved were done with the resources of the Cabildo. From the outside the only thing we got was a sack of peanuts because we never had consensus (2005 personal communication). (parenthesis added)

In other words, as Cabildo officials do not represent a united front to bargain with candidates, the Comuna is weakened in its lobbying power. The result was that each Cabildo official, in addition to other recinto leaders, negotiated on their own terms with candidates, each pushing for projects for their own barrio, recinto, or oftentimes for the members of their associations. Segundo Castillo’s experience as Cabildo President and association leader is also telling of the situation:

First of all, in my little pueblo I’m (forced) to condition a public work. Imagine that, a politician comes, gives us something and when election day comes first thing he says is “thanks to me you are all here”. And it’s true! You have to give him/her a vote. But one starts thinking, why not condition the public work before it happens? (why not say to the candidate) “Come over here partner, let’s talk about this situation –look, by being Ecuadorian I deserve this benefit without commitment to you, or do I have to pay you something later on?” “If you are going to condition the work lets just leave it as it is, because, if I’m going to be looking for votes everywhere (to pay) my debt to you, then I’m on bad terms with you and before my community I’m also in bad terms (parenthesis mine) (Castillo 2004 personal communication).

There are a number of interesting aspects of Segundo’s analysis. First, local leaders and Comuna officials are engaged in clientelistic relations with municipal authorities. Second, municipal

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9 The sack of peanuts in question was donated by a friend of mine doing his masters in agronomy. The peanuts were meant to be used as seeds.

10 Meaning public works are granted by elected officials based on the level of support they received in different communities at elections. Election results show voting percentages by parroquia, giving officials an idea of the preferences of Comuna voters.
authorities are quick to remind local leaders that their position in their towns and Comuna is a result of the public works that he or she granted them. Third, in order to avoid being a client, Segundo Castillo would prefer not to have public works at all, that way, no debt is owed to the Alcalde. This sort of inaction or rejection of services becomes then a form of retaliation that maintains Comunero independence but negatively affects collective action. This process takes us back to the issue of Comuna fissioning, in which recinto-level associations are bypassing altogether the Cabildo in its role of political broker with municipal and national authorities. As a result, a micro fragmentation of political negotiations exists between local rural populations and regional and national government. Comuneros are not pawns in the intricate game of national party politics. As we have seen, the history of the Comuna shows that recintos have always struggled to find a balance between unity at the Comuna level and independent recintos before the foundation of the Comuna. In the constant search to improve services and bring economic opportunities to their communities, complex political strategies are developed by local leaders who are in a constant shuffle to negotiate with national government officials, non-government organizations’ representatives, and other external actors.

For example, Former Comuna President Julio Castillo, is a firm believer in the Comuna as the exclusive articulator between NGOs and Comuneros, in other words, he believes that the Comuna has to be part of all institutional agreements between local associations and external aid. In 1996, he rejected the proposal of international NGO Plan International to initiate nutritional and educational programs in the Comuna. He emphatically said no to Plan because it required recinto associations to obtain vida juridica –corporate entity status- at the national level. According to him, once associations gained corporate entity status it would lead to the disintegration of the Comuna” (Concha 2005 personal communication). The Comuna would
have become obsolete, as recintos would have been able to negotiate with government agencies and NGOs independent of the Comuna. According to him, there was “total unity” in the Comuna in the mid-nineties and it was only with the arrival of “foundations” (NGOs) that disunity came about. “The arrival of RL, INFA, PROPIEBLO, etc started to break up the people… the end result is that the Comuna is ignored” (Concha 2005 personal communication). Julio’s opinion is perhaps the clearest example of the inextricable relationship between local political considerations and development outcomes. His position is one of defending the integrity of the Comuna as a legal and cultural unit. It attempts to safeguard the integrity of its people and territory in the face of external actors who demand new organizational strategies in exchange for help. This point will be clearer when we look at the producers associations sponsored by the NGO Rural Lifestyles.

Julio’s fear crystallized in the El Ceibo-Loma Alta-Rio Nuevo region. An example of the atomization of organizational practices was the creation of The El Ceibo Aid and Charity Committee –El Comité de Ayuda y Beneficencia de El Ceibo (CABE). Founded in 1999 in the village of El Ceibo, the CABE is devoted to the improvement of the living conditions of the peoples of El Ceibo and surrounding communities. Its membership totals approximately 60 members (usually representing a household) and is exclusively made up of residents of El Ceibo and neighboring Loma Alta, Las Palmas I and Las Palmas II -the recintos located on the northeast sector of Loma Alta. This is the group of recintos previously mentioned as having a lower rate of Comuna membership and a history of ancestral rights to land predating the Comuna. CABE is presided by Fausto Santisteban, a resident of Las Palmas I and a highly experienced participant in governmental and non-governmental projects. Fausto is a member of the Comuna and very active in local and municipal political circles. It is not uncommon for
Fausto to travel to Santa Elena or Libertad on several occasions during the week to talk to Parroquia officials, potential candidates running for office, and other municipal employees in charge of public works and economic and social development offices. He is always interested in “bringing projects for the Committee” and his breath of knowledge of bureaucratic knowledge as well as people in office is large. For all practical purposes Fausto runs the association. Although a board of elected officers exists, only two of them are regular assistants to meetings, Claudio, the Secretary, and Fausto himself. I attended several of the assembly meetings of the CABI; approximately 90 percent of the members attending those meetings were women, but their verbal participation was very limited, except for Fausto’s mother, Doña Angelita, and two other prominent women in the community. In the 10 meetings I attended, Fausto would either arrive with an update on a particular proyecto underway, or would propose a new proyecto to be initiated. I never heard anyone in the assembly making a proposal, though amendments were suggested by some.

The work of Fausto, in other words, is central to the very existence of the association; he is a charismatic leader with political connections. It took me several months of interaction with Fausto to grasp the length of his political experience and connections with municipal authorities. Fausto and his nuclear family have a very modest way of life; his household and material possessions are very limited. His mode of transportation is a bicycle, there is a bare minimum of furniture in his house, and the house itself is very modest in its construction and finish. To the outsider, he does not come across as someone with political influence. Nonetheless, in a conversation I had on financial issues in development projects with several Comuneros, they referred to Fausto as un pájaro de alto vuelo –a high flying bird. Meaning two things, first, that Fausto is highly experienced in the dealing and wheeling of money and development projects.
Secondly, that his approach to projects might not be the most honest. Suspicions of money mishandlings in the hands of elected association and Cabildo officials were common, yet the very people suspected of embezzlement were constantly re-elected to office. I believe this mistrust is a strategy to curb leaders’ prominence, a way to communicate the idea that they are been watched. In addition, these accusations are also the result of the historical disputes among recintos, accusers and accuse are usually from different recintos.

**Municipal Pressures**

The CABI, like the Comuna and the Seguro Campesino, is dependent on a limited pool of leaders with sufficient political clout to demand services from the government authorities. As Fausto and Segundo explained above, success in getting public works depends on a negotiated strategy with candidates to get them votes in exchange for services. This implies that local leaders are up to date with the plans of diverse municipal, and some times national government policies, sometimes through personal relations with municipal officials. During my stay at Limoncito, the CABE was finalizing an agreement for the construction of a community center in the town of El Ceibo. A community center is much like a *casa communal* –communal center- which in Limoncito is a cement block and tin roof structure resembling a warehouse where all associations, including the Comuna have their meetings. Compared with Comunas in the southern PSE, the casa communal in Limoncito is very humble in appearance, as well as size (approximately 25m x 10m).

The construction of a parallel community center in El Ceibo represents a challenge to the Comuna’s centralized government authority. El Ceibo is a small, peripheral town in the Comuna, by having the municipality build a new structure that will surpass in quality and possibly in size *la casa comunal*, El Ceibo is defying Comuna unity and further asserting its independence as a recinto. After all, for several years, Comuna members and officers have discussed the need to
expand or rebuild the communal center something that has not been fruitfully carried out mainly because of a lack of funds.

How are we then to understand El Ceibo’ capacity for local community development? To some degree, I have defined Icereños as peripheral, underrepresented inhabitants of the Comuna. If so, to what degree is their empowerment beneficial to them if it only aggravates larger Comuna fractioning? As I left Limoncito in the summer of 2005, Fausto was frantically trying to close the deal on the community center; the municipal elections of November 2004 put administrative processes at a standstill, and Fausto, like many other Comuneros knew that on top of local elections, Ecuador was facing a radical repositioning of political forces that eventually ended with the ejection of President Lucio Gutierrez from the Presidency in early 2005. This, Comuneros understood, would likely had a ripple effect all the way to Limoncito as leaders and brokers were repositioned and new political elements would rapidly fill spaces left by a collapsing structure.

Local Political Practices: Ties of Affection and Development

As James Ferguson (1990) pointed out, development rarely achieves its stated goals; nonetheless it is very effective at enacting new forms of power relations between individuals and institutions. The experience of Comuneros in northern Colonche with the non-government organization Rural Lifestyles (RL)\(^{11}\) provides a telling example of the way discourse deviates from praxis, and how the latter has the capacity to transform social relations among individuals. Founded in 1977, Rural Lifestyles’ larger goal is to aid in the sustainable development of the peoples of the Peninsula of Santa Elena. Their funds come from the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, as well as the PL 480 Food Program of the Department of Agriculture

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\(^{11}\) Pseudonym.
of the United States. Firmly grounded on the idea of integrated rural development, RL engages both in productive projects as well as educational and health services to the Comunas of the northern half of the peninsula, usually in agreement with the municipality of Santa Elena. RL field workers as well as Comuneros tell stories of very difficult beginnings for the first RL projects, and the hard work it took to get Comuneros to take part in the ideas they were proposing. It was in fact in Limoncito where RL first applied its development philosophy founded on a strong participative and empowerment focus, and with particular attention to gender issues. For twenty years, RL has been the most important development institution in the municipalities of Santa Elena and Manglaralto. Even with the arrival of the World Bank’s PRODEPINE projects, RL was still the most influential force in rural development in this part of the Peninsula. In fact, it is the only source for institutional agricultural credit for small producers in the region. To my knowledge, as of the summer of 2005, no other government or non-government association offered micro-credit for small-scale agricultural production in this region.

The story of the relationship between Comuneros and the RL is an interesting one in terms of the demands that rural development specialists make on the rural poor. These demands vary depending on the economic activity that applicants wish to pursue, nonetheless, not all economic activities are supported equally by RL. The Comuneros of Limoncito, and the region in general are caught between a rock and a hard place as RL has progressively moved its budget towards non-agricultural, service-oriented projects. Considerable support is going to tourism related activities in order to take advantage of the province’s development of the Ruta del Sol - Route of

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12 Under the PL 480 program the USDA donates surplus grains, usually wheat, to Ecuador. The Ecuadorian government uses the proceeds from sales to fund small cooperatives and peasant organizations. The value of the donation was five million dollars in 2005.
the Sun—the coastal highway that runs from Salinas in the south to the Province of Manabí in the north and has vast extensions of beaches and other natural attractions. In this new developmental scheme the problem for Algarrobeños is that they do not own beach-front property, nor is the demand for tourist services particularly large in the stretch of beaches facing Parroquia Colonche. Tourists concentrate in Salinas to the South or Manglaralto to the north. In a casual conversation with a RL official, she mentioned as an example of a possible entrepreneurial activities for Comuneros selling corn tortillas—pancakes—to tourists traveling on their way to the beaches. The corn of course would come from the Comuna, she said, and the tortillas would be made there too, therefore diversifying the economy of local households. Comuneros, nonetheless, sense a contradiction in plans such as this as they have sensed that the mission of RL has shifted:

RL’s mission has changed, has been altered, it is not rural development anymore. Now the loans are going to young entrepreneurs and micro-businesses. Who is going to sell the tortillas on the side of the road that RL mentions? Are the people of Algarrobos (who produced the corn) going to sell them? No, it’s going to be the youngsters of Palmar!” (parenthesis added) (Gallegos 2004 personal communication).

Palmar is a Comuna west of Limoncito facing the ocean, and where the highway following La Ruta del Sol passes by. Mr. Gallegos, in this sense, sees the shift from agriculture to commerce as bringing another problem, the added value of maize tortillas will not benefit those who produced it in the first place, it will go to Comunas that have immediate access to the tourists. A visit to RL’s web site is very telling of their shift in development strategy for the Comunas of the area. The web site focuses exclusively on turismo comunitario—local community tourism—and highlights the services offered by local Comunas along the Ruta del Sol with a heavy emphasis on ecotourism related activities, such as cabañas, eateries, and handcrafts produced in the area.
Organizational Capacity as Prerequisite to Development in Limoncito

Small-scale agriculture has been sentenced a slow death in the northern PSE. RL has a slim line of credit and technical support for maize growers grouped in three associations: Algarrobos, Huancavilca, and El Ceibo. A small Cattle Raisers Association is also funded in Tres Mangos. This line of support seems to obey more to emotional ties and strategic alliances with Comuna leaders than to an integrated economic development strategy that considers small-scale agriculture as part of Comunero economic and cultural needs. Under such an environment, joining an agricultural producers association requires that the applicant either has a padrino – sponsor- or is a padrino (in which case, a person might be able to start an association by lobbying RL). Formal obligations of association members include: paying monthly fees (usually 1 dollar), attending regular meetings, and being willing to accept the risks associated with group loans in which default by one member affects all members. In exchange, members receive inputs on credit, technical assistance, and help in storing and negotiating better buying prices at harvest.

According to several producers, in the past, RL would grant them individual credit based on their credit histories. Those with impeccable credentials would usually get credit. Today, those same individuals are required to organize in groups in order to be considered for the same type of credit. Mili Rodriguez’s experience is telling: “When I applied the technician told me to join the Huancavilca maize growers association, because a group application is easier to be granted than an individual one” (2004 personal communication). The situation of agricultural loans granted to groups on occasion exacerbates local conflict as producers have preferences about who they choose to associate with. Mili explains:

My son-in-law and I asked to be members of the (Huancavilca) group but they didn’t accept us. They said they were complete…. I went back to the technician and he told me to tell the Algarrobos or El Ceibo groups that he gave the order for us to be affiliated…Fausto (the President of the El Ceibo maize growers group) welcomed me and told them that the more members, the greater the strength of the group (2004 personal communication).
Judging from Mili’s experience, membership in producers associations can be imposed by NGO staff, which there is no reason to doubt based on the interactions I observed between NGO staff and producers. This action disregards the by-laws of the group, which requires a general assembly vote to accept or reject an affiliation petition. It also seems to contradict ideas of empowerment, economic justice, and collective action usually implied in the formation of associations.

The Association as Clientelistic Politics

In this sense, development projects in Limoncito are similar to public works; they are dependent on the exchange of favors between unequal partners. In the case of public works, mayors and candidates usually hold the upper hand –I mentioned that one mayor seeking reelection extends credit to producers in the form of agricultural inputs through his business; if he loses, producers don’t “have face” to ask for more credit, as they were unable to gather enough votes at the community level for a victory. In the case of development projects, Mili’s experience is also telling of vertical relations at the local level. At a broader, regional level, the relationship between Comuneros and the second degree organization operating in the region -The General Association of Peasant Workers of Colonche and Manglaralto –La Coordinadora General de Trabajadores Campesinos de Colonche and Manglaralto – is also illuminating. The Coordinadora, as people call it, groups Comunas and associations in the region and receives funds from the PL 480 Food program. Despite being a legally recognized association with a budget of its own, Comuneros say that the Coordinadora lets RL decide the allocation of the

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13 RL does not directly receive PL 480 money. It acts as advisor to the Coordinadora General de Trabajadores de Colonche y Manglaralto, a second degree organization that unites associations and individuals from both Parroquias. As part of its role as advisor, RL determines how the money is assigned.
budget. This has generated resentment among agricultural producers as money is going to services and not to agriculture.

For producers in Limoncito, the best chance to get their needs funded is by exerting pressure on RL and Coordinadora officials through local leaders such as Fausto and others who helped RL in its beginnings and who were founding members of the Coordinadora. Fausto’s relationship with the Executive Director of RL is a case in point: “Cesar Trujillo (the Executive Director of RL) and I, we talk like a “brotherhood”, I helped him with his thesis. It is here where he learned how to grow onions for his thesis” (Santisteban 2004 personal communication). Fausto is referring to the fact that several of the RL employees carried out research for their agronomy degrees in Limoncito years ago. Fausto and other producers in Limoncito were their main consultants. When Fausto is dissatisfied with the explanations given to him by RL’s field technicians he goes directly to Trujillo because in important matters, he says: “I don’t talk to the clown, I talk directly with the owner of the circus” (2004 personal communication). Don Ramiro, a man in his mid-seventies, was also a teacher to the now technicians and executives of RL. He, like Fausto, have close contact with NGO executives.

Don Ramiro is a member of the Huancavilca Maize Growers Association so: “People are always looking for me as a padrino [godfather] but I always talk straight and tell them that the floor decides” (Lara 2005 personal communication). By “the floor” Don means that people are accepted into the association by general assembly vote, not by personal recommendation. Nonetheless, his association only has 6 members, 5 of whom form the governing board. This was the association that did not accept Mili’s and his son’s application. Unlike Mili and son, Melecio Suarez was recently accepted. The assembly accepted him upon the condition that he paid a year of fees (one dollar a month) because “he cannot just join and receive benefits, like a dreaming
cow,” Segundo Castillo, member of the association jokingly told me (Castillo 2005 personal communication). Melecio is a beekeeper and is one of a very few Comuneros in Limoncito who works with the NGO ProNatura in honey production. Members said they will ask him to teach them beekeeping. In demanding retroactive fees, Don Ramiro and the other members are in a way charging for their political clout in RL and the Coordinadora. But also because lobbying in favor of an association is an expensive business. Officers have to travel, make phone calls, send letters, and make photocopies, all of which incur considerable expenses for the average Comunero household.

**Conclusion: The Politics of Trust and Civic Participation**

What is the role of trust and participatory attitudes in economic development? How does culture affect formal organizational outcomes? The narrative I presented had as a goal to show the highly politicized background in which variables associated with social capital operate. Membership, participation, collective action, and trust are foundational concepts in the communitarian view of social capital, nonetheless, its proponents depart from the assumption that these mental categories exist in a cognitive vacuum waiting to be awakened or strengthened. In the ethnographic account I have presented, I cover to a minimal extent specific perceptions of trust, participation, and collective action. I have focused on the political interpretations of these categories through the organizational experiences of Comuneros. In the next chapter, I use the World Bank’s Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire to elicit household level views on those subjects. The purpose is two-fold, first to analyze the responses the instrument offers, and second, to compare them to the ethnographic observations and social networks analysis.

One way to test the issue of whether there is a relationship between positive development outcomes and levels of trust, cooperation, and participation is to compare scores for these variables, including the extent of participation, between Comuneros who are associated in
agricultural producers associations and those who are not. I have hypothesized there should be no statistically significant differences between the groups as associational life is embedded in the political economy of development. The data I offered above further supports this argument. I close this chapter by further problematizing the issue of membership in formal associations as social capital by briefly touching upon household subsistence strategies in the Comuna. I asked Virginia Casal, resident of Tres Mangos and liaison between RL and the Comuna how could people still be doing agriculture when returns so limited. Her answer is very telling:

“For example, those who grow watermelon have relatives with money; they repay them with a percentage of the earnings from the production… Teófilo (her husband and member of a Maize growers association) plants maize to feed the animals. By growing maize he pays for the animals (cattle, goats, and chickens). He doesn’t make a profit…. I work, my daughter and my son work (wage workers) so that he stays there (in the field). The problem with the producer is that it is a sacrifice… The person who takes the risk to produce is because he has an income from someone else to help him/her. And because he likes the work, why else would he be out in the field? (Parenthesis added) (2005 personal communication).

Agriculture survives because the women and younger members of the household subsidize it. It is no coincidence that of the 28 members of the Algarrobos association 26 are men. In Huancavilca all six members are men, and in El Ceibo 18 of the 19 are men. To belong to an association in Limoncito implies membership in a household with diverse sources of income that spread risk. Associations try to minimize risk and so they become exclusive in their acceptance of applicants. As we have seen, membership is made up of traditional leaders and successful producers (they helped NGO staffers with their agronomy degrees) and they tend to accept individuals who are more financially solvent than the average Comunero. In conclusion, it is
producers with financial support from household members who join associations, not the poorest of the community. This finding points in the direction of rejecting my second hypothesis which stated that those households who hold better structural positions in the community would not associate. The data presented in chapter five on social networks analysis will help to clarify this question.
CHAPTER 4
THE WORLD BANK’S SOCIAL CAPITAL INTEGRATED QUESTIONNAIRE

The World Bank has developed two instruments to measure social capital, the Social Capital Assessment Tool (SOCAT) and the Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire (SOCAP IQ). Their main goals are to: (1) inventory the levels of social capital in a community; (2) uncover how social capital is distributed among socioeconomic groups; and (3) measure the potential for a community to engage in mutually beneficial collective goals. The questionnaires are composed of modules that address community levels of social capital, the social capital of local organizations, and the perception and command of social capital by households. They are both composed of questions with nominal and scale-like answers (see annex 1). The SOCAT is extensive in its design, in addition to the questionnaire it includes group interviews under the module “Community Profile and Asset Mapping” intended to generate interaction and discussion among community members and researchers, much in the style of a workshop. This module assesses the community’s assets, services, and institutions. The SOCAT is 72 pages long and is divided in four sections: a community questionnaire, a household questionnaire, organizational profile interviews, and an organizational profile score sheet. The last two are designed to assess the sustainability, composition and political organization of institutions, including the role of elites and leaders in them. The considerably more focused SOCAP IQ is aimed to “generate quantitative data as part of a larger household survey, such as a household income/expenditure survey”. The questionnaire evaluates six themes: groups and networks; trust and solidarity; collective action and cooperation; information and communication; social cohesion and inclusion; and empowerment and political action. The questions contained in the SOCAT are very similar to those in the SOCAP IQ, and the themes also mirror each other except that the

14 The questionnaire can be downloaded in English or Spanish from the World Bank’s web page at http://go.worldbank.org/LHI4AYZEF0
SOCAP IQ does not assess community level social capital, it is intended to gather individual and household level data and to cross-tabulate this information with living standards measures. My interest in testing the relation between cognitive measures (trust, cooperation) and membership made the SOCAP IQ methodologically and theoretically adequate for the purposes of my design.

As I mentioned in the introduction, applying the SOCAP IQ is fundamental to test the argument I have presented, namely, that certain measures of the instrument are unable to capture issues of power and conflict at the community level, which lie at the core of why poverty exists and persists even in the presence of development projects. The inability of the instruments to factor in these elements stems from its theoretical foundation - the communitarian view of social capital, which places considerable emphasis on traditions of participation and collective action, and how these are root causes of economic and political performance\(^\text{15}\). In other words, for many scholars associated with this position poverty is caused by low social capital (Grootaert 1999; 2001; Narayan and Pritchett 2001)\(^\text{16}\). In this paradigm, there is minimal attention to local political histories of land, water, and institutional politics in general, or the way the local community relates to regional, national, and international economic policies and policy mandates. In this chapter I test the cultural assumptions of the communitarian view by analyzing the relationship between membership in an agricultural producers associations (APOs) and the cognitive measures of the SOCAP IQ. We want to know whether the instrument identifies differences in trust, cooperation, and participation (actual and perceived) between members and non-members of associations. In Limoncito, there might be different sets of values (cultures) regarding collective action and cooperation for the greater good of the community. In other

\(^{15}\) Putnam’s argument emphasizes the positive correlation between democracy and social capital.

\(^{16}\) As mentioned in the introduction Narayan and Pritchett’s 2001 article on the correlation between household welfare and social capital in Tanzania is frequently cited as a solid demonstration of social capital as a causal variable in household welfare.
words, some groups in the community might have a high regard for participation and civic engagement while others do not, which would explain differential participation in formal associations such as APOs and ultimately wealth indicators, the position of the communitarian approach to social capital.

**Social Capital Assessments and Development Projects**

Before addressing the data collected with the SOCAP IQ we need to pause to locate the role of social capital assessments in current rural community development. To my knowledge, social capital assessments are not a standard or even a common tool in research related to project planning. The idea of social capital as a causal variable that explains household welfare made it necessary to develop tools to assess its existence and potential at the community level. The social capital questionnaire is meant to be part of larger surveys on household welfare (Gootaert et al 2004). Its designers recommend it is used along the Living Standards Measurement Surveys System, another World Bank instrument, which is usually used with national level samples. Nonetheless, it’s creators also recommend the SOCAP IQ as a baseline of socio-economic data that can be used to evaluate projects at the local level; the inclusion of social capital measures “would make it possible to assess the impact of the project on social capital, or conversely, to assess whether areas with high levels of social capital have more successful project implementation” (Gootaert et al 2004: 2). The question that arises is the degree of importance that social capital indexes, either as a base line or as a goal, can potentially be ascribed. If social capital is a causal factor in household welfare it is possible that community level projects be geared towards building, enhancing or transforming types of social capital. There is perhaps the potential for certain types of projects to be matched with certain levels of social capital. In communities where levels of trust and participation are assessed as low, would it be possible that certain types of projects would be deemed highly unsuccessful and therefore not implemented?
Although hypothetical, the point to keep in mind is that a community’s organizational capacities should not be exclusively assessed based on cognitive forms of social capital, in particular if they are disassociated from contextual participatory practices and their relation to social organization.

**Method**

I conducted 74 SOCAP IQ interviews tested and adapted to local Spanish\(^{17}\) with the assistance of two local residents. The questions were directed to the head of the household, in the vast majority of cases the mother or father of the family. In several cases the number of response options in the Likert (agreement-disagreement) scales were reduced from five to three options, as recommended in the pilot test of the SOCAP IQ (World Bank 2004). Some questions were adapted to fit the social organization of the community, such as the use of barrios and recintos instead of the word village. Questions dealing with ethnicity and religious differences were left out as there is negligible variation in those issues in the village. The sample was defined by dividing all households in the Comuna in two groups: those belonging to an agricultural producers association and those who did not. Two random samples from both groups were elicited, accounting for the fact that only 30 percent of Comuna households are members of producers associations. I used approximately 80 percent of the questions of the SOCAP IQ based on the characteristics of the community. The following questions and its respective sub-questions were included:

**Section 1 Groups and Networks:**

Q 1.1 Number of associations in which the household participates
Q 1.7 Number of meetings attended in the last 12 months
Q 1.11 Diversity in backgrounds in association
Q 1.12 Diversity in political views in association
Q 1.13 Diversity in incomes in association

\(^{17}\) the SOCAP IQ was first tested in rural Albania and Nigeria in 2002. It is available in Spanish in the WB’s website.
Q 1.2 Number of friends and sources of support

Section 2 Trust and Solidarity

Q 2.1 Perception of trust in recinto
Q 2.2 Degree of trust in neighborhood
Q 2.3 Degree of trust in government officials, leaders and NGO representatives
Q 2.6 Contribution in time and money to community beneficial projects

Section 3 Collective Action and Cooperation:

Q 3.1 Household engagement in community oriented activities.
Q 3.3 Amount of times household participated in community oriented activities.
Q 3.6 Proportion of people in recinto that contribute to larger collective goals.
Q 3.7 Proportion of people who would help to solve a water problem in the village.
Q 4.11 Number of times they traveled to a city

Section 5 Cohesion and Social Inclusion

Q 5.7 Association or group which households cannot join

Section 6 Empowerment and Political Action

Q 6.2 Influence over local governance
Q 6.4 Influence in making the village a better place to live.
Q 6.7 Participation in political activities.

Results

I have hypothesized that attitudes toward trust, solidarity and participation should not explain membership in formal associations. Therefore, I did not expect to find statistically significant differences between members and non-members of APOs in relation to trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Membership in associations, I believe, depends heavily on producers’ web of social relations and their social position in the community. The analysis was carried out with the statistical package SPSS 16.0 (see table 4.1 for the results of all measures). The results I present support this hypothesis to a large degree. Of the more than 30 measures
collected in the questionnaire, the following five show statistically significant differences between members and non-members of producers associations:

**Section 1 Groups and Networks**

Only one measure in this module shows statistically meaningful differences between the two groups: question 1.1, which counts the number of associations households participate in (see table 4.1). Frequency-wise, members of associations participate in more formal and informal associations than non-members (see figures 4.1 and 4.2). A likely explanation in the context of Limoncito is that members of associations belong to closed networks that carry people from one type of association to another. Members of APOs include traditional leaders of the Comuna, such as local government officials, who have had long careers dealing with external institutional actors. These leaders rely on personal networks of relations to get agricultural support from the NGOs, as well as services and projects from municipal officials. Trust among members of associations carries from one association to another. For example, membership in the Comuna is stronger in the larger Tres Mangos y Algarrobos recintos, where political power also concentrates. In this sense groups of trustworthy partners reproduce themselves and are transported from one organizational setting to another: from Comuna membership to associations’ membership.

Questions 1.11; 1.12; and 1.13 inquired about the diversity of backgrounds of members of associations. The results show that both members and non-members of APO do not report statistically significant diversity in educational backgrounds, occupation, or political views of the associations they belong to. In other words, regardless of the type of association, formal, informal, for productive or social purposes there is no perceived variation in the backgrounds of members. In the social capital literature this type of diversity is considered an important element in the formation and maintenance of social capital as it indicates multiple sources of information.
and opportunities. This result indicates that formal and informal associations in Limoncito may have limited ways to link with the outside world, which would support the clientelistic theory of organization I present.

Section 2 Trust and Solidarity

Module two measures a number of trust and solidarity indicators: (1) levels of trust among residents at the recinto level (Q 2.1); (2) the degree of cooperation among residents at the recinto level and trust in borrowing and lending money (Q2.2); and (3) level of trust of government officials, NGO representatives, and people from other recintos (Q 2.3). In addition, question 2.6 inquires about the likelihood that the interviewee would cooperate with time and money to a community beneficial project. Of these seven measures, only two show statistically significant differences between groups: how much interviewees trust people from other recintos (Q. 2.3 B) and how much they trust local government officials (Q 2.3 C). Below I provide an interpretation of these results.

APO members trust people from other recintos less than non-members (Q 2.32)

As mentioned above, four APOs exist in Limoncito. Of them, three are exclusive in their membership. They only admit applicants considered trustworthy by the membership, which in the case of two of them (Tres Mangos and Huancavilca) is composed of the same individuals that act as the board of directors. One of the reasons for this is that they are financially liable as a group in terms of the loans extended by the NGO. If one defaults, the entire group is held responsible. From an economic perspective, APOs members tend to stick to people they know well, usually extended family members and friends, people who usually live in the same recinto. As I previously pointed out, recintos are made up of a few extended families, in this economic and social context it makes sense that members tend to trust people from their same recinto. In the next chapter, social network analysis will further show how recintos tend to operate as
independent social, economic, and political units, which reinforces this point. Figure 4.3 shows that 58 percent of members trust “to a very small extent” people from other recinto. In contrast, 24 percent of non-members chose this option (figure 4.4). Eight percent of non-members trust people from other recintos to a great extent (figure 4.4), while no members chose that option (figure 4.3).

**Members trust local government officials more than non-members (Q 2.33)**

There is considerable extrapolation in leadership in the village. Those who are officers in associations have also been, or continue to be, elected as Cabildo officers; in addition they are also operatives for political parties at the local level. As I mentioned in the ethnographic chapter, both government positions and formal association leadership positions demand leaders who are able to negotiate with outside authorities under clientelistic forms of reciprocity. In this study I talked in detailed about the clientelistic relationships between candidates running from municipal office and villagers, and between villagers and NGO staff. In the first example, candidates expect local leaders, usually formal organization officers, to mobilize voters for them at the Comuna level. If the candidate wins, he will favor those Comunas who voted for him, in the form of projects and services, or at least will put them at the top of the list in case financial resources in the municipality are limited. In the case of NGOs, we saw how the limited support for agriculture makes it necessary for leaders to move their personal influence with NGO staff members in order to procure funds for agricultural production. From this point of view it makes sense that members trust local government officials more, after all, they are also their officers and partners in APOs. Figure 4.5 shows that 17 percent of members trust to a great extent or a very great extent government officials; No non-members chose this option (figure 4.6).
There is no statistical difference in the likelihood of cooperation in time or money to community beneficial projects between members and non-members of APOs (Q2.6)

In terms of frequency, 88 percent of non-members and 100 percent of members declared they would cooperate with their time to communally beneficial projects. Equally, 88 percent of non-members and 72 percent of members declared they would cooperate with money to communally beneficial projects. These results show no significant difference in intent to cooperate, regardless of affiliation.

Section 3 Collective Action and Cooperation

Question 3.3 asked: “All together, how many days in the past 12 months did you or anyone else in your household participate in community activities?” Results show that members of APOs participate in more community activities than non-members. I found it unlikely from extended observation and interviews that APO membership is more demanding on the number of activities required from members than other organizations such as the funeral services group or school committees. It is more likely that since many of the members of the associations are traditional leaders of the community, they have a tendency to be involved in more activities. Associations include current and former local government officers, as well as some of the best producers in the Comuna, such as those who helped current NGO executives in the first years of the NGO. APOs, in other words are composed of unusually highly active people in the community. These are people who are good at solving problems and organizing people, therefore, they are invited or requested to participate in projects, and in turn, they pull their group of associates into the effort. Furthermore, many leaders enjoy participating and socializing with people. Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show 70 percent of members of APOs participating in 41 or more “community works, projects and meetings” in the last 12 months; compared to 46 percent of non-members
Finally, question 3.1 “In the past 12 months, have you worked with others in your village/neighborhood to do something for the benefit of the community? shows no statistical difference between groups, indicating similar levels of collective action across groups. As does question 3.6, which frequency-wise indicates that over 85 percent of respondents both groups believe that almost everybody or approximately half of their fellow recinto residents contribute in time of money to “achieve improvements for the benefit of all” (figure 4.9 and 4.10).

Section 5 Cohesion and Social Inclusion

Question 5.7 asked respondents whether there was a group in the community in which they would like to participate but they were not able to. The results show a tendency towards significance (p = .078). 46 percent of non-associated APO members said there are groups and associations they would like to be a part of but they were unable. 25 percent of APOs associated members said the same. The most desirable groups were: APOs with 14 mentions, followed by the Comuna with nine, and the Seguro Campesino with eight. The reason, as mentioned previously is that there is a demand for agriculture-related credit, commercialization aid, and technical assistance that individuals cannot get on their own. In Limoncito, to get these resources producers have been asked to associate by the one institution granting agricultural credit, an NGO, yet the avenues to do so are limited, as these results suggest. We can conclude that there is an issue of exclusion in the community which the SOCAP IQ was able to expose.

Section 6 Empowerment and Political Action

Question 6.7 asked: In the past 12 months, have you done any of the following?

1. Attend a Comuna meeting, association or committee meeting?
2. Expressed your point of view in a meeting?
3. Met with a politician, called him/her, or sent a letter
4. Met with an development institution representative, called or wrote to him or her.
5. Participated in an information or election campaign
6. Participated in a protest or demonstration
Answers 2 and 4 showed statistical significance:

**Members express their point of view in meetings more than non-members (Q 6.72)**

Unsurprisingly, 87 percent of APO members express their view in meetings compared to 56 percent of non-members. APOs demand considerable discussion about the goals, rights and obligations of its members, perhaps even more than institutions such as the Comuna or El Seguro Campesino, as their members make financial and production related decisions that affect all. In addition, members have to constantly lobby NGO representatives to be taken into consideration in budgetary and policy planning. I have argued that this is primarily through leaders that goals are achieved; nonetheless, this result, in conjunction with the next question opens the possibility that APO members, in general, are politically active individuals, therefore injecting a dose of human agency to my analysis.

**APO members have met with a development institution representative, called or wrote to him or her more often than non-members (Q 6.74)**

Sixty two percent of members compared to 22 percent of non-members have met, phone called, or written a development institution representative. Those who are more likely to meet with development institutions representatives are members of the APOs and parents with children enrolled in the child-care/school program also executed by the NGO in question. In the El Ceibo-Loma Alta-Rio Nuevo region, the local association meets more often in general assemblies with personnel of Plan Internacional regarding healthcare, nutrition and education issues. This result might indicate that as communitarian theoreticians claim, either APOs are composed of people who are more participative or the association has made members more participative and civically engaged. The constant need to solve problems together and think for the common good of its members perhaps does generate positive externalities that spill over to the larger community. On the other hand, this explanation contradicts the results of question 2.32
in which APO members trust people form other recintos less than non-members. Perhaps pointing out the independent functioning of recintos despite all belonging to the Comuna political entity.

**Conclusion**

More than 30 measures were used in the SOCAP IQ to find differences in cognitive and participatory attitudes between members and non-members of APOs. Of these, six showed statistically significant differences:

- APOs members participate in more formal and informal associations than non-members (Q 1.1).
- APOs members trust people from other recintos less than non-members (Q 2.32).
- APOs members trust local government officials more than non-members (Q 2.33).
- APOs members participate in more community activities than non-members (Q3.3).
- APO members express their point of view in meetings more than non-members (Q 6.72).
- APO members have met, phone called or written a development institution representative more often than non-members (Q 6.74).

These results, except for number two, can be interpreted to suggest that there are features of certain households that make them more civically engaged, more prone to believe in the virtues of collective action. Nonetheless, there are many other variables that find no significant difference between the answers of APO members and those who are not. These are the most notorious:

- No difference in the number of meetings attended by members of the household in associations they consider the most important for them in the last 12 months.
- No difference in the number of friends and sources of support they can recur to in case of an emergency (Q 1.25; 1.26; 1.27).
- No difference in how associated and non-associated members perceive willingness to help in their recintos (Q 2.2).
- No difference in levels of trust of neighbors, association leaders, and NGO representatives(Q 231; 2.32; 2.34; 2.35).
No difference in whether they worked with fellow recinto members “to do something for the benefit of the community” in the last 12 months (Q 3.1).

No difference in the willingness to contribute with time or money to achieve collective goals (2.6).

No difference in the degree of influence respondents feel they have over local government and association-related decisions that affect them (Q 6.2).

No difference in the degree of influence respondents feel they have to make their community a better place to live (Q 6.4).

No difference in meeting or communicating with politicians, participation in a political campaign, participation in a protest or demonstration (Q 6.71; 6.73; 6.75; 6.76).

Contrasting Differences in Results with Ethnography

In order to explain the differences between groups, I want to further explore the results in three questions and analyze them with the help of ethnographic observations. Question 1.1 tells us that APOs members participate in more formal and informal associations than non-members. Question 3.3 indicates that APO members participate more when asked for a total number of activities they had participated in “community work, projects, and meeting for the benefit of the community.” In contrast, when asked yes or no to whether the interviewee had “worked with other persons of his or her recinto for the benefit of his or her community” there is no difference. These results contradict my argument as the SOCAP IQ shows those households who associate in formal, productive organizations also participate in more activities for the collective good. But to what degree is it a manifestation of higher participatory and collective values in the cognitive orientation of some households? To what extent is it the result of the structure of internal and external social and political relations in the community? The following ethnographic observations of the practices of participation in Limoncito provide some answers:

Members of APOs include long time community leaders. These are individuals who have occupied cabildo positions for years as well as other organizational leadership roles.
The community relies on a limited number of leaders to organize collective actions as well as production oriented associations.

The cabildo acts as the main source of community oriented works and projects, which, as mentioned above is under the control of a limited number of leaders.

The comuna is fractioned politically and collective works as well as APO formation is guided by recinto affiliation.

When people meet to address a community problem, for example the need to refurbish the school, clean wells, or develop a proposal to bring an NGO project, formal associations and its leadership will host the meeting.

Some segments of the Comuna would rather not participate in anything that involves traditional leaders as resentments prevail over old projects, cabildo decisions, and comuna membership problems.

Together these points show that participation is directed by a small leadership and is segmented, meaning that cliques of participation have formed. One example is the fact that comuna general assemblies rarely ever reached the required minimum attendance. One of the reasons for that is that certain sectors of the Comuna, usually recinto-level groups, would rather withdraw their participation than deal with the old leaders. This is true at the recinto level also, where some claim that associations tend to be made up of individuals from a few families. The result is that communally beneficial activities that are supposed to generate a positive participatory response from people do not. Individuals recognize the benefit that the activity entails but they are not willing to risk further conflict or disappointments over the planning and execution of collective activities with those they do not trust or dislike. From this point of view, we can see that the differences between members and non-members are then the result of historical issues in community social relations, not an issue of capacities of value systems. Further research is needed to understand issues of attitude towards collective goals. By this I mean that there are, without doubt, issues of personal preference towards working together for the common good among comuneros. Personal life histories and individual personalities (not general peasant
character) do influence the way people approach the idea of association in rural communities. In conjunction with social structure and local histories a fuller picture of participation and development can emerge. The SOCAP IQ, in many ways points in the right direction. In the context of project planning or evaluation surveys are necessary. They provide standardized and concise data with considerable explanatory potential. In this work, I do not argue that we should do away with surveys. My recommendation is that they are supported and expanded by other data gathering techniques in order to capture as many of the complexities of social relations in relation to social capital measures. SNA analysis, as we will see in the next chapter is another useful technique that can be used along with surveys.

Table 4-1 Group statistics for measures

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<th>Question</th>
<th>Associated member 1</th>
<th>Non-member 0</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
<th>Std. error mean</th>
<th>Sig. (2-tailed)</th>
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<td>.508</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6.76</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>1.90</td>
<td>.303</td>
<td>.043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
<td>1.78</td>
<td>.422</td>
<td>.088</td>
<td>.239</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Total

![Bar Chart](image_url)  
**Figure 4-1** Number of associations mentioned (Total) by percentage of members of APOs
Figure 4-2 Number of associations mentioned (Total) by percentage of non-members of APOs.

Figure 4-3 Level of trust of people from other recintos by percentage of members of APOs. Scale: 1. To a very small extent; 2. To a small extent; 3. Neither small nor great extent; 4. To a great extent; 5. To a very great extent.
Figure 4-4 Level of trust of people from other recintos by percentage of non-members of APOs. Scale: 1. To a very small extent; 2. To a small extent; 3. Neither small nor great extent; 4. To a great extent; 5. To a very great extent

Figure 4-5 Level of trust of local government officials by percentage of members of APOs. Scale: 1. To a very small extent; 2. To a small extent; 3. Neither small nor great extent; 4. To a great extent; 5. To a very great extent
Figure 4-6 Level of trust of local government officials by percentage of non-members of APOs. Scale: 1. To a very small extent; 2. To a small extent; 3. Neither small nor great extent; 4. To a great extent; 5. To a very great extent

Figure 4-7 Number of community projects, works, and meetings assisted by non APO members
Figure 4-8 Number of community projects, works, and meetings assisted by APO members

Figure 4-9 Non-APO members reported percentage of fellow recinto inhabitants that contribute in time or money to communally beneficial activities. 1 Almost everybody; 2 Approximately half; 3 Almost nobody
Figure 4-10 APO members reported percentage of fellow recinto inhabitants that contribute in time or money to communally beneficial activities. 1 Almost everybody; 2 Approximately half; 3 Almost nobody.
CHAPTER 5
SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

In order to provide evidence for the need to think of social capital primarily as networks, this chapter shows the association between presence or absence of membership in organizations and household position in the social structure of the Comuna Limoncito. Two different kinds of membership were used: membership in producers associations and in the Comuna. I defined the social structure of Limoncito by eliciting a complete network of the Comuna’s households using Social Network Analysis (SNA). As stated in chapter one, I have hypothesized that the stronger the structural position of a household in the community, the less likely it is to become a member of a rural producers’ organization. Conversely, as the structural position of the household becomes less prominent, the likelihood of participation in a rural producers’ organization increases. Behind this assumption was the idea that wealthier, better socially connected producers would stay out of associations as a way to keep resources valued for themselves, such as credit and marketing opportunities.

The structural position of a household refers to two related set of characteristics. First it indicates the level of centrality it has in the network. High levels of centrality indicate that persons in those households are sought after by others, that they are connected to many people and that they occupy a position in which they have the capacity to control information or resources that flow in the network. It is in many ways an index of popularity, which varies depending on the question asked to generate the network, as we will see. Ethnographically, a strong structural position means that the person or household has occupied a leadership role in the community, belonging to the small leadership of the comuna. As I said, those who have been cabildo officers are also involved in non-governmental projects; they are cultural and political brokers. In addition, a strong structural position indicates that individual or household to which
he or she belongs is known to command more material or financial resources which in some cases reinforce their status.

The data I present show how the structure of social relations in a community explains membership in associations. In other words, ideological variables such as trust and solidarity are not sufficient to explain membership in formal organizations, a basic tenet of the communitarian approach of social capital which advances the idea that an individual’s participative attitude and levels of trust and solidarity become causal explanations for participation. I argue that in the historical, economic, and political context of agricultural practices in Limoncito, people who belong to organizations are not necessarily more participative than those who do not, instead, they are members of producers associations because they occupy less advantageous positions in the structure of social relations of Limoncito. Simply put, the poorer an actor is, the more likely she or he is to join an association, and vice versa. As we will see, this hypothesis was rejected. The results show that those individuals who occupy the most strategic and central positions in a network, are in fact also members of the Comuna and of producers associations. In the next pages I provide an explanation for these results.

**Definition of Concepts in SNA**

Social network analysis conceives social structures as patterns of relations linking social units (Mardsen 1990). It seeks to describe social structures in terms of networks, and to interpret the behavior of actors in light of the positions they occupy within a social structure. Social capital and social network analysis have been comprehensively explored across the social sciences, although the vast majority of studies come form urban and industrialized societies. In this dissertation I will contribute to the SNA literature by providing data from a rural society in the developing world. As previously argued, social capital is a resource that is best measured as an individual attribute. In methodological and theoretical terms, this is central to our discussion.
on social capital in development as we are trying to define what the role of cultural values and social organization is in collective action.

The advantage of the social networks approach is that it allows researchers to differentiate the causes from the outcomes of concepts such as social capital. As I mentioned before, in economic development, social capital refers to both culturally determined values, such as reciprocity and trust, as well as to organizational features of social groups, such as cooperatives, committees, and clubs. Because of this, it is hard to know whether a cooperative, for example, was created out of the trust people have on each other, or whether trust was the result of the contractual rules that were establish in the cooperative. The methodological individualism espoused by SNA offers a parsimonious path to understand the relationship between social structures and cultural values. Furthermore, when SNA works in complement with ethnographic data, historically and contextually grounded explanations about social relations and cultural values emerge.

Fundamental to most social network analysis is the idea that resources available to members of a social group are distributed unequally, usually by rank; the higher an individual’s rank, the greater his or her ability to obtain valued resources. In relation to social capital, the better the position of origin in a social network, the more likely the actor will access and use social capital (resources). As previously mentioned, this definition of social capital is incompatible with current conceptualizations of the concept by the World Bank, where class oriented analysis is absent.

**Social Networks and Social Organization**

The purpose of using social network analysis in this study is to uncover patterns of social relations among comuneros. In Limoncito, as in many small rural communities, economic exchanges, political alliances, and kin obligations co-exist in the relationship between two or
more individuals. While a group of individuals organized around an association might have specific goals (a singlestranded coalition, Wolf would call it), participation and membership are part of a larger universe of reciprocal relations as well as individual interests. Network analysis provides a way to reveal structural patterns based on the social contact individuals have. For the purposes of this dissertation, SNA also has the potential to show a relationship between the position of an individual in the totality of social relations of the community and her or his organizational life history. This history includes his or her involvement in local government, local projects for the common good, leadership positions, achievements and failures, as well as the way other fellow villagers see this person. In the previous chapter I put forward the idea that participation in for the common good is affected by the limited number of leaders who direct collective action efforts. As the comuna is divided in factions that distrust the actions of certain leaders and groups, the result is limited participation by certain sectors of the community, be it for collective or individual (economic) purposes. SNA can uncover the importance of these leaders and their sphere of influence.

Method and Sample

The social position of households in Limoncito was determined through a socio-centered network. Socio-centered networks focus on bounded social groups. Their goal is to understand how the structural positions of actors within the group explain both individual and group level phenomena (Wasserman and Faust 1994). With the help of assistants, I elicited data from 255 households (95 percent of households in the village) in order to determine how households were linked to one another and the strength and type of ties they share. I asked 8 questions to household heads about hypothetical situations dealing with trust, reciprocity, and economic and political relations (see for example Schweizer et al 1998). For each question, participants were asked to name 5 heads of household or one of his or her dependents in the village.
Questions Used to Generate the Networks

1. Suppose you have an emergency and you need to borrow 10 dollars, mention five persons you would borrow money from.

2. Do you exchange produce, meat, or prepared meals with people in town? If so, please mention five families you share food with.

3. Suppose you are looking for a job or looking for buyers for your product, mention five persons you would go to for help to find a job, or find buyers.

4. Suppose you have to leave town for a couple of days and you need someone to take care of your kids. Mention five families you would ask to do so.

5. Mention five persons you would trust to share a group loan.

6. Suppose you need to borrow a tool -such as a hammer or a shovel. Mention five persons you would ask for the tool.

7. Suppose you are very sad because of a personal family problem you had, such as an argument with your spouse, an illness in the family, or the death of a family member. Mention five persons you would trust your problem to.

8. Suppose you are very angry as a result of a decision taken by the Comuna government or by an association you belong to (for example: Seguro Campesino, Junta de Agua). Mention five persons you would trust to share your discontent with the decision taken.

The responses from the questionnaire were used to generate eight networks of social relations in the village, each network reflecting a different question. This was done by generating eight adjacency matrixes where the first row and column lists each of the households in the village and the intersection of each of the cells represents the tie between households (in yes or no binary fashion)\(^\text{18}\). In other words, all possible ties between households are represented in the matrixes. Although there are a vast number of possible analyses I could have carried out,

\(^{18}\) The instrument was tested before gathering the data. The vast majority of people interviewed found the questions to straightforward. Interviewees did not exclusively list heads of household; other family members who live in the household were also mentioned. Therefore, when we say that the Hurtado household has high centrality scores it could be so because several members of the household were mentioned by other respondents. In this sense, the World Bank’s SOCAP IQ and the socio-centered network approach are similar in that they see the household as a unit.
with these matrices, I will focus on three specific network measures (Freeman 1979): (1) degree centrality; (2) betweenness centrality; and (3) closeness centrality defined as follows:

**Degree centrality** reveals how many direct ties an individual has to others in a network. Degree is an indicator of access to sources of support. “Actors who have more ties have greater opportunities because they have choices. This autonomy makes them less dependent on any specific other actor, and hence more powerful ” (Haneman 2001:65).

**Closeness centrality** indicates how close is an individual to other actors in a network. Closeness is measured by the number of ties an actor has to go through in order to reach another actor. These distances, called path lengths, can go from one, when an actor has direct tie with another, to several, depending on the size and characteristics of the network. An individual who has many one path length contacts is in a favorable to position to spread information or to receive information (Hanneman 2001: 37). Closeness is also a kind of index of expected time until the arrival, for a given actor, of whatever is going on in the network (Everett 2007).

**Betweenness centrality** measures the extent to which an actor can be a broker or a bridge in a network; a position which might indicate a potential for control over others (Scott 1991) or control over the flow of information. Betweenness, in other words, measures how often a person lies along the shortest path between two other persons. Actors that lie between other pairs of actors have the capacity to isolate people (Hanemann 2001) as well as bringing together separate groups.

**Results and Analysis**

As mentioned above, the eight questions previously listed generated an equal number of social networks of the village. This means that the way social relations in the community are structured under question one: “Who would you borrow money from” is not that same as in question eight “who do you trust to talk about local politics”. This is so because households
provided different names for different questions, although they often mention the same names for some questions—relatives for example, might be mentioned in several questions. Throughout the chapter I use the local word *recinto* to refer to the eight settlements or pueblos that make up the Comuna Limoncito. The word village refers to all the recintos together and the word Comunero to all inhabitants of Limoncito, when explicitly talking about membership in the Comuna I use the words Comuna members.

Social networks were analyzed with UCINET software which provided visual and statistical analysis of networks. Results were then correlated against two measures collected for each household: (1) membership in agricultural associations; (2) membership in the Comuna. The results show that Comuna members are always more centrally positioned in all networks than non-members. Members of associations are almost always more centrally positioned in all networks than non-members.

**Reading Social Network Visualizations**

Throughout this chapter I will provide a combination of statistical and narrative explanations for each network. As mentioned previously, the combination of participant observation data gathering techniques in conjunction with social network analysis provides rich historical and social explanations otherwise unavailable by means of survey-based methods attempting to explain associative behaviors. First, I present visual representations of the eight social networks. In them, each actor is represented with a dot, called a node in the jargon of the field; the reported relations among actors are represented with lines joining them together. If an actor was mentioned several times, she or he will have as many lines connecting her/him to

---

19 The lines are directional, and can be represented with arrows. When an actor is mentioned by another actor the arrow will point in the direction of the person mentioned. Arrows were omitted in the diagrams to make them visually more clear.
others. On a limited number of occasions, actors were neither mentioned by anyone, nor did they mention anyone in response to a question. In this case the node becomes an isolate, located in the upper left corner of the diagram. It is important to notice how the network representation generated by UCINET software fits the spatial distribution of recintos in the Comuna in all networks.

**Network 1 “Money”**

Suppose you have an emergency and you need to borrow 10 dollars, Mention five persons you would borrow money from.

![Network 1 with recintos by color](image)

**Figure 5-1 Network 1 with recintos by color**

**Analysis**

The first and most visually striking feature of this network is that the visual representation of this network (figure 5.1) matches the spatial composition of the recintos of the Comuna (see figure 5.2). The five major clusters in the diagram match the five *recintos*—small villages—of the
Comuna: Algarrobos, Tres Mangos, San Sebastián, Huancavelica, a fifth one, formed by the smaller recintos of El Ceibo, Loma Alta, Las Palmas I and Las Palmas II, which lie on the left of the figure and on the right of the map. The ethnographic record indicates that inhabitants of San Sebastián and Huancavelca share closer ties not only because the two recintos are spatially close to each other, but also because they share strong kin ties. Households in both recintos help each other. San Sebastián is the hub for small commerce; therefore, cash is available year-long for some of its inhabitants. Lola Rosales for example (Lola in figure 5-3), along with her husband Pedro have some of the highest household scores in all centrality measures. Pedro is considered a generous man, he owns a bar facing the paved road to the coast on the edge of the Comuna and also sells gasoline. Lola sells fried snacks near the bar.

In Tres Mangos, Maracio’s and Jairo’s households have the highest degree centrality scores. Maracio features prominently in all three measures. He has sold fish for over 20 years, his wife used to work in the tuna processing plant. They also own cattle and have a large network of family members in urban areas as well as sons and daughters in their late teens and early twenties whom help financially to the household. Jairo, as mentioned above has been President of the Comuna on two occasions, owns two buses and was the President of the Public Transport Cooperative in Northern Colonche. Not surprisingly those who are wealthier are more often called upon for help. Borrowing money nonetheless, is to some degree restricted by recinto. As we will continue to see, social relations are compartmentalized by recinto. And as I have discussed, the different recintos have historically struggled to get along after they decided to become a Comuna and have a central government, usually dominated by people of Tres Mangos and Algarrobos.
Figure 5-3 Degree centrality for network 1 “Money”. Recintos from top right, clock-wise: Algarrobos, Tres Mangos, San Sebastián (yellow), Huancavilca, Las Palmas 1 (Fausto), and El Ceibo (Amalia). The larger the node, the highest the degree score.

In Huancavilca, for example, the household with the highest degree centrality, as well as very high closeness and betweenness scores belongs to Miriam (see figure 5-3). She was the former President of a savings and loans association (part of PRODEPINE, see Chapter 1), recently, she has become a private lender in the wake of the break up the association. Her husband Lucrecio owns a DJ business for private and community celebrations. She is very involved in community organizing and municipal politics, and is a very influential voice in recinto politics and finances as many people go to her for formal and informal loans. Fausto and Amalia hold similar positions. Fausto has been involved in community organizing for decades, he is very well known among non-governmental organizations as well as municipal officials in the region. His mother is a prominent figure in the Rio Nuevo-El Ceibo region. Amalia, is a money lender, midwife, and small merchant. She is also an evangelist who likes to “preach the
word” as people pointed out to me. Individuals who are the most sought after for a 10 dollar loan are those with financial means. Tres Mangos is the barrio with the highest centrality scores. On the other hand, Algarrobos, has very limited influence, despite their historical importance in negotiating local governance with Tres Mangos.

**Network 2 “Food”**

Do you exchange produce, meat, or prepared meals with people in town? If so, please mention five families you share food with.

![Network 2 with recintos by color](image)

**Analysis**

The pattern of compartmentalized relations observed in the borrowing money network is even more pronounced in network 2. Even the social ties in the smaller recintos of El Ceibo, Loma Alta and Las Palmas I and 2 are separate, which show the importance of proximity in
sharing food. Ethnographically, this also makes sense, as recintos were originally constituted by a few extended families, and new couples continue to settle near their parents. The food network, in conjunction with the Tools and Personal networks provide evidence of the pattern of social organization of the village. In addition, the results show that trust and reciprocity exist in the village, which does not necessarily translate into formal organizations of successful economic goals. An issue I touched upon in previous chapters and will expand below.

**Network 3 “Jobs”**

Suppose you are looking for a job or looking for buyers for your product, mention five persons you would go to for help to find a job, or find buyers.

![Network 3 with recintos by color](image)

Figure 5.5 Network 3 with recintos by color

**Analysis**

This is the only network where we see greater connections among recintos. The neat distinction of the previous network disappears to give way to a fuzzier pattern where the
distinction between Algarrobos and Tres Mangos is less apparent, also happening to a lesser
degree between San Sebastián and Huancavilca. Looking at the three centrality scores for the
Jobs question (table 5.1), we see that some of the highest scores belong to Milo, Eusebio,
Carmita, and Jairo. They are the most named persons in the town when it comes to finding out
about job opportunities and agricultural markets opportunities. In addition, they also act as
bridges between many other households.

Table 5-1 Individuals with the highest centrality measures in network 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eusebio</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>Eusebio</td>
<td>15.357</td>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>12.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carmita</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Carmita</td>
<td>15.047</td>
<td>Jairo</td>
<td>8.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>15.047</td>
<td>Nilma</td>
<td>8.184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fausto</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>14.785</td>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>7.689</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jairo</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>Nilma</td>
<td>14.759</td>
<td>Rocio</td>
<td>7.339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>5.569</td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>13.028</td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>1.097</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Milo, Eusebio, and Jairo have been Presidents of the Comuna, Carmita is the elementary school
teacher in Tres Mangos, originally from there, she is married to Eusebio’s brother, Pablo, also a
former President of the Comuna, and one of the founders of the re-established Comuna in 1979.
Eusebio, like his brother Pablo, is a person with many connections at the regional and national
level. According to him, he has good relationships with at least one Congress member in Quito.
He is a very out-going person an avid contractor constantly in search for business in the regional
construction industry; he usually finds larger contracts that some other contractors in the village.
Eusebio is playfully -and mockingly- called *el rey*- the king- in the Comuna as he likes to brag
about his business and his connections. Milo was President of the Comuna for two consecutive
years (2002-2003). He was able to reconcile the different factions that emerged after the land
sales conflict in the late 1990s. A gifted orator, and a man of grand ideas he is recognized
throughout the region for his participation in many governmental and non-governmental projects. He is related to Pedro and Lola in San Sebastián.

Carmita, like her husband Pablo and her brother-in-law Eusebio, have a large network of family members and acquaintances that transcend the village and the region. She is a *maestra fiscal* – a ministry of education tenured elementary school teacher, a highly coveted job. Her husband is also a teacher in a nearby town, although he rarely participates in social and political issues in the community. Once again, we see that wealthier individuals, with access to a wider net of resources many times financial, other times social, and usually both are the most sought after for help finding jobs.

**Network 4 “Babysitting”**

Suppose you have to leave town for a couple of days and you need someone to take care of your kids. Mention five families you would ask to do so.
Analysis

Network five indicates that parents in Loma Alta trust the care of their children to those who live in their own recinto. These patterns confirm the idea that recintos act in some respects like independent social units – location is a driving force in social structure. As I have previously mentioned they banded together under the Comuna legal entity to save their lands. Recintos are usually made up of extended families, which explain the clear preference for intra-recinto child care. Nonetheless, parents trust the care of their children to neighbors not necessarily related by blood. Neighbors, in other words, know each other very well and trust each other, a cultural value associated with social capital which in this particular example does not transcend location.

Network 5 “Group Loan”

Mention five persons you would trust to share a group loan.

Figure 5-7 Network 5 with recintos by color
Analysis

In network five we asked people to name five persons they would trust to share a group loan, “the type that development institutions offer and one in which all members of the group monitor each other in order to maintain a good credit history” we expanded when interviewees demanded clarification. The results once again reinforce the reliance on social relations by recinto, with a few exceptions. A closer look of the social dynamics between trust and loans show a preference to mention people with experience in projects, and community organizing, many of these are, or have been local government officials, sometimes, they also are wealthier individuals. In Algarrobos and Tres Mangos, for example, there is a tendency to name highly experienced community leaders and Cabildo officers, yet, some of the names with high centrality measures on other networks are missing, for example Eusebio and Jairo. A look at the highest degree centrality scores for this network shows which persons have the most direct ties to other actors, an indication of “popularity” in the association network.

Table 5.2 Individuals with highest centrality measures in network 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Barrio</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Barrio</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>Algarrobos</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Miriam</td>
<td>Huancavilca</td>
<td>14.519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fausto</td>
<td>Rio Nuevo</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Juanita</td>
<td>Las Palmas II</td>
<td>11.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>Algarrobos</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>Huancavilca</td>
<td>10.831</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>Tres Mangos</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>Tres Mangos</td>
<td>9.581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paula</td>
<td>San Sebastián</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>JuvenalG</td>
<td>El Ceibo</td>
<td>9.044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angel</td>
<td>Algarrobos</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>Misael</td>
<td>Las Palmas II</td>
<td>8.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>Huancavilca</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>Catalino</td>
<td>Huancavilca</td>
<td>7.808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam</td>
<td>Huancavilca</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>Tres Mangos</td>
<td>6.607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hugo</td>
<td>El Ceibo</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>Carmita</td>
<td>Tres Mangos</td>
<td>6.591</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, wealthier businessmen like Eusebio and Jairo in Tres Mangos, and Rosa Greis in San Sebastián are missing, while veteran leader/officers such as Miguel in Tres Mangos, Milo in Huancavilca, and Beto and Ecuador in Algarrobos take prominent roles (these last two come right below Carmita in betweenness scores). Like Milo, Beto, Ecuador, and
Miguel have been Cabildo officers for at least five terms and have occupied many other positions in services committees, like the water service committee, health-related committees, and many NGOs projects. Beto was the President of the Maize growers association of Algarrobos as of 2004. Chichi had also been an official in the Huancavilca Maize Growers Association.

These results indicate that people associate group loans with finding knowledgeable people to share responsibilities with. In fact, I believe they are sacrificing trustworthiness in order to have experienced people. A group’s loan is a financial obligation which requires specialized financial knowledge, something leaders are seen as having. In addition, leaders have connections, which in the context of how credit operates in this region this is a rational strategy to follow. As we have seen, credit is very scare and perhaps granted through special favors, as some producers argue (see chapter 2). In addition, the individuals listed in table 2 have proven their leadership or interesting in advancing projects beneficial to the community. For many of them, this commitment involves considerable investment in time and money. To be an officer of an association or local government entails a considerable expenditure of time traveling to Santa Elena and other towns to meet municipal government officials, NGO staff, and meetings related to other government programs such as el Seguro Campesinos, and occasion those of the Federacion de Comunas. A second degree organization in the peninsula. In addition, leaders and officials receive daily requests for help usually dealing with people’s legal and bureaucratic questions. In this sense, they are trustworthy individuals; they have proven their commitment to larger communal causes and most people understand that there is a level of personal and financial sacrifice involved in representing an association or the Cabildo.
Network 6 “Tools”

Suppose you need to borrow a tool. Mention five persons you would ask for the tool.

Figure 5.8 Network 6 with recintos by color

Analysis

A striking feature of this network is an even neater spatial division into the five main recintos that make up the village. Even in the El Ceibo—Loma Alta-Rio Nuevo cluster (left side of figure) individuals borrow tools from their neighbors. The theoretical significance of this network is twofold. First it reinforces the idea that the recintos in many ways act as independent communities that for specific historical reasons decided to have a central government. Secondly, that certain resources in the village as a whole are less centralized in few individuals than others. For example, information about jobs and buyers (network 3), is concentrated in fewer individuals than tools, in every community there are people you can borrow tools from but not always
people who know about jobs and buyers. In a sense, this is an indicator of uneven distribution of resources in the village.

Network 7 “Personal”

Suppose you are very sad because of a personal family problem you had. Mention five persons you would trust your problem to.

![Network 7 with recintos by color](image)

Figure 5.9 Network 7 with recintos by color

Analysis

The purpose of this question, as with the child care question, was to point out at the complexity of using trust as an explanatory category in social capital. Without doubt, people in Loma Alta trust each other; in this particular network, Comuneros trust people in their own recinto more than those outside of it. There are a few nodes that do not correspond to their own recintos. These correspond to persons who mentioned family members inhabiting a recinto
different from theirs; this is rare because the vast majority of people trusts their neighbors and has family members in their own barrio. Beyond the specifics of family residence patterns, we have a repeated pattern of social fissioning in which barrios function as independent social units. The importance of this pattern is that the smaller barrio units seem to have with higher levels of trust as compared to barrios as a unified political unit called the Comuna. This finding supports the narrative presented in the ethnographic chapter, where I described conflicts over services and projects between recintos and Comuna. In addition, this network also indicates a muti-layered meaning of trust at a local level. Trust in Loma Alta seems to have a variety of definitions that vary according to the realm of life they pertain to. Those trusted to be partners of a loan group are not necessarily the same as those trusted to find a job or take care of your kids. This is an important point to keep in mind when developing indexes of trust in relation to development.

However, as discussed in the theoretical part of this work (chapter 1), we also have to consider the multiplicity of roles that a dyadic or polyadic relationships entail. While trusts might be segmented by sphere of life, relationships can cover several aspects of social life. A compadre might be a loving padrino but a less than ideal business partner or fellow member of an association. That is the challenge that the study of participation and collective action faces, how to find analytical variables that can catch the complexity of social life, yet provide comparable and perhaps generalizable data. I will expand on this last point in the conclusion we discuss the different approaches in knowledge gathering by both development professionals and academics, in particular anthropologists.
Network 8 “Politics”

Suppose you are very angry as a result of a decision taken by the Comuna government or by an association you belong to (for example: Seguro Campesino, Junta de Agua). Mention five persons you would trust to share your discontent with the decision taken.

Figure 5-10 Network 8 with recintos by color

Centrality measures for this network show that some of those with the highest betweenness (those who link the highest bridging and brokering potential) are also prominent officers and leaders in the community. For example, Milo in Huancavilca, Beto in Algarrobos, Julio in Tres Mangos and Miriam in Huancavilca, all of them have been highly involved in local development projects as well as regional politics. Julio, like Milo has been Presidents of the Comuna in at
least 2 occasions. Concha, and her husband own the only store in El Ceibo. She belongs to
minority of is evangelicals in her pueblo and Comuna as a whole.

All the persons listed in table 5-3 have the highest degree centrality scores (most direct ties
to others) in this network. They all have been government officers and community organizers.
Fausto, as we have seen, is highly active in promoting community development initiatives for his
community, carefully stating away from Comuna government influence. Gina is the daughter of
Miriam and Lucrecio influential Huancavilca residents as I mentioned before. Mirroring network
five (Group Loan) we see again a strong relationship between prominent position in the
community and trust; this time in talking about political issues. At first sight this is confusing,
since it is precisely those who occupy local government positions who are more commonly
accused of negligence, selfishness, and corruption. A likely explanation lies in the political
organization of the village. As we saw in the ethnographic chapter, many political and
institutional aspects of village life are carried out at the recinto level. Recinto organizations and
village government do not usually share common developmental goals, which explain the pattern
of distinct groupings by recinto in the network. In addition, while officers and leaders are
criticized and distrusted by some, they still have the highest centrality measures. This
contradiction seems to indicate two things: first, that leaders are trusted by members of their
recintos while distrusted by those outside of them; second, that leaders are indispensable brokers
between the community and the outside world. As we have seen in the ethnographic chapter, this
contradiction has to do with how the Comuna has formed political alliances by recinto, and how
recintos tend to argue over political control amongst them. In the chapter examining the World
Bank’s SOCAP IQ we will see similar results.
Table 5-3 Individuals with highest centrality measures in network 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>23.807</td>
<td>Fausto</td>
<td>12.205</td>
<td>Jairo</td>
<td>26.569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>17.854</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>8.268</td>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>26.376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concha</td>
<td>15.269</td>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>7.48</td>
<td>Gina</td>
<td>26.078</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plácido</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>7.087</td>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>25.657</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gina</td>
<td>14.732</td>
<td>Angel</td>
<td>6.299</td>
<td>Augusto</td>
<td>25.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alejandro</td>
<td>14.568</td>
<td>JuvenalG</td>
<td>6.299</td>
<td>JuanM</td>
<td>24.878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>13.307</td>
<td>Jairo</td>
<td>5.906</td>
<td>Ramiro</td>
<td>24.732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miriam</td>
<td>13.002</td>
<td>Gina</td>
<td>5.512</td>
<td>Fausto</td>
<td>24.612</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Going back to the analysis of network seven dealing with trust about personal matters, we can expand on the complex nature of trust. As I indicated above trust acquires many meanings and definitions\(^\text{20}\) that vary according to the situation at hand; this is so because trust is subsumed in kinship patterns, agrarian histories, spatial arrangements (distance among barrios), economic transactions and emotional ties. This represents a methodological challenge to any kind of analysis and in particular survey type instruments.

The networks I presented provided a systematic interpretation of social relations and their relations to ideological categories such as trust, as well as more material ones such as economic relations. In the next section, I present a number of correlations between the eight networks to further my argument.

**Quadratic Assignment Procedure**

The Quadratic Assignment Procedure (QAP) tests the association between pairs of networks and assesses to what degree their association is due to chance. Table 5.4 shows the correlations among the eight social networks elicited, all of which are significant. The relationships between pairs of networks will help to further uncover patterns of social relations, the structure of those relations, and how they relate to the ethnographic description and analysis.

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\(^{20}\) I depart from the assumption that the questions asked were meaningful and clear to participants.
offered in chapter 3. Next, I focus on 5 networks correlations in order to support my argument:

(1) Food and Jobs; (2) Politics and Jobs; (3) Baby-sitting and Food; (4) Group Loan and Personal; and (5) Group Loan and Jobs

**Food and Jobs and Tools and Jobs Have the Lowest Correlation Scores**

I have previously argued that access to agriculture-related assistance and government services in Loma Alta flows through a vertical or hierarchical system in which leaders serve as brokers between the local population and government and non-government authorities. The Jobs network indicates that power is more centralized, meaning that compared with other networks, fewer people hold more strategic positions, in other words, a limited number of people get asked about where to get a job. Also, the network is less circumscribed to recintos than all others, and in particular the Food network. This means that to find information about jobs individuals might have to go beyond their neighbors in their barrio to find out. On the other hand, exchanging food is carried out amongst neighbors at the recinto level. Borrowing a tool from someone is also dependent upon proximity. While one of your neighbors is likely to have the tool you need, he or she might not have the connections or social resources to know about jobs available.

**Table 5-4 Statistical correlation among networks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Money</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Jobs</th>
<th>Babysitting</th>
<th>Group Loan</th>
<th>Tools</th>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Politics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Money</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>0.374</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>0.234</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Babysitting</td>
<td>0.399</td>
<td>0.579</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Loan</td>
<td>0.368</td>
<td>0.341</td>
<td>0.263</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>0.327</td>
<td>0.436</td>
<td>0.213</td>
<td>0.404</td>
<td>0.318</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>0.402</td>
<td>0.447</td>
<td>0.227</td>
<td>0.471</td>
<td>0.363</td>
<td>0.378</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>0.276</td>
<td>0.328</td>
<td>0.174</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.331</td>
<td>0.319</td>
<td>0.342</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Politics and Jobs Networks Have a Low Correlation Score

To find out about a job, people approach specific individuals who are better connected with municipal government employees, people who reside in cities like Libertad and Salinas, and with those who have contacts with employees and executives of the one NGO working in the region on economic development. These individuals are also the same who hold Cabildo positions or important local jobs, such as teachers. They are well-connected people and they expect to be asked for help, as well as to be asked for favors. On the other hand, when comuneros talk about politics, they seem to approach their neighbors, kin, and friends. In addition, the network for Jobs show relations that go beyond barrios, the politics network is highly restricted by barrio.

Loma Alta is a town going through a process of organizational fissioning in which barrios are becoming increasingly independent and requesting governmental and non-governmental services independently of the centralized Comuna local government. This process is in part the result of continuous disputes among barrios about how to best acquire governmental and non-government services: water, housing, health, economic projects, etc. In addition, differences about land sales, and past allegations about corrupt practices by leadership have also contributed to social disruption. It could be that people in general are careful about who they share their thoughts with on power relations, given the political atmosphere in the Comuna. Another possible explanation is that people talk to their friends and neighbors and do not worry about political repercussions because of their opinions. The latter is supported by the neat clustering along barrios in the politics network.

Baby-Sitting (Baby) and Food Exchange (Food) are Highly Correlated

While food exchange is an activity easily associated with proximity, it can be argued that parents are more likely to trust family and close friends over neighbors. In Loma Alta, barrios are
made up of extended family units, and within barrios, sub-divisions show kin groupings more pronouncedly. Therefore, proximity and kin relations are associated.

**Association is Somewhat Strongly Associated with Personal (0.363) and Money (0.368); but Less Strongly Associated with Jobs (0.263)**

Jobs and Association are somewhat weakly correlated because Jobs is centralized around fewer actors, usually local leaders. In the Association network, individuals considered trustworthy of sharing the financial responsibility of a loan include both influential individuals, such as local leaders as well as friends and family regardless of their financial prowess. The network in this sense is less centralized. Table 5.5 shows the actors with the top five centrality scores in the association network.

In the association network results show that except for Juvenal G, Paula, and Catalino, all other individuals have constantly hold local government positions (Milo, Miguel, Beto, Ecuador, and Julio) or are recognized local leaders with extensive exposure to NGO sponsored associations, locally organized associations, and/or government sponsored projects (Juanita, Miriam, and Carmita as well as the men listed above). Paula, the only person with limited formal involvement in politics or development initiatives is a very successful small-business owner in San Sebastián.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Betweenness</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>ID</th>
<th>Closeness</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Miriam</td>
<td>14.519</td>
<td>Beto</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>21.149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Juanita</td>
<td>11.692</td>
<td>Fausto</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>Julio</td>
<td>20.735</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>10.831</td>
<td>Ecuador</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Carmita</td>
<td>20.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>9.581</td>
<td>Miguel</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>Catalino</td>
<td>20.684</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JuvenalG</td>
<td>9.044</td>
<td>Paula</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Milo</td>
<td>20.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>2.742</td>
<td>MEAN</td>
<td>17.202</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The results of the QAP helped to strengthen the argument that social capital variables such as trust, reciprocity, and association patterns in Limoncito are influenced by structural
arrangements of social relations, that is by the particular ways in which people are located in the social structure of the Comuna. In the next section I compare the centrality measures of those Comuneros who are associated and those who are not as a way to complement and contrast the results of the SOCAP IQ in the previous chapter. First I look at differences between Comuna and non-Comuna members, followed by a comparison of members and non-members of agricultural producers associations.

**Centrality Scores of Comuna Members and Non-Members**

The purpose of this section is to uncover possible substantial differences between the centrality scores of those individuals who are members of the Comuna and those who are not. This comparison goes to the core of the argument about the role of participation and civic engagement as discussed through ethnographic observation and analysis in chapter 3. Below, I present the scores of comuneros and no-comuneros for each of the networks, and for each centrality measure (table 5-6). In every single category, members of the Comuna (comuneros) have higher scores than non-members of the Comuna (non-comunero). Those who are members of the Comuna occupy more important positions (bridging, brokering, more direct contacts, shorter path lengths to others) in the social structure of the village than those who are not members. The highest differences exist in the following measures and networks: degree in “Group Loan”; closeness in “Money”; and degree in “Politics”. The lowest differences occur in closeness in “Babysitting”; closeness in network 3 “Jobs”; and betweenness in network 3 “Jobs”.

The highest differences usually occur in degree measures, indicating that Comuna members have more direct contacts with others than non-comuneros, in this sense we can say that they depend less on others for access to resources.
Table 5-6 Centrality Scores of Comuna members and non-members

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Centrality measure</th>
<th>Network</th>
<th>Non comunero</th>
<th>Comunero</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Prob&gt;t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Group Loan</td>
<td>0.9134</td>
<td>1.7448</td>
<td>-0.8314</td>
<td>0.0036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Babysitting</td>
<td>2.2333</td>
<td>2.8279</td>
<td>-0.5946</td>
<td>0.1931</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>0.9401</td>
<td>2.0607</td>
<td>-1.1206</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>0.9142</td>
<td>1.3417</td>
<td>-0.4275</td>
<td>0.0724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>1.0842</td>
<td>1.8128</td>
<td>-0.7286</td>
<td>0.0028</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>1.6054</td>
<td>2.5639</td>
<td>-0.9585</td>
<td>0.0234</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>1.5444</td>
<td>2.5282</td>
<td>-0.9838</td>
<td>0.0227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Betweenness</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>1.1997</td>
<td>2.053</td>
<td>-0.8533</td>
<td>0.0355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Group Loan</td>
<td>17.005</td>
<td>17.465</td>
<td>-0.46</td>
<td>0.1048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Babysitting</td>
<td>13.19</td>
<td>13.499</td>
<td>-0.309</td>
<td>0.1565</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>21.423</td>
<td>22.685</td>
<td>-1.262</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>12.849</td>
<td>13.267</td>
<td>-0.418</td>
<td>0.0569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>25.145</td>
<td>27.446</td>
<td>-2.301</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>22.285</td>
<td>23.39</td>
<td>-1.105</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>19.971</td>
<td>21.622</td>
<td>-1.651</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closeness</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>20.189</td>
<td>21.438</td>
<td>-1.249</td>
<td>0.0011</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Group Loan</td>
<td>5.7671</td>
<td>8.5688</td>
<td>-2.8017</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Babysitting</td>
<td>5.2123</td>
<td>5.6789</td>
<td>-0.4666</td>
<td>0.0854</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Food</td>
<td>6.0822</td>
<td>6.9174</td>
<td>-0.8352</td>
<td>0.0039</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Jobs</td>
<td>4.863</td>
<td>6.5138</td>
<td>-1.6508</td>
<td>0.0018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>5.6233</td>
<td>7.8073</td>
<td>-2.184</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>5.5685</td>
<td>6.8716</td>
<td>-1.3031</td>
<td>0.0002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>5.863</td>
<td>8.2569</td>
<td>-2.3939</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Tools</td>
<td>6.445</td>
<td>8.0092</td>
<td>-1.5642</td>
<td>0.0001</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Small differences in betweenness scores between the two groups indicate that there is no significant difference in brokering or bridging positions -the capacity of certain individuals to control the flow of information and resources or conversely, to rapidly distribute it. On the other hand, comuna members do have higher degree scores meaning their positions in the network allow them to contact more persons directly, without intermediaries. Next, I provide an interpretation of these results based on my observations and interviews in the village.

**In Money and Politics, Comuna Members Have Considerably Higher Scores**

Comuna members reside mostly in Tres Mangos and Algarrobos. These barrios also hold the historically prominent families that reestablished the Comuna in 1979. In Algarrobos, many
Comuneros are maize growers who own large tracts of land, in addition to cattle. In Tres Mangos, commercial farmers tend to grow fruits and vegetables. In addition, Comuna members own the largest convenience stores in Algarrobos and Tres Mangos (and Huancavilca), and hold the few government and non-government positions available in the Comuna. Comuna members, therefore, tend to be wealthier, and tend to be Cabildo officers.

The Olmedo family for example, which includes Eusebio, have historically been brokers with outside authorities, particularly in the area of education and Comuna government affairs. Eusebio’s brother, Pablo, was of the founders of the new Comuna, his wife is Carmita, is the only elementary school teacher with ministerial tenure (maestro fiscal). A third brother, Edgardo is also an agricultural producer. The three brothers are Comuna members, and so are, their married sons and daughters. They form an influential, extended family unit, all Comuneros, which extends favors to others.

A larger and equally influential extended family are the Catutos, they form a kin group with complex blood relations composed of several full and half brothers and sisters who are constantly elected to the top positions of Comuna government, and have served, like the Olmedos, as brokers with NGOs and the municipality for over 30 years. Jairo Arroyo, for example, has been President of the Comuna three terms as well as President of the Transportation Cooperative (public buses), the only one to operate in northern Colonche. In addition, he and his brother Julio have served as campaign organizers for candidates to the municipal presidency of Santa Elena. All married Catutos, are members of the Comuna, forming another large block of kin and non-kin alliances dominating Comuna politics. In conclusion, Comuna members form strong kin networks that concentrate economic and political wealth in
Algarrobos and Tres Mangos, and to a lesser degree Huancavilca. These extended family blocks provide favors to a number of people in town and are in themselves allied by marriage.

**There is a Small Difference in the Centrality Measures of Babysitting and Jobs for both Groups**

Previously I argued that certain types of trust, such as that seen in the childcare network make it problematic to make a neat correlation between a unified concept of trust and economic development. A community might have limited success in associating for economic purposes but high levels of trust when it comes to childcare or sharing food. In this sense, it makes sense that Comuna members and non-members show little statistical difference. Nonetheless, another measure I expected to be similar between comuneros and no-comuneros was the network “Personal”, in which people mentioned those they talked to about personal matters. This is not the case, and further research needs to be carried out to find out why this is so.

Differences between groups is also minimal in betweenness and closeness in the “Jobs” network (although is very high in favor of Comuneros in degree) leading to a contradictory conclusion: both non-members and members of the Comuna occupy positions of power when it comes to information, or perhaps, recommendations to get jobs or find buyers. This means that networks associated with money and politics are not necessarily dominated by Comuna members. There is one likely explanation for this contradiction –keeping in mind that Comuneros still dominate every single “Jobs” measure- if we look at who is a member in the Comuna by barrio, we will see that non-Comuna members are also wealthy influential individuals. For example, the vast majority of families in San Sebastián are not affiliated. In addition, San Sebastián has the largest number of profitable, small businesses. As previously mentioned, Rosa Greis and her husband own a large motorcycle repair shop; Paula Beltran runs a photocopy and telephone services shop, and the popular billiard and bar next to it is owned by
Paula’s parents. Business owners in San Sebastián might not be members of Comuna Limoncito but they know many people through their commercial prowess. The Algarrobos and Tres Mangos barrios have its share of powerful actors, most of whom are Comuna members, but so does San Sebastián and to a limited degree Loma Alta-El Ceibo, where most people are non-members, therefore, fractioning the composition of the Comuna into different networks of power.

**Centrality Scores of Agricultural Association Members and Non-Members**

A comparison of centrality scores between members and non-members of agricultural associations indicates that members have higher scores in all degree measures (number of direct contact with other actors, a measure of independence from brokers) and mixed scores in betweenness (ability to link or isolate sub-groups) and closeness (proximity to all others in the network). In relation to betweenness, non-members have higher numbers in three networks: “Money”; “Personal”; and “Babysitting”. Unlike, the Jobs network in which power tends to concentrate on fewer actors, or networks like “Group Loan” where more central individuals are those who exhibit a mixture of trustworthiness, wealth, and leadership, the three networks mentioned above, are networks that I associate with non-material aspects of communal trust. Sharing personal problems or asking people to look after your children have more to do with proximity and kinship than with strategic calculations. The network Money does not fit well in this description, except in the sense that people do not simply go and ask the wealthiest persons in community to borrow money ($10 was the hypothetical amount in the questionnaire), there has to be some degree of acquaintance with the person. Eusebio and Jairo are wealthier than many families, yet many would exploit all other alternatives before asking them a favor, for example, asking Maracio and his wife (a fish seller-cattle grower and a fish plant worker,
respectively), simply, as someone told me, because they are nicer, implying along the way that they were also more humble.

Closeness indicates the number of path lengths between nodes (contacts along the way) that an actor has to go through before he or she can reach other actors. In this case, it means that non-members are positioned in the network in such as way that when it comes to babysitting, exchanging food, and borrowing tools they can access these opportunities faster. It takes shorter path lengths for them to reach these resources. I have argued that these networks are the least related to power and politics and closer to communal support networks of daily necessities. Closeness is not usually a measure used to understand power relations, it tells us about the overall structure of the network, in that sense, it is also telling that non-members score higher in the least politicized networks. Conversely, as in Comuna membership, members score higher in all degree measures, particularly in Group Loan, Jobs, and Politics (table 5-6) indicating that non-members have less direct connections to others in networks, supporting the argument that they are dependent for favors and resources on a limited number of people. This point supports the argument that members of associations command more economic and political resources, they are better-off in general.

**Conclusion**

The networks I have shown, uncovered patterns of social relations in Limoncito. They show that there is a tendency for those with strong structural positions to be members of both the Comuna and producers’ associations. SNA is not infallible in its predictive power. Some of the people with the strongest centrality measures were not members or either the Comuna or associations. They seem to fulfill important roles at the recinto level that neither SNA nor the ethnographic record was able to detect. This is the case of Concha and Alejandrina in figure 5-2. Examples such as this indicate that SNA is an excellent medium to uncover structural patterns of
relations; it gives order to the whole structure. The network visualizations, for example, match the fractioned nature of the community, not only along political lines but also geographically. The shortcoming of networks data is that beyond providing data that aptly describes structural patterns of social relations, it requires considerable ethnographic data to accurately interpret its results. In a community of the size of Limoncito, with five different population clusters, I was able to draw these conclusions after long-term ethnographic research. Without it, my analysis would have been more limited.

For social capital assessments social network analysis I strongly recommend its use. Even without extensive knowledge of social organization in a community, SNA uncovers very neat structural patterns of association. It can clearly show clusters and cliques of people that for some reasons are close; conversely it can provide data about factions and people who occupy central positions and connect or perhaps, disconnect groups of people. Doing so, would force researchers to include conflict and unequal relations if power at the local level and by default how these relate to trust, participation, and membership.

SNA is not a “silver bullet” that can fix the problems of definition and assessment of social capital. It is nonetheless, a very effective technique that can be used to rapidly uncover patterns of social relations. From a project execution and evaluation point of view, SNA is highly efficient (and cost effective) as it provides readily identifiable avenues of investigation in the form of patterns of social relations that can ideally be followed up or preceded by ethnographic data and surveys.
CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

In this study I hypothesized that participation in producers associations could be better predicted by the position that households occupy in the social structure of Comuna Limoncito. This hypothesis arose from the dominant conceptualization of social capital, the communitarian view, which places considerable emphasis on values of participation as drivers of what makes people participate and organize for collective and individual goals. This appreciation comes directly from the World Bank literature on social capital, which acknowledges the work of Robert Putnam as the most influential factor in their construction of the concept. Another concern discussed in this study is the idea that social capital is a causal factor determining household welfare. The fear here is that, since social capital is usually equated with collective action and organizational capacity, it follows that differences in welfare will be attributed to differences in abilities to organize and participate. I have tried to show that the reasons why people decide to participate are heavily influenced by the nature of social relations in the community, such as the existence of patron-client types and the history of political relations among sector of the community. Social capital specialists as the World Bank, acknowledge that networks play a role in social capital (Grootaert et al 2004) and that it is made up of multiple social and cultural phenomena, nonetheless, its measuring instruments are unable to fully capture the networks approach. To include a networks component in social capital would mean to acknowledge inequality at the community level, which in turn would uncover a highly politicized culture of participation.

In order to test these ideas, I utilized three methods for measuring social capital: the World Bank’s Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire, ethnography, and Social Network Analysis. My goal in using them was to compare and cross-reference their results and determine which
elements of each method can potentially contribute to more effectively measure, define, criticize, and provide policy solutions to the problem of social capital in rural community development. Together these three techniques can potentially form a standardized research methodology applicable to project planning and evaluation.

**Ethnography**

Ethnography provides detailed data about the ideas and actual behavior of residents of a community. By establishing rapport with individuals, the researcher can potentially see how participation and membership in associations are conceptualized and negotiated by people in everyday life. Ideally, the goal of ethnographic data is to understand how economy, politics, religion, and other aspect of community life are related or separate from each other and how that affects types and forms of social capital. Ethnography is unfortunately time consuming. The nature of projects, with its numerous budget provisions, deadlines, and financial restrictions, make ethnography an unlikely partner in development research and policy. I have argued that in terms of social capital research, it is a fundamental component, as it provides data on how people structure alliances, coalitions, and associations, and the reasons they work and do not work. A final point regarding qualitative research is that focus groups, while providing valuable information and generating conversation among participants are unlikely to provide researchers with data regarding political factions and community histories of organizational failures. Such level of detail requires researchers to establish rapport with residents, which usually takes time. Once again, we are presented with an incompatible approach between “large, institutional” development policy and ethnographic-qualitative ones, which ideally should complement each other in community development.
The Social Capital Integrated Questionnaire

The SOCAP IQ is an important tool that provides standardized and concise data on participation, membership and the structure of associations. Like all surveys, it is an efficient way to draw valuable, mostly numerical data for comparison and analysis. It provides a quick entry point to further explore patterns found. In this study, the SOCAP IQ revealed differences in participation among groups that contradicted the original hypothesis. It also provided insightful results about cognitive measures, which when used in relation to ethnography provided rich interpretations. As its creators recommend, the SOCAP IQ is not intended to be used by itself. Its information needs to be cross-referenced with other data, in this study, ethnography and SNA. In this sense, the SOCAP IQ provides valuable data for base line purposes or evaluation needs.

Social Network Analysis

The contribution of SNA is more evident in its ability to uncover the overall structure of social relations of a community in a visually neat way. For the purposes of social capital research, SNA is highly adaptable to the needs of development research and policy. Data is relatively fast to obtain and provides clearly identifiable avenues of research as it shows in detail how each individual or household in a community is located in the totality of the network. It shows clusters of social relations, factions, and central actors that might control information and resources. In terms of organizational capacities and membership SNA is a very useful analytical tool. Furthermore, when combined with ethnographic data it provides rich explanations of social behavior. Since it produces numerical data, its findings can also be easily compared with other populations. As previously mentioned, the use of SNA in social capital studies as it forces researchers to consider conflict and inequality as closely related to participation and organization.
Most importantly, the three techniques seem to work best when they cross-reference each other, as they reinforce or highlight their own shortcomings. In terms of research design, I would recommend users of this method to collect a shorter version of the SOCAP IQ with the networks questions. If this is too lengthy, I would recommend collecting network data as the first step. Analysis of network results could help refine the SOCAP IQ. Once networks are collected and analyzed, researchers can potentially ask for informants’ help to understand the results. Depending on the familiarity of informants to this type of visual mapping, they might be able to provide deeper analysis. Under no circumstances should researchers incur in unethical behavior by exposing or asking about relationships that jeopardize the standing or social life of informants in the community. I did not run into this problem in this study, although there is potential for it in a small community. Using networks data to guide ethnographic data collection is in some ways a good compromise between the needs of development professionals and qualitative data gathering. Ideally, however, the three techniques should be independent enough to generate data that is not influenced by the other techniques. In the section that follows I further explore data gathering and the uses of knowledge in development anthropology and development policy.

**Further Avenues of Research and Analysis**

Household composition is an important variable influencing participatory behavior. Depending on the ratio of producers to consumers (for example, children, elderly, and members of working age), household attendance and participation in association meetings and communal work will vary. Anecdotal evidence in Limoncito indicates that households at the later stages of their life cycle, meaning those with members of working age and few or no infants are able to join producers associations, as well as engage in agricultural production every year. This unlike many young households, which cannot afford to have a member of the family dedicated full time to agriculture. Members of producers associations, as well as Cabildo officials are usually men.
with married and unmarried adult daughters and sons who work, and in many instances contribute to their parents’ expenses. In addition, it is not uncommon for extended families to live together and pooling financial resources, which as mentioned in chapter three, it allows for older men, usually the patriarch of the family, to work the land as a full time job. Younger members of the family usually find wage work in fish processing plants or in Guayaquil as maids. Further research is needed to find possible patterns in household composition and participatory practices. We might expect to find households with specific demographic compositions to have larger more time to engage in collective action, to visit and further reinforce ties of friendship and cooperation, or to be committed to the many obligations that leaders and officials face. Such findings would reinforce the idea that economic and social organization variables heavily influence participation.

The Anthropology of Development and Development Policy

There is a disconnect between the methods of anthropology and the needs of development policy. Anthropologists aim to generate detailed studies of a specific place. We seek to find universals through the in-depth study of a community or a group of people. This level of detailed knowledge has produced very valuable data on human behavior, data that is heavily grounded on the experience of individuals at the local level. Nonetheless it is a system of knowledge production that is incompatible with the way that development policy is conceived and executed. This dissertation is in many ways the result of this debate. In it I have tried to develop a multi-methodological approach to tackle a current debate in development research and policy. The design puts considerable emphasis on understanding social relations in its larger political and historical context, without this context, social capital studies run the risk of blaming the victim for an inability to organize or for having a deficient value system (Schaft and Brown 2003: 335). But to understand the reasons for mistrust, disorganization, and lack of participation,
ethnography must be part of data gathering. Achieving this under the current design preferences and operational constrains of development policy needs most likely will require a shift in the way both development professionals and academics understand the role of knowledge and how it is gathered, in achieving social change.

I am well aware that in policy contexts the ability to produce sound results under limited time is crucial. There is little room to over-problematize planning or execution and therefore, certain data gathering techniques are preferred. Still, I hope this study has demonstrated the need to use diverse methodologies as well as diverse theoretical approaches as a way to uncover multiple causes of differential welfare among individuals and households in rural communities.

**Culture in Development Policy**

My insistence in politicizing social capital is also a call to redefine the concept of culture in community development. The communitarian view of social capital shows that the need to incorporate socio-cultural phenomena in development theory and policy has led communitarian scholars to think of culture as mental imprints, as structural patterns that live somewhat immutably in people’s minds (see for example Harrison 1985; Harrison and Huntington 2000). 21 The concept of social capital in large international institutions such as the World Bank, detaches cultural values from everyday praxis, perhaps, as a way to minimize its problematic economic, political, and ideological weight. Culture, as Clifford Geertz argued, does not solely live in mental passages in the heads of individuals, culture is also experienced and negotiated in the interactions amongst individuals (1975), in that sense, culture cannot be detached from politics and history.

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21 “Underdevelopment is a State of Mind” by Lawrence Harrison is representative of this literature.
The work of James Ferguson (1990) is particularly relevant on this point, as he argues that development institutions operate under systems of knowledge that are apolitical and ahistorical. For institutional development theory and practice to work under the administrative constraints and institutional goals it faces, it has little choice but to equate rural underdevelopment with lack of complexity, with an understanding of the rural as traditional. In reference to his work in Lesotho, Ferguson argues that the end effect of this approach is that "Lesotho can be represented in 'development' discourse as a nation of farmers, not wage laborers; a country with a geography, but no history; with people, but no classes; values, but no structures; administrators, but no rulers; bureaucracy, but no politics" (1990: 66). Social capital is in part the result of this apolitical knowledge system. It is unable to accommodate politics and the interrelation between agrarian histories, national policy, and local organizational experiences. As I discussed previously, this has to do in part with how development agencies operate. They are, in many ways, bureaucratic cultures (Nolan 2002). They operate under an administrative value system where goals are specific, limited in scope, and designed to solve problems. Knowledge for development practitioners, as Nolan tells us, serves to make decisions about a problem. Development professionals are aware that they are constantly making inferences about a context and its peoples and that they assume acceptable imprecisions and “optimal ignorance” to provide solutions (Nolan 2002: 251). Anthropologists on the other hand, tend to collect knowledge to learn about a problem, to question basic aspects of a situation, and to provide context-specific answers that can potentially be applied universally. Under the bureaucratic deadlines faced by professional practitioners there is no time for basic problems or difficult to compare results. As Nolan points out, anthropologists are seen as using nonreplicable methods to gather over detailed
information that is nongeneralizable (2002: 249). This view is certainly problematic as field work based ethnography is able provide needed knowledge in social capital research.

Throughout this dissertation I have argued that participatory behavior should not be understood purely as mental capacities or attitudes. In terms of policy, one of the consequences of thinking of participatory choices as cultural imprints is that it reproduces the idea that poverty ultimately rests on the incapacities of poor people. They are incapable of accumulating trust, developing political connections, or engaging in collective action. In this framework, development outcomes are not related to politics, conflict, or inequality in access to resources. It is in a way a case of blaming the victim. Unfortunately, there is a chance that the current system of knowledge guiding policy and research at development institutions like the World Bank is heading in that direction, despite the many voices inside these agencies.

Without an analysis that focuses on structural sources of inequality and how structure and agency meet in the decisions of individuals, it becomes very easy to blame poverty and underdevelopment on lack of social capital. The challenge is to reconceptualize culture in community development policy and to add a historical dimension in order to understand how networks of relations construct and reproduce networks of power and exclusion. And conversely, how people challenge authority and create new avenues for more equal access to resources.
APPENDIX
SOCAP IQ ADAPTED

Cuestionario integrado para la medición del capital social (SCIQ)

Entrevistado: Fecha d/m/a:
Recinto:
Entrevistador:

EL objetivo general de esta encuesta es conocer qué grado de participación existe en la comuna Limoncito así como entender las relaciones sociales que existen en la comuna. Nadie sabrá lo que usted contestó excepto yo y su nombre no será usado en el estudio, solo las respuestas que nos de servirán para realizar el estudio. El estudio servirá para escribir una tesis de doctorado en la universidad de Florida en Estados Unidos. El cabildo ha dado permiso para que se lleve a cabo este estudio y a cambio, el investigador (Antonio de la Peña) ha estado trabajando con diferentes comités para traer proyectos a la comuna.

1. Grupos y redes
1.1 Me gustaría comenzar preguntándole acerca de los grupos, comités u organizaciones, en las que participa usted o un miembro de su familia. Estos podrían ser grupos formalmente organizados o simplemente grupos de personas que se reúnen de manera regular para realizar una actividad o conversar acerca de algo. Mientras leo la siguiente lista de grupos, digame si alguien de este hogar pertenece a los grupos mencionados. Si es así, digame qué miembro de la familia es más activo en dicho grupo y si él o ella participa activamente en la toma de decisiones del grupo.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nombre del grupo</th>
<th>Nombre del miembro de familia más activo</th>
<th>¿Qué tan activa es la participación de esta persona en la toma de decisiones del grupo?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comuna</td>
<td></td>
<td>1 = Líder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Agua de:</td>
<td></td>
<td>2 = Muy activa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Padres de la escuela de:</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 = Algo activa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Padres de la guardería de</td>
<td></td>
<td>4 = No participa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Padres del CAE de</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comité de Padres del CEN</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Caja Funeraria del Seguro Campesino – Algarrobos y Tres Mangos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité Pro-mejora del Cementerio</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grupo de Jovenes - El Ceibo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Academia Sta Maria del Pilar de Corte</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Beneficiencia y Ayuda - El Ceibo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comité de Acción Social – Cultura Huancavilca</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Club Social y Deportivo Tres Mangos</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Botica Comunitaria</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comité ProFiesta de</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAE</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIDI – Municipio Sta Elena</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

164
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grupo de MIDUVI</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Seguro Campesino</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Corporacion de Agricultores PROMSA</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grupo de Maiceros de</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Grupo de ganaderos de</td>
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<tr>
<td>Grupo de Apicultores</td>
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<tr>
<td>FINCA</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEPINE</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Comision de Terrenos</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinadora General de T. de Colonche y Mngl</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cooperative de Ahorro y Credito</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partido político</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otro grupo que no haya mencionado:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2 En comparación con hace cinco años atrás, ¿los miembros de su hogar participan en más o en menos comités y organizaciones?

1. Más  2. La misma cantidad  3. Menos

1.3 De todos los grupos a los que pertenecen los miembros de su hogar, nombre los dos más importantes para su hogar.

Grupo 1  Grupo 2

1.4 ¿Cuántas veces al mes alguna persona de este hogar participa en las actividades de este grupo, por ejemplo, asistiendo a reuniones o realizando trabajos para el grupo?

Grupo 1  Grupo 2

1.5 ¿Cuál es la manera de convertirse en miembro de este grupo?

1. La persona nace con derecho a ser miembro  
2. Es necesario unirse  
3. Es necesario ser invitado  
4. Es por opción propia  
5. Otra (especificar) __________________________

Grupo 1  Grupo 2

1.6 ¿Con cuánto dinero o bienes contribuyó su hogar a este grupo en los últimos 12 meses?

Grupo 1  Grupo 2

1.7 ¿A cuantas reuniones de _____ fue este en los últimos 12 meses?

Grupo 1  Grupo 2
1.8 ¿Cuál es el principal beneficio que se obtiene al unirse a [grupo 1] [grupo 2]?

1 Mejora la subsistencia actual de mi hogar y el acceso a servicios
2 Es importante en casos de emergencia o para el futuro
3 La comunidad se ve beneficiada
4 Por diversión o recreación
5 Para beneficio espiritual o de auto estima
6 Otros (especificar) __________________________________________

Grupo 1                     Grupo 2

1.10 Si analizamos lo que tienen en común los miembros de [nombre del grupo], la mayoría de ellos comparte …

1 Sí
2 No

Grupo 1                     Grupo 2

A. Que residen en la comuna
B. Que residen en el mismo recinto
C. Que son parientes
D. El mismo Sexo
E. La misma Edad

1.11 Los miembros de [grupo] tienen principalmente la misma …

1 Sí
2 No

Grupo 1                     Grupo 2

A. Ocupación
B. Formación o nivel educacional

1.12 ¿Los miembros de [grupo] son principalmente de la misma tendencia política o pertenecen al mismo partido político?

1 Sí
2 No

Grupo 1 _____                 Grupo 2 _____

1.13 ¿Algunos miembros del [grupo] son más ricos o más pobres que otros o la mayoría tiene ingresos similares?

1 Mayoría con niveles de ingreso similares
2 Combinación de ricos y pobres

Grupo 1 _____     Grupo 2 _____
1.14 En los últimos cinco años, ¿la cantidad de miembros del [grupo] ha disminuido, se ha mantenido o ha aumentado?

1 Ha disminuido  
2 Se ha mantenido  
3 Ha aumentado  
8 No sabe / no está seguro

Grupo 1 _____  Grupo 2 _____

1.15 ¿Cuando hay una decisión que tomar en el [nombre del grupo], cómo se toma esa decisión?

1 La decisión es impuesta desde afuera del grupo  
2 El líder decide y luego informa a los miembros del grupo  
3 El líder pregunta a los miembros del grupo lo que piensan y luego decide  
4 Los miembros del grupo analizan la situación y deciden en conjunto  
5 Otro método (especificar la mayoría decide, la asamblea, entonces  
8 No sabe/ no está seguro  
9 No corresponde

Grupo 1 _____  Grupo 2 _____

1.16 ¿Cómo se seleccionan los líderes del [nombre del grupo]?

1 Mediante una persona o entidad externa  
2 Cada líder elige a su sucesor  
3 A través de un pequeño grupo de miembros  
4 A través de la decisión o voto de todos los SOCIOS  
5 Otro método (especificar _________________________________________)  
8 No sabe / no está seguro  
9 No corresponde

Grupo 1 _____  Grupo 2 _____

1.17 En general, ¿los líderes del [nombre del grupo] ejercen su LIDERAZGO de manera…..

1 Muy efectiva  
2 Efectiva en parte  
3 No efectiva  
9 No corresponde

Grupo 1 _____  Grupo 2 _____

**Redes**

1.25 ¿Aproximadamente cuántos amigos cercanos tiene en la actualidad? Estas son personas con las que se siente cómodo, puede conversar sobre temas privados o puede llamar para pedir ayuda.

_____
1.26 Si repentinamente usted necesita una pequeña cantidad de dinero digamos $10 ¿cuántas personas fuera de su hogar inmediato podrían ayudarlo?

1) Nadie  
2) Una o dos personas  
3) Tres o cuatro personas  
4) Cinco o más personas

1.27 Supongamos que sufre de un grave problema económico, tal como la pérdida de su trabajo. ¿Cuántas personas cree que podría pedir ayuda en esta situación a parte de su familia inmediata?

1.28 [SI NO ES CERO] ¿La mayor parte de estas personas son de nivel económico similar, superior, inferior al suyo?

1) Similar  
2) Superior  
3) Inferior

1.29 Si repentinamente tuviera que irse por uno o dos días, ¿podría contar con sus vecinos para que cuiden de sus hijos?

1) Sí  
2) Probablemente  
3) Probablemente no  
4) No  
9) No corresponde/ no tiene hijos

1.30 El año pasado, ¿cuántas personas con algún problema personal se dirigieron a usted para pedirle ayuda?

1.31 [SI NO ES CERO] ¿La mayor parte de estas personas son de nivel económico similar, superior, inferior?

1) Similar  
2) Superior  
3) Inferior

2. Confianza y solidaridad

En toda comunidad, algunas personas se reúnen con otras y se tienen confianza mutua, mientras que otras no. Ahora me gustaría conversar acerca de la confianza y la solidaridad en su comunidad.
2.1 Hablando en forma general, ¿diría usted que puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas en su comunidad o que necesita ser muy prudente en sus tratos con otras personas?

1 Se puede confiar en la mayoría
2 Hay que ser muy prudente

2.2 En general, ¿está de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las siguientes afirmaciones?

| A. Se puede confiar en la mayoría de las personas que viven en esta comuna.                        | 1. Si |
| B. En esta comuna se debe estar alerta o alguien se aprovechará.                               | 2. Más o menos |
| C. La mayoría de las personas en esta comuna está dispuesta a ayudar cuando es necesario.     | 3. No |
| D. En esta comuna las personas generalmente no tienen confianza mutua en cuanto a pedir y prestar dinero. | |

2.3 Ahora quiero preguntarle cuánto confía en diferentes tipos de personas. En una escala de 1 a 5, donde 1 significa muy poco y 5 significa mucho, ¿cuánto confía en las siguientes personas?

| A. Personas de su recinto          | 1. Muy poco |
| B. Personas de otro recinto       | 2. Poco |
| C. Dueños de tiendas              | 3. Ni mucho ni muy poco |
| D. Miembros del Cabildo           | 4. Mucho |
| E. Funcionarios del gobierno municipal | 5. En gran medida |
| G. Profesores y educadoras        | |
| H. Enfermeras y médicos           | |
| I. Extraños                       | |
2.4 ¿Cree usted que en los últimos cinco años, el nivel de confianza en el pueblo ha mejorado, empeorado o se ha mantenido?

1 Mejorado
2 Empeorado
3 Se ha mantenido

2.6 Si un proyecto de la comunidad no lo beneficia directamente, pero tiene beneficios para muchas otras personas del pueblo, ¿contribuiría con tiempo y con dinero al proyecto?

A. Tiempo
B. Dinero
1 No contribuiría con tiempo
2 Contribuiría con tiempo
1 No contribuiría con dinero
2 Contribuiría con dinero

3. Acción colectiva y cooperación

3.1 El año pasado, ¿trabajó usted con otras personas de su recinto o la comuna para hacer algo por el beneficio de la comunidad?

1 Sí
2 No vaya a la pregunta 3.4

3.3 En resumen, ¿cuántas veces en el año pasado usted o alguien de su hogar participó en actividades de la comunidad o COMUNA?

3.6 ¿Qué proporción de personas en la comuna contribuye con tiempo o con dinero para el logro de objetivos de desarrollo comunes, tales como recoger la basura de las calles?

1 Todos
2 Más de la mitad
3 Alrededor de la mitad
4 Menos de la mitad
5 Nadie

3.7 ¿Si hubiera un problema con el suministro de agua en esta comunidad, ¿qué probabilidades hay de que las personas cooperen para tratar de resolver el problema?

1 Muchas
2 Algunas
3 Ni muchas ni pocas
4 Pocas
5 Muy pocas

4. Información y comunicación

4.2 ¿Cuántas veces en el último mes usted o alguien de su hogar ha leído un periódico?
4.6 El mes pasado, ¿cuántas veces ha hecho o ha recibido una llamada telefónica?

4.11 ¿Cuántas veces usted ha viajado a una ciudad (Libertad, Guayaquil, etc) en los últimos 10 meses?

5.7 ¿Hay alguna actividad de la comunidad en la que usted no pueda participar?

1 Sí
2 No, puedo participar en todas las
   actividades vaya a la pregunta 5.10 ______

5.8 ¿En qué actividades no puede participar?
[ENCUESTADOR: ENUMERE HASTA 3 ACTIVIDADES]

5.9 ¿Por qué no puede participar?
[ENCUESTADOR: ENUMERE HASTA 2 RAZONES]

1 Pobreza
2 Ocupación
3 Falta de educación
4 Género
5 Edad
6 Religión
7 Tendencia política
11 Otros (especificar ________________)

6.2 ¿Cuánto control siente que tiene usted en la toma de decisiones que hacen comites, organizaciones y el cabildo y que afectan sus actividades diarias? Usted siente que tiene:

1 Ningún control
2 Control sobre muy pocas decisiones
3 Control sobre algunas decisiones
4 Control sobre muchas decisiones
5 Control sobre todas las decisiones ______

6. Empoderamiento y acción política

6.4 En general, ¿cuánta influencia cree usted que tiene para hacer que este COMUNA sea un mejor lugar para vivir?

1 Gran influencia
2 Poca influencia
3 Ninguna influencia ______
6.7 En el último año, ¿ha hecho usted algo de lo siguiente?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 Sí</th>
<th>2 No</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Asistido a una reunión de un comité, reunión mensual del cabildo o algún otro tipo de discusión pública</td>
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<td>B. Reunirse con un político, llamarlo, o enviarle un oficio</td>
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<td>C. Participar en una protesta o demostración</td>
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<td>D. Participar en una campaña política</td>
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<td>E. Hacer una denuncia al periódico o la radio acerca de un problema local</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Notificar a la policía o a un juzgado acerca de un problema local</td>
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Woolcock, Michael

World Bank Operations Evaluation Department

Zhao, Yandong

Zibechi, Raúl
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Antonio de la Peña García grew up in Campeche and in Mexico City, Mexico. He received his B.A. in anthropology from the University of North Dakota and his M.A. from the department of anthropology at the University of Florida.