COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: POWER, ISOLATION, AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL BOTSWANA

By

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I am dedicating this work to my parents and my future wife (Laura)—your care and support has allowed me to pursue my dreams and passions. You never stood in my path, but always whispered words of encouragement along the way.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

| LIST OF FIGURES | ........................................................................................................... | 7 |
| LIST OF ACRONYMS | ........................................................................................................... | 8 |
| ABSTRACT | ........................................................................................................... | 10 |
| PREFACE | ........................................................................................................... | 11 |

## CHAPTER

1. **INTRODUCTION** ........................................................................................................... 13
   - Purpose of Community Based Natural Resource Management ........................................... 13
   - Literature Review ........................................................................................................... 14
   - Economic Anthropology and Social Evolution ................................................................... 14
   - Dependency Theory ........................................................................................................ 16
   - The Tragedy of the “Tragedy of Commons” .................................................................... 17
   - Space, Privatization, Sovereignty, and the Commodification of Nature ............................ 19
   - Gender and Development ............................................................................................... 19
   - Summary .......................................................................................................................... 22
   - Research Questions ........................................................................................................ 22
   - Sub-Questions .................................................................................................................. 23
   - Chapter Outline .............................................................................................................. 23

2. **HISTORICAL STRUCTURES OF INEQUALITY IN BOTSWANA** ................................. 28
   - Modern Botswana .......................................................................................................... 28
   - Recent History of Botswana ............................................................................................ 30
   - Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Botswana ...... 35
   - Foot and Mouth Disease, International Dependency, and Social Evolution ..................... 37
   - The Fencing Paradox ...................................................................................................... 45
   - The First Paradox .......................................................................................................... 45
   - The Second Paradox ....................................................................................................... 47

3. **HISTORY OF CBNRM** ................................................................................................. 55
   - The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources Program in Zimbabwe ................................................................. 55
   - Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana ................................... 61

4. **ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELD RESEARCH** .................................................................. 67
   - Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 67
Fieldwork Findings: Socio-economic Composition of the Chobe Enclave and Individual Livelihood Challenges .......................................................... 71
On-Farm Activities ............................................................................. 72
Off Farm Activities ........................................................................... 74
Livestock in Chobe ............................................................................ 76
Chobe Education ................................................................................ 77
Chobe Health ..................................................................................... 78
Community Based Natural Resource Management’s Success: How is the program speaking to Chobe resident’s livelihoods? ...................................................... 79
Local Participation in Community Based Natural Resource Management ........................................................................................................... 80
Location ............................................................................................. 82
Time .................................................................................................... 83
Language ............................................................................................. 83
Management of Funds ........................................................................ 84
Community Based Natural Resource Management and Gender ......................................................................................................................... 86
Summary ............................................................................................ 96

5 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................ 102
Devolution of Authority: Is Community Based Natural Resource Management really devolving authority over wildlife back to local villages? .................................................. 102
Development and Sustainability: Is Community Based Natural Resource Management a successful motivator for the prevention of poaching? ......................................................... 105
Participation and Relevancy: Are there any unintended consequences to this strategy of natural resource management? .................................................................. 107
Conclusion .......................................................................................... 109

APPENDIX
A KAVIMBA VILLAGE TRUST COMMITTEE BUDGET HANDOUT PAGE 1 ............. 112
B KAVIMBA VILLAGE TRUST COMMITTEE BUDGET HANDOUT PAGE 2 ............. 113
C KAVIMBA VILLAGE TRUST COMMITTEE BUDGET HANDOUT PAGE 3 ............. 114
REFERENCES LIST ................................................................................. 115
BIOGRAPIHCAL SKETCH ...................................................................... 123
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure | page
---|---
2-1 | Map of Botswana showing Disease Control Zones. Source: Derah and Mokopasetso 2005, pg. 4. 54
4-1 | Gender divisions of labor.  Source: Author. 99
4-2 | Seasonal calendar.  Source: Author. 100
4-3 | Chobe Dashboard: Level of knowledge regarding the source and amount of income from Community Based Natural Resource Management.  Source: Data obtained from Child et al. 2007 (Chart constructed by author). 101
4-4 | Chobe Dashboard: Level of knowledge regarding the source and Value of hunting quotas.  Source: Data obtained from Child et al. 2007 (Chart constructed by author). 101
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BDP</td>
<td>Botswana Democratic Party</td>
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<td>BMC</td>
<td>Botswana Meat Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOCOBONET</td>
<td>Botswana Community Based Organization Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CECT</td>
<td>Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust</td>
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<td>CHA</td>
<td>Controlled Hunting Area</td>
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<td>DWNP</td>
<td>Department of Wildlife and National Parks</td>
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<td>EUFMD</td>
<td>European Commission for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease</td>
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<td>FMD</td>
<td>Foot and Mouth Disease</td>
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<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>International Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IUCN</td>
<td>World Conservation Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>JVA</td>
<td>Joint Venture Agreement</td>
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<td>MAF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries</td>
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<td>MAFF</td>
<td>Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries, and Food</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRMP</td>
<td>Natural Resource Management Project</td>
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<td>OIE</td>
<td>World Organization for Animal Health</td>
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<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rural District Council</td>
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<td>SAT</td>
<td>Southern African Type</td>
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<td>TAC</td>
<td>Technical Advisory Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>TGLP</td>
<td>Tribal Grazing land Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Village Trust Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>WINDFALL</td>
<td>Wildlife Industries New Development for All</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMA</td>
<td>Wildlife Management Areas</td>
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COMMUNITY BASED NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: POWER, ISOLATION, AND DEVELOPMENT IN RURAL BOTSWANA

By

John Landon Denkler

December 2009

Chair: Dr. Willie Baber
Major: Anthropology

In rural northern Botswana, the Basubiya have lived as agro-pastoralists and hunters for over a century and a half. However, the effects of colonialism, independence, and modernization have limited their access to both local wildlife and international cattle markets. Adding to the strains of a desert environment and one of the highest Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) rates in Africa, the Basubiya must deal with the inherent conflict of living adjacent to a protected wildlife park and the roaming fauna that devour their crops and livestock. The concept of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) was first introduced to Botswana in the late 1980s as a proposed solution to the economic ills of rural populations and to remedy the poaching trends that developed as villagers and wildlife became antagonists in the land reforms and conservation efforts of the first half of the twentieth century. Two Decades later, CBNRM is established in Community Based Organizations (CBO) throughout Botswana, but the first experiment in CBNRM is still struggling to meet its intended goals.
PREFACE

Arching my back in the bright mid-day sun, I stopped for a moment to glance back over the river valley spread out several hundred meters beneath me. Ndavo’s homestead was more isolated from the rest of the village, up high looking out over the glistening Chobe River that snakes and skirts along the bottom edge of the sloping plateau, marking the northern border between Botswana and Namibia. This river, only a fraction the size of the Mississippi I had grown up with, is the life support of so many villagers and wildlife alike in this African wilderness. As I stood there, peering through the glare on my glasses at the sight before me, I remembered Kumansa’s simple but appropriate words, “It is beautiful here.” She had grown up in a village several hundred kilometers to the south but had come to Kavimba to work for the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust. Though she dreams of bigger things, even she had to admit the spectacular beauty of her present surroundings.

Turning back to Ndavo’s homestead, I saw a slender figure walking amongst the sheet-metal covered, cement brick huts and scraggly branched fences, tending to her daily chores. I dragged myself the fifty meters to the break in the fence line and paused to see if there was any sign of the elusive man Masule had sent me to find.

“Where is this guy?”

Gingerly approaching the young female so as not to startle, I waved her down and stated his name, “Henry Ndavo?”

Immediately recognizing the name, the young female points toward the cement hut nearest me as she walks closer. She proceeds inside and quickly returns with Mr. Ndavo, a thin, spry man of about seventy who I now recognize as the outspoken junior headman and local

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To maintain anonymity, some names have been substituted.
pastor I have seen before, hanging about the tribal headquarters. After introducing myself, I explain why I am here.

“I have come because Masule told me you could lead me to the cultural place.”

Ndavo smiles and guides me over to his garden where he was working shortly before I arrived. Only about twenty feet by fifteen feet in size, he is growing a variety of crops including maize and spinach. Having no cattle, there are about a dozen goats roaming the property that I can see. Ndavo explains the difficulty of growing crops on the dryland plateau with its sandy soil and poor nutrition.

“You see,” he picks up a handful of the sandy soil and grinds it between his hands, “It is very difficult, very difficult to grow anything. I use manure.”

In a bucket nearby, Ndavo has manure from the cattle kraals of his neighbors soaking in water to later fertilize his garden. He dips his hand and pushes the manure around a bit before shaking his hands dry. Again I try to push for the cultural place, but Ndavo claims that it is too late in the day and too far to go now. I wanted to interview him anyway, and he agrees. We sit down outside his garden under the shade of nearby acacia and begin . . .
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Purpose of Community Based Natural Resource Management

The purpose of CBNRM is to create direct and tangible links between rural people and the wildlife that lives on their land so that they are provided with strong incentives to conserve wildlife, and so that wildlife, in turn, addresses livelihood issues. Secondly, the revenues from CBNRM provide a powerful mechanism for collectively organizing rural communities to manage their own affairs and so become less dependent on charity (Child et al. 2007: 6).

The popularity of Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) has grown substantially in recent years. The idea of indigenous participation in natural resource management is an appealing solution to years of colonial and post-colonial exclusionary policies. However, CBNRM has encountered multiple challenges and excessive criticism regarding its purpose and feasibility. This thesis is an examination of CBNRM in Botswana. This examination concentrates on the Chobe Enclave, a grouping of five rural villages along the Chobe River in northern Botswana and the country’s first experiment in CBNRM. As part of the discussion, the historical and current forces that have contributed to the modern challenges facing both rural agro-pastoralists and CBNRM’s success as a whole are examined on a macro and micro level. These forces include the legacy of British colonialism, the power transformation that occurred after independence, and the effects of national and international economic policy on the livestock industry. After considering these forces, I argue that CBNRM in Botswana, while experiencing limited success, is suffering from many of the same problems found in participatory management systems throughout Southern Africa. Among these problems are the historical structures of inequality created during colonialism that continued after independence; the mixed and often contradictory motivations and goals of CBNRM planners, officers and participants; and national and international governments’ paternalistic attitudes.
toward rural tribal populations resulting in limited devolution of authority and isolationist tendencies.

**Literature Review**

Because CBNRM in Botswana is the product of both national and international interventions and because, through the commodification of nature, it is inherently an economic activity, the theoretical framework for this thesis is based largely on the economic anthropology literature and the historic, international, and residual influence of social evolutionary thought on political and economic entities. Included, is a discussion of dependency theory, Hardin’s faulty propositions within the Tragedy of the Commons, and the resulting privatization of space that occurred following Botswana’s independence. Lastly, points from the gender and development literature are analyzed for their explicatory use in understanding the gendered dimension of CBNRM and the rural agro-pastoral communities for whom it was designed.

**Economic Anthropology and Social Evolution**

Economic anthropology seeks to understand both global and local economic processes. Within this endeavor is a key question, what motivates the decisions of mankind? Is it a rational sense of foresight and economizing, or a more relative culturally bound sense of social and material obligation? Two camps of theory were established, the culturally relative substantivists versus the universalism of the formalists. Substantivists such as Karl Polanyi and Gregory Dalton defined their position by focusing on the material base of economic transactions, examining the processes of reciprocity, redistribution, and exchange and claiming that all economic interactions were in response to social obligations and material subsistence (Polanyi 1958; Dalton 1961). The rational economic man was a farce, and there is no way to know the mental processes or non-material motivations behind economic interactions. The formalists on the other hand, believed in the rational man, making every human decision the outcome of
economizing processes. Scott Cook explained both stances quite well, defining the substantivist version of economics as provisioning and the formalists’ version as economizing (Cook 1973: 28). The substantivists and formalists were arguing over what makes individuals or groups of individuals trust each other enough to operate on a social and economic level. It is now understood that the substantivists and formalists were generally arguing past each other, and that there is no reason for their mutual exclusion, but that both contribute to our overall understanding of macro and micro economic processes and the motivations behind them (Wilk 2007; Dupré 1978). The relevance of this debate for economic anthropology has to do with how the substantivist versus formalist debate translated into a greater theory of human development. It demonstrates that all humans are more dynamic than previous theories allowed, theories that supported colonial governments’ imperial aspirations.

Economic anthropology is therefore heavily entrenched in the analysis of global historical forces to better define current politico-economic institutions and to understand their contributions to the condition of rural populations within developing and third world states. For the purposes of this discussion, the forces analyzed include the roles of colonization and the imperialist ideology that followed it in the form of social evolution. In the case of Botswana, British imperialism operated under the notion that British governance and methods were superior to those of the indigenous populations within its colonies. This colonial mindset was entrenched in a racist ideology of religious and cultural superiority based on a belief in “social evolution” which placed Britain at the top of a social and intellectual spectrum that justified their imperial ambitions. Ferguson, pulling from nineteenth century theorists Morgan and Tylor, defines social evolutionism through three key principles:

First, there is the central idea that different societies are to be understood as discrete individuals, with each society making its way through the evolutionary process at
its own pace, independently of the others. Second is the insistence that all societies are ultimately heading toward the same destination; in this sense, human history is one story, not many. Finally, the social evolutionary schemes posited that differences between human societies were to be interpreted as differences in their level of development (Ferguson 2007: 142).

Ferguson also notes that this type of mindset in anthropology began to wane with the establishment of the Boasian school of thought in the early half of the twentieth century, but was reborn in new concepts of development and modernization after World War II. This affected the development of post-colonial relationships and trade agreements.

The idea of social evolution gave Western nations the justification for policies which supported and reinforced their dominant position within the world system. This incorporated a series of political and economic developments including the creation of international organizations such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as other international organizations made up of, and controlled by, first world nations to maintain their appropriation of control. One of these organizations is the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) which makes and enforces policies regarding international trade and transport of livestock, policies which heavily favor the importing nations who make up the OIE’s controlling bodies. Through the colonial process, ideas of social evolution and Western superiority filtered throughout Britain’s colonies and became part of their institutional fabric during and after independence.

**Dependency Theory**

Dependency theory asserts that the dependence of former colonies on former colonizers is a result of an economic process in which low-value products are exported from underdeveloped nations to developed nations and in turn high-value products are exported from

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2 See Chapter 2, FMD, Dependency, and Social Evolution for a deeper discussion of the OIE.
developed nations to their former colonies for consumption. This process creates a disproportionate trading system in which the latter retains greater bargaining power over the former through economic tools such as the allocation of large sums of national debt, reverse capital flows, and resource dependence. However, in an increasingly globalized economy where all economies are dependent on each other and where the processes of production, manufacturing, debt accumulation and consumption are occurring in all corners of the world, is this theory still valid? Leys recognizes that dependency theory does not have the weight it once had, but still insists:

[D]ependency theory’s focus on the many forms of acute dependence of small, open, ex-colonial economies on the powerful economic interests and states that dominate the financial and commodity markets in which they operate (‘concrete situations of dependency) remains indisputably valid (Leys 2007: 119).

While dependency theory as a post-colonial economic theory is not a panacea for any former colony, such as Botswana, it does offer another lens through which to analyze some of Botswana’s economic processes. In the case of Botswana, the development of the livestock industry over the course of the twentieth century provides a current example of economic dependency within a particular industry. Although livestock is no longer the economic titan it once was in Botswana, it has deep roots and still represents a significant means of resource accumulation. Fifty year old policies regarding trade in livestock have limited Botswana’s export options and created an unequal system of trade between the producer and importing nations. Chapter 2 discusses the significance of this trade imbalance and what it means for rural livestock producers in northern Botswana.

The Tragedy of the “Tragedy of Commons”

Garret Hardin’s thesis, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” (Hardin 1968) was released only a couple of years after Botswana’s independence. Examining common property through the lens
of the rational, logical, economizing individual espoused by economists and formalists, Hardin asserted that communal lands were doomed to overuse and were environmentally unsustainable as each participant granted open access would take full advantage of all the resources he could consume without considering the environmental or social impact as this was the most economically beneficial and most rational action for self-preservation. In response, Hardin argued, common property should be privatized to limit the number of individuals with access and therefore prevent overutilization and environmental degradation. The Tragedy of the Commons provided development organizations, and the government of Botswana, the rationale they needed to expand the private commercial livestock sector of the economy, even at the cost of the rural agro-pastoralists who needed access to communal rangeland and water sources.

Research conducted since the Tragedy of the Commons have proven that Hardin’s assertions were incorrect because he failed to recognize the place of traditional governance mechanisms in the control and monitoring of natural resources including common property regimes (Dietz et al. 2003; Ostrom 2000). Because many governments, such as Botswana, adopted the ideologies and policies of Western nations, including social evolution and the Tragedy of the Commons, local community-based systems of governance had the majority of their authority appropriated by national governments. Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern state, “Global and national environmental policy frequently ignores community-based governance and traditional tools, such as informal communication and sanctioning, but these tools can have significant impact” (Dietz et al. 2003: 1908). Instead, Dietz, Ostrom and Stern demonstrate how community-based governance produces greater environmental sustainability utilizing common property and communal land in comparison to privatized lands, an argument which has been
born out over the course of numerous studies on range management (Selolwane 2001; Bigalke 2000; Owen and Owen 1984; Albertson 1998).

Space, Privatization, Sovereignty, and the Commodification of Nature

Mbembe, Mrozowski, and Spierenburg and Wels all discuss the implications of Western ideas of space, privatization, and sovereignty (Mbembe 2000; Mrozowski 1999; Spierenburg and Wels 2006). Mbembe explains that modern boundaries within Africa are not the product of arbitrary colonial lines, but were made with a distinct purpose that served the colonizer’s appropriation of control (Mbembe 2000). Mrozowski takes this idea one step further to examine the transformation of nature into a commodity within the state (Mrozowski 1999). Both ideas have to do with gradual commodification of nature, an idea which is linked to the enclosure of spaces and the wresting of control from one group to another. Mrozowski states, “On a broader scale, however, representations of space could also serve as the instruments of control, domination, and power” (Mrozowski 1999: 155). Spierenburg and Wels explore the symbolism of fencing within these ideas of space, control, and division as a physical symbol of isolation and domination (Spierenburg and Wels 2006). The processes of privatization and the commodification of nature, using tools such as fencing, cartography, and land reform, resulted in the gradual erosion of traditional mechanisms of natural resource management and appropriated control over nature at the national and international levels as resources were claimed and redistributed among the elite actors. Therefore, the authority and legitimacy of local institutions has diminished as national and international institutions have taken on the role of patrons and “reinforce the existing system of stratification” (Wallerstein 1974: 1).

Gender and Development

As a development project, CBNRM is meant to empower rural tribal populations. The gender and development literature seeks to define empowerment and how gendered
considerations must be incorporated into the development process from conceptualization to implementation and evaluation. If a development project is truly going to empower the population it targets, it must recognize the importance of integrating women at all levels of the project. Young defines empowerment by stating,

[E]mpowerment is about people taking control over their own lives: gaining the ability to do things, to set their own agendas, to change events in a way previously lacking . . . But for feminists, empowerment is more than this: it involves the radical alteration of the processes and structures which reproduce women’s subordinate position as a gender (Young 1997: 371-372).

Because CBNRM is set in a traditionally patriarchal setting, and because it is intended to be a democratic process, understanding the roles of men and women within the traditional power structure is critical to predicting the projects potential success as an empowering mechanism. These roles can then be analyzed using existing gender and feminist theory and frameworks to determine how women should be incorporated into CBNRM. This thesis considers several arguments from gender and development, analyzing their relevance for CBNRM as an empowering and democratic process. In particular, debates regarding efficiency, monitoring and evaluation, and female access and control over resources are considered.

In the gender and development literature, and in many development organizations, economic efficiency is argued as a rationalization for incorporating women into development projects (Moser 1993; Spring 1995). March, Smyth, and Mukhopadhyay define the efficiency approach in “that it is inefficient to ignore women in planning a distribution of resources. [The efficiency approach] aims to create projects and programmes with the most efficient allocation of resources” (March et al. 1999: 25). Therefore, the efficiency approach does not place female empowerment as the stimulus for female integration, but rather sees female integration as a necessary step in a rational economic process.
Jahan outlines the need for effective evaluation and monitoring in development projects such as that used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in ensuring female integration in a project including: (a) the consultation of women from the study-group during project design, (b) female participation in implementation, (c) female barriers identified and overcome; and (d) WID expertise utilized (Jahan 1995: 50). “Lack of field data is a major problem for [Women in Development] assessment . . . hence it is difficult to measure progress towards gender equality of women’s advancement” (1995:53). Therefore, female participation is key, but it must be complimented by accurate and descriptive data that can be used to measure their participation and evaluate the program’s success in promoting female integration and empowerment.

In their Gender Analysis Framework, Feldstein and Poats utilize resources analysis to identify male versus female access and control including land and livestock as well as knowledge (Feldstein and Poats 1989). They demonstrate that in general, female access and control over natural resources is much more restricted in comparison to their male counterparts. Feminist research into household composition has often found unequal consequences for men and women in development stratagems, with men gaining greater access to knowledge and resources (Dixon: 1985; Moore: 1998). It has also been shown that when macro levels of governance are male dominated, female leverage and economic control are affected at the micro level (Blumberg: 1988). Women in developing nations are often relegated to the domestic sphere, where their efforts are focused on reproductive activities which do not carry the weight or prominence given to the productive activities of men. This division between public and domestic spheres allows men to gain access to greater levels of social and economic capital, control household finances, and attain elite positions within local and national governments. Feminist research, however, has
shown that men and women in developing countries allocate money and resources differently (Momsen: 2004; Blumberg: 1988; Spring: 2000), with women devoting more of their income to family welfare, compared to men. Understanding gender relations is therefore essential in the development process, including how resources are distributed and who has access and control over what.

**Summary**

Social evolutionary ideas have had a lasting impact on multiple disciplines and shaped, at least in part, the policies of many colonial and post-colonial governments as these ideas were again reflected in the development literature following World War II. They have been used as justification for intentional global processes that resulted in systems of unequal trade, rampant privatization and re-appropriation, the erosion of local sovereignty and the commodification of nature, and the subjugation of female participation in production and the public sphere. It is necessary to understand these linkages if one is going to try and reverse the processes that led to the dispossession of natural resources by their traditional custodians. CBNRM, by trying to devolve authority over wildlife back to the local populations with whom they share their territory, is attempting to reverse these historical processes and therefore, it must recognize how social evolutionary ideas influenced the development of modern national and international institutions and must work to overcome those misconceptions to recast rural and tribal populations as valuable participants in the development process.

**Research Questions**

When approaching my research, I wanted to discern if and how CBNRM was fulfilling its purpose to motivate wildlife conservation through economic incentives.

- Is CBNRM really devolving authority over wildlife back to local villages?
- Is CBNRM a successful motivator for the prevention of poaching?
If it is, why is it successful?

- Are there any unintended consequences to this strategy of natural resource management?

To answer these questions I developed a series of sub-questions that had to be answered.

**Sub-Questions**

- How does CECT operate at a local level, and does it speak to local livelihoods including both genders and female-headed households?
- Is CECT truly participatory? How are people involved?
- Are the benefits being felt from CECT? What kinds of projects are being pursued and are they sustainable?
- How do the villagers view CECT and does it decrease their likelihood of poaching?

Through a variety of methodologies, including interviews, participant observation, and the collection of primary materials such as contracts, policy papers, and meeting minutes, I decipher the operations of CECT at the local level and identify key areas that are inhibiting the program’s success in achieving both its goals of conservation and development.

**Chapter Outline**

Chapter 2, Historical Structures of Inequality, provides a brief introduction to Botswana’s demographic and geographic characteristics followed by an examination of its recent history including the forces of colonialism and the extraordinary changes that took place after independence. As a land locked state and desert plateau, Westerners did not begin exploring Botswana’s interior until the beginning of the nineteenth century, long after the slave trade had begun in West Africa and relatively late in comparison with its South African neighbors.

Botswana is predominately populated by the Setswana speaking Batswana, but minority groups
also make it their home including the Kung! and the Basubiya, and most of the population is made up of rural agro-pastoralists. With an arid, desert environment, rain-fed agriculture is difficult and most are dependent on their livestock. Botswana’s history of colonialism was brief, as the British did not establish a system of taxes until the turn of twentieth century and then granted independence approximately sixty years later. However, the legacy of colonialism has lived on through modern economic policies pursued both by the international community and by Botswana’s government officials. The colonial government established by the British was labeled the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and little effort was given toward modernizing the territory. The most valuable land on the eastern border was redistributed among the colonizers and the cattle industry became Britain’s primary focus in Botswana. The processes of land redistribution, colonial taxes, and the commercialization of the cattle industry began with the British, but independence brought with it new policies which continued and enhanced rural chieftaincies subjugation. It was also during colonialism that one of the most influential processes of redistribution and physical alteration began. The fear of Foot and Mouth Disease that developed in Britain during the turn of the twentieth century eventually had repercussions throughout its colonies including Botswana. This fear led to a series of fencing and zoning strategies in the 1940s and 1950s that had immense impact on both the local wildlife and cattle producers all over the country. The strategies not only continued after independence, but increased as a result of global cattle trade policies and a post-WWII mindset that placed first world nations’ reputations above their own safety and the well-being of developing nations.

The importance of these historical structures is relevant for modern CBNRM efforts as they affect how individuals identify themselves and how rural agro-pastoralists livelihoods have evolved over the past century. Particularly for the Basubiya, the legacies of colonialism and
modern international trade regulations have limited their livelihood strategies including their relationship with surrounding natural resources. This thesis seeks to explicate these historical structures and how they impact their livelihoods and the success of CBNRM in Botswana.

Chapter 3, History of CBNRM, examines the historical roots of CBNRM including its origins in Zimbabwe. Community Based Natural Resource Management was originally conceptualized and developed in Zimbabwe as the CAMPFIRE program during the 1980s (Child et al. 1997; Chitsike 2000; Murphree 1998). Its purpose is to create a vested interest in preserving local wildlife by providing economic incentives through the sale of animal hunting quotas to local wildlife hunting safaris. It is also meant to be a sustainable, participatory development program that includes local villagers in the development process. Through my research, however, I discovered that intentions do not always translate into real-world results. This is illustrated both through CBNRM in Botswana and the CAMPFIRE program. For this reason, I compare CBNRM in Botswana with CBNRM’s origins in Zimbabwe and the issues the CAMPFIRE program struggled through, in particular issues with authority, access, and control over resources and administration costs. I will demonstrate that there are multiple challenges facing sustainable participatory development through the CBNRM program in Botswana, including local, national, and international forces that intentionally and unintentionally cooperate to prevent rural agro-pastoralists from developing greater autonomy, economic self-sufficiency, and sustainable development. Included within these forces are the global cattle trade, patriarchal controls, and a government intent on modernization and commercialization despite many negative consequences.

Chapter 4, Anthropological Fieldwork, concentrates on my own fieldwork in Botswana and my attempt to decipher how the micro and macro forces discussed in Chapters 2 and 3
impact the villagers of the Chobe Enclave, and in particular, the successes and failures of CBNRM and CECT in affecting positive and sustainable change both in conservation and in local economic development. Kavimba is the site of my fieldwork, conducted over two months in the summer of 2008. My focus is on the challenges CBNRM has faced within the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT). The results of this fieldwork provide a case study through which to examine the issues affecting rural agro-pastoralists in Botswana and the ability of CBNRM to provide practical and positive change for these communities. CBNRM evolved out of the conflict created when populations such as the Basubiya Tribe were removed from the Chobe Park and no longer allowed to hunt the local wildlife. Poaching became a problem because the local wildlife sustained by the Chobe Park wander beyond its borders and damage local communities’ crops and livestock. There is considerable documentation and research showing the connection between poaching and problem wildlife (Swatuk 2005; Jones and Murphree 2004; Owen and Owen 1984). Communities that used to rely on hunting wildlife have now become predominately agro-pastoralists surviving on subsistence crops and livestock. I chose Kavimba because it is the headquarters of both the Basubiya Tribal Administration and the headquarters for CECT, both of which have influence over all of the villages within the Chobe Enclave.

Chapter 5 provides a summary of my overall findings and is therefore entitled Findings and Conclusions. The chapter includes a final analysis of both the historical and modern challenges facing the successful implementation of CBNRM in Botswana, including issues with devolution of authority, program and project sustainability, and local participation and the relevance of CBNRM for individual livelihoods. This is followed by a reexamination of my research questions and their answers. I then conclude with some recommendations on how the
government and policy makers should re-approach CBNRM and its future implementation as well as my goals for future research.
CHAPTER 2
HISTORICAL STRUCTURES OF INEQUALITY IN BOTSWANA

Botswana’s recent history includes a short colonial period followed by its rapid economic development and modernization under the independent government. This chapter examines this history and explores some of the intended and unintended consequences of the policies adopted by both colonial and post-colonial administrations. Following a brief description of the country’s geographic and demographic characteristic, I provide a summary of the transition to a capitalist economy under colonialism and the introduction of taxes. The chapter then switches gears by investigating the role of the cattle industry in shaping colonial and post-colonial policies regarding land use and access to commercial markets and exports. This investigation reveals that the policies adopted during this period have had unintended consequences on both local wildlife and rural cattle herders. Within the investigation, the use of fencing as a tool for the implementation of government policies is revealed to have had a paradoxical outcome where its implementation resulted in having an opposite effect from the administrators’ intended purpose.

Modern Botswana

Botswana as a country is approximately 582,000 square kilometers (U.S. Dept. of State 2009) with an estimated population of 1.8 million (Central Statistics Office 2009). Since discovering diamonds shortly after independence mining has become the driving economic force in Botswana as a parastatal enterprise and comprised 39 % of the overall GDP for 2008 (Central Statistics Office 2008). The tourism industry is another economic leader making up 11.3% of the annual GDP (2008). Agriculture has experienced a steady decline in economic prominence and accounted for only 1.9% of the total GDP in 2008 (2008). Urbanization has been rapid in recent years and by 2001 urban residents made up a majority of the population at 54% (Central Statistics Office 2004). This urbanization has tended to concentrate in several communities.
throughout the country including Maun, Francistown, Molepolole, Serowe, Kasane, and in particular the capital of Gaborone.

Botswana’s environment is varied but generally all districts experience little to no rainfall during the summer months, but some districts can experience as much 348 mm (34.8 in.) in one month (Central Statistics Office 2008). According to Poteete, “Rainfall varies spatially and from year to year, generally ranging between 350 and 550mm annually . . . Investment in both arable and pastoral agriculture decreases vulnerability to the failure of crops and the death of livestock” (Poteete 2003: 535). Rural villagers react to climactic variability by diversifying their activities and through utilization of veld resources including thatch and other plant life.

Despite the decrease in the role of agriculture in the overall economy, much of Botswana is still dominated by rural subsistence agriculture in conjunction with paid employment. According to the 2001 Census, more than 12% of the working population is engaged in agriculture and hunting (Central Statistics Office 2008). In the Chobe District it jumps to more than 14%, and this percentage reflects includes the town of Kasane which makes up a majority of the District’s population. Livestock makes up a considerable part of agricultural life and national herd totals are estimated at between two and three million head (U.S Department of State 2009). According to Poteete, “Livestock production remains the mainstay of subsistence livelihoods in rural Botswana, provides employment for some of the most economically vulnerable rural populations, serves as a store of investment for many with urban employment” (Poteete 2003: 471).

The Chobe District, where CBNRM in Botswana was first developed, makes up the northeastern corner of Botswana. Kasane, a town of about seven thousand, lies on the northeastern side of the Chobe National Park and directly west of Kazungula, a small burg smack
in the middle of one of the most heavily used truck routes between South Africa and Zambia. On any given day there will be semi-trucks backed up for miles waiting to be ferried across the Chobe/Zambezi confluence into Zambia; a wait many are willing to make in avoidance of the heavy tariffs when travelling through Zimbabwe. The Zambezi flows eastwardly into Zimbabwe where the massive amount of moisture kicked up by 1.7 km wide Victoria Falls creates a perpetual raincloud that supports a rainforest oasis in the middle of surrounding shrub-land.

The Chobe National Park, which skirts up against Kasane and provides the town with a tourism-based economy, is the third largest park in Botswana and home to one of the largest and most diverse concentrations of wildlife in Africa. Further southwest lie the villages of Mabele, Kavimba, Kachikau, Satau, and Parakarungu. Kavimba, the second in line, is a village of approximately 600 and is predominantly made up of the Basubiya Tribe. Cement houses and huts dominate the hillside of the plateau, gazing over the river where their cattle drink, and the men fish and hunt water fowl. For these villages, the antagonism between wildlife and man is particularly poignant, demonstrated in the death of a villager by an elephant just one month before I arrived in the summer of 2008. The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), a local community based organization made up of villagers from all five villages provide the local administration with the funds accrued from CBNRM. CECT, as the organization that the villagers identify with wildlife management, is therefore the focus of my research.

**Recent History of Botswana**

The history of Botswana has dimensions that are both surprising and unique when comparing it to its Southern African neighbors. Having no coastline, Botswana received European visitors early in the nineteenth century, relatively late in comparison with most of Southern Africa. The early to mid nineteenth century brought increasing European encroachment as hunters and traders made their way into the interior seeking game trophies.
These pioneers developed the first “long-distance wagon trails, spread western technology and manufactured goods, and opened Botswana to the missionaries” (Mortan et al. 1989: xi). Both British and German missionaries came to Botswana, but it was the British who eventually took control over the territory in 1885 declaring it the Bechuanaland Protectorate (Sillery 1974; Chirenje 1977; Mortan et al. 1989). Anthony Sillery notes the reactions of European travelers to the tribal people they encountered during this period, describing them as a particularly “hospitable” people with a nature for “cleanliness” (Sillery 1974: 3). Their dress included the kobo, “a cloak made from leather or from fur,” however missionary bans on traditional clothing soon “gave way to the more godly shirt and trousers and Mother Hubbard” (1974: 3-4). Because of Botswana’s historically arid climate and unpredictable rainfall, water has always been a scarce commodity; a fact clearly illustrated through the term *Pula* (rain) used in ceremonial greetings (1974:6), and now the name of the nation’s currency.

Under British colonialism, Botswana experienced an accelerated depletion of game resulting in the collapse of the hunting trade. Adding to the mostly rural and sparsely populated territory’s struggles, the British introduced a set of taxes between 1899 and 1919 (such as the “hut tax”) which forced many to resort to urban migration in search of wage labor as the only method for generating cash income (Bar-On 2006: 370-371; Mortan et al. 1989: 32). The taxes facilitated investment in cattle and agricultural equipment, an economic resource that became one of the mainstays of modern Botswana, but which also “dwindled natural habitats, with corresponding decreases in wildlife numbers” (Bar-On 2006:371). It was also during this period that the colonial system of land tenure, including tribal, crown, and freehold, that whites were able to possess the areas of highest agricultural potential along Botswana’s eastern border (Smit
This resulted in high levels of economic inequality with a minority of the populace owning the majority of the national herd, an inequality that has persisted (Curry, Jr. 1987).

Much of Botswana’s history and environment has been characterized by its arid climate and limited access to water. Traditional mechanisms of subsistence included hunting, herding, and agriculture. Agriculture was carved out primarily by women who grew millet, sorghum, cowpeas, beans, melons, and maize. Men were responsible for herding cattle, sheep, and goats. Fishing occurred in areas near rivers such as the Okavango and the Chobe (Mortan et al. 1989). During the colonial and post-colonial periods, however, when the most productive land was redistributed to a white minority, agriculture took a marked turn toward cash cropping. After independence the government, supported by the National Development Bank, implemented procedures to increase rural productivity which resulted in the “emergence of a small number of wealthy commercial farmers” (Comaroff 1984: 76). Their success led some of these men into politics, “or to financial expansion into the urban centres; others have remained in their chiefdoms and have become prominent in local and district affairs” (1984: 76). The turn to cash cropping, in addition to multiple years of drought, reduced local food production and pushed Botswana into greater dependence on South Africa for its food security: “owners having access to income from the cash cropping, however, were able to purchase local and imported foodstuffs, but only at higher prices” (Curry, Jr. 1984: 81).

Diamond mines facilitated rural to urban migration both within the country and to South Africa as tribal populations found access to water increasingly difficult. Only the wealthiest Batswana had access to the borehole technology that allowed them to maintain large herds of cattle while smaller herds suffered through the droughts on common property lands (Swatuk
All of this translated into greater hardship for poor rural farmers as market forces challenged their ability to survive:

As local food production declines, and as imports replace local production, a distortion in access to supply channels emerges. Once based upon a traditional allocating mechanism—tied closely to producing and sharing for subsistence—access shifts to reflect the impersonalization of the marketplace (Curry, Jr. 1987: 81)

Many rural Batswana have been displaced as a result of increased market forces and globalization, dropping out of agriculture altogether and “relying instead on itinerant casual laboring for their subsistence” (Cullis and Watson 2003: 17).

In 1966, Botswana declared independence and established a multi-party democratic government which has maintained peaceful elections; however, the Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has remained in power since its inception (Morten et al. 1989; Swatuk 2005). Much of Botswana’s post-colonial economic and political success has been attributed to the discovery of diamonds in 1967 which has provided the government with the majority of its financial security (Mortan et. al 1989). Independence had multiple repercussions for traditional tribal systems and their chiefs, who had become used to relatively little British incursion on their local authority. In fact, by 1956, the British had issued the *African Administration Proclamation* that “formally recognized tribal councils as chiefly advisory bodies and established, within each chiefdom, subordinate councils under local headmen” (Comaroff 1984: 69). Under the post-colonial government, however, local control was swiftly transferred from traditional authorities to newly formed democratic systems through a series of laws including: the *Chieftainship Law, Local Government Law*, and *Tribal Land Act* (1984: 69-70). The Tribal Land Act (1968) established the use of Land Boards who took control of land distribution, a change that has immense relevancy for the development of CBNRM. John Comaroff has argued that the government had no confidence in the ability of tribal chiefs to fulfill the obligations of “policies which are
ultimately not of his own and his people’s making” (1984: 70). This reflects a continued colonial bias under the current post-colonial government which perceives tribal groups under the racist ideology of “primitive mind,” as Larry Swatuk illustrates:

Whereas rural people are now portrayed by many donors as repositories of ‘indigenous knowledge,’ government still regards them as ignorant resource degraders engaged in unsustainable forms of agro-pastoralism at best and ‘stone age creatures’ doomed to ‘die out like the dodo’ at worst (Swatuk 2005: 107).

The government continues to channel its concerns toward diamond and cattle production which sustain the elites increasing material consumption as development and urbanization have facilitated increased capitalism in what some have described as “internal colonization” (2005: 110).

In 1976 the government issued the Tribal Grazing Land Policy with the purpose to “conserve grazing land and reduce inequality of income in the livestock sector” (Mortan et al. 1989: 65). As a result, “Tribal grazing land was rezoned into three categories: commercial . . . communal . . . and reserved areas (originally set aside as a safeguard for the poorest members of society)” (Swatuk 2005: 111). As conservation efforts continued to falter throughout the seventies and eighties, however, the government decided to implement Wildlife Management Areas (WMA). Established in 1986, WMA once again rezoned the “reserved areas” designated under the Tribal Grazing Land Policy (20 percent of the land) for dual purposes as the Department of Wildlife National Parks (DWNP) hoped this move would link the processes of conservation and development (Twyman 2000: 325). Three years later CBNRM was established utilizing the WMA reserved areas: “It is in these areas (and occasionally on state land) that CBNRM is being implemented and where resource use conflicts are highest” (Swatuk 2005: 111). Continued efforts at developing conservatory mindsets in the rural populace have had limited success. CBNRM policy is based on the theory of increased community participation
including the value of traditional ecological knowledge and resource management. However as Comaroff argues, the efforts of Botswana’s government since independence have been deliberately focused on restricting the autonomy and authority of local communities and traditional tribal systems: “In contrast to the South African regime, the Botswana government has tried to develop an administrative system which pays only limited respect to traditional institutional forms” (Comaroff 1984: 70). Traditional wildlife management has been subsumed by the central government who is relatively detached from the rural populace and wildlife. Amy Poteete confirms this point, stating that modern government officials within the ruling BDP are viewed as technocrats and “out of touch with rural voters” (Poteete 2009: 563). Bar-On claims that the continued dispossession of the chieftaincy has “reduced wildlife by ‘democratizing’ its use” (Bar-On 2005: 368), explaining that before independence only tribal chiefs could determine when hunting should occur and which animals would be hunted. Now that authority over wildlife is no longer under the auspices of local chiefs but has been retained by a distant federal government who is noticeably absent in local affairs, access to wildlife is restricted in theory but easily available in practice.

**Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome in Botswana**

Botswana has one of the highest rates of HIV/AIDS in Africa, hovering near 30 percent (Acemoglu 2001), which may be related to “the spiraling incidence of casual unions” (Comaroff 1984: 76), high degree of rural-urban migration, and limited education on safe sexual practices among the youngest and the eldest populations. The 2001 Botswana AIDS Impact Survey found that knowledge of prevention methods is highest among young adults ages 15 to 30 years with the most limited knowledge among adolescents 10 to 14 followed by those aged 50 to 64 (Central Statistics Office 2008). Of those recognizing “Having sex only with one faithful partner,” as a means for reducing the risk of AIDS infection, no age group included a majority. Those aged 20
to 30 years old yielded the highest percentage (32.2%) of all age groups recognizing monogamy as a means for reducing infection risk, while only 19.8% of seniors responded positively (2008:12). When comparing knowledge of condom use in the prevention of AIDS, the survey found that 36.2% of adolescents and 53.1% of seniors knew that condom use can reduce the likelihood of disease contraction. This is compared with a high of 80.5% in young adults aged 20 to 30. When examining the numbers of those who have been tested for HIV, only 21.7% of those aged 20 to 30 responded positively to having ever been tested. Of those 50 to 64 years in age, only 7.7% have ever been tested (2008). However, the percentage of men and women who reported a genital ulcer within the previous 12 months of the survey and sought treatment are 100% and 59.3% respectively. More than 90% of those aged 20 to 49 reported genital ulcers. Once more, the 2001 AIDS Impact Survey only included 14 districts, of which Chobe was excluded. According to the 2005 Government of Botswana Country Report on HIV/AIDS, however, the highest percentage of HIV prevalence is within the Chobe District, where CBNRM was first introduced (Government of Botswana 2005). The level of knowledge regarding HIV and AIDS is impressive among young adults, but the statistics for older populations demonstrate the limited level of AIDS education and awareness by the generation of Batswana that lived through the beginning of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s.

The social impact of HIV and AIDS includes an increased incidence of orphans, particularly in rural areas: “With a rise in orphan numbers, the capacity of the extended family to absorb these orphans will be stretched to the limit” (Government of Botswana 2005: 13). Despite Botswana’s efforts to battle HIV/AIDS over the past two decades, including considerable governmental budgetary contributions such as P896 million in 2007 (Republic of Botswana 2007), the stigma and silence surrounding the disease have had significant effects on
the success of such efforts, particularly when it comes to the use of condoms. Allen and Heald comment on the problem stating that “condom promotion fuelled an alternative discourse of AIDS, bedded in Tswana beliefs and understandings, which held the condom an agent not in the control of the disease but rather in its very origin and spread” (Allen and Heald 2004: 1144).

The history of Botswana reflects the challenges rural tribal groups have endured since the period of colonization and increasing after independence. These events are relevant to the development of CBNRM policies and can explain the difficulties planners have experienced in trying to implement CBNRM. Among these challenges are national and international policies regarding the raising and control of livestock. In particular, Foot and Mouth Disease policies have represented a significant challenge to the success of rural agro-pastoralists. The following sections examine this in detail, exploring the history and effects of Foot and Mouth Disease on Botswana and how development in northern Botswana, including the Chobe District, is negatively affected by such policies.

**Foot and Mouth Disease, International Dependency, and Social Evolution**

As cattle production in Botswana became the dominant economic force under British colonialism, new governmental policy and methods of control were instituted as part of the modernization and Westernization process. These methods were implemented throughout Britain’s empire and have modern repercussions in the form of international trade and import policies that dictate the manner in which developing nations, such as Botswana, produce and control their cattle production. This section examines how Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) has influenced these policies and what it means for Chobe’s rural agro-pastoralists and the challenges of sustainable development for CBNRM.

FMD is a costly virus that has long-term effects on livestock. Specifically, FMD is recognized as the Aphthovirus of the family Picornaviridae (Grootenhuis 2000). There are seven
main serotypes, of which six occur in Africa with three identified specifically as SAT (Southern Africa Type). While not usually resulting in the death, the FMD virus significantly impairs the productivity of livestock, especially cattle, in commercial production. Symptoms include excessive salivation and the development of lesions in the oral cavity and the tongue, muzzle, nares or nostrils, teats, coronary bands, and interdigital spaces. The consequences of infection include: "sterility, abortion, excessive weight loss, significant loss in milk production, heart damage, lameness, and generally poor condition" (Blackwell 1980: 1019). FMD is also highly contagious and can spread through fluid transfer or by "inhalation of aerosolized virus" (1980: 1019). Although eradicated from most modernized nations, it is still endemic throughout the third world, especially in Africa.

Botswana’s current FMD control methods include a combination of vaccination, fencing and movement control, livestock identification, disease surveillance, and eradication in case of exposure (Mokopasetso and Derah 2005; Baipoldi et al. 2003). The country is divided into nineteen veterinary districts, each district containing one or more disease control zones (See Figure 1). Passed in 1977, the Diseases of Animals Act "provides for the prevention and control of animal diseases, the regulation of imports and exports, the movement of animals and animal related products and, under certain circumstances, the quarantine of animals" (Derah and Mokopasetso 2005: 3). Figure 2-1 depicts the disease control zones which are composed of five separate categories including the FMD vaccination zone in the north (enveloping all of the Chobe District), the FMD free zone in the south, and the Buffer zone in-between. The other two zones include the Buffalo Area and the Stock Free Zone which are limited to national parks such as the Kalahari and Chobe. These zones are separated using cordon fencing and periodic checkpoints known as "crushpens" and are operated by health technicians, as well as state
veterinarians (2005: 4). “By preventing the movement of infected animals from one area to another, the fences would, in theory, make the disease easier to control. But foot-and-mouth disease continues to develop and spread across fence lines in Botswana” (Owen and Owen 1984: 301).

The vaccination zone is limited to the north because of its high number of wildlife, particularly buffalo which have been shown to spread FMD to domesticate cattle (Vosloo et al. 2002). While immunization has proven highly effective in preventing the spread of FMD within the vaccination zone, vaccination has not been adopted within the FMD free zone. The reason for this has to do with international trade policy. Specifically, it has to do with export to Britain and Europe because “Beef from vaccinated animals cannot be exported for up to two years after vaccination,” a stipulation put in place because “importers will not accept FMD vaccination as a sufficient control measure on its own, and insist on fences to contain the disease in endemic areas” (Taylor and Martin 1987: 329).

The idea that vaccination is not a sufficient control measure stems from British methods of livestock movement control and eradication that were developed during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The method pursued by the British during this time did not change with the advent of vaccination in the 1950s, but instead vaccination was mostly ignored as an unsubstantiated method of control, despite continued use of vaccination alongside slaughter methods on the European mainland (Woods 2004). Woods explains why:

There were other important reasons why MAF [Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries] officials and their supporters refused to adopt vaccination. Their private discussions upon the matter show clearly that their policy preferences were underpinned by deep-seated-and perhaps not even consciously recognized-moral, cultural and nationalistic convictions. It seems that they viewed slaughter not only as a method of disease control, but as a moralizing, disciplinary and educational force, and a ‘virility symbol’ of Britain’s superiority over vaccinating nations . . . British proponents of slaughter felt that nations who adopted it were automatically
on a higher plane than those who did not because it stamped out germs and gave rise to national disease freedom, a state which MAF had long regarded as the highest possible achievement in livestock disease control (Woods 2004: 100-101).

Vaccination was briefly considered in the emotional aftermath of the British FMD epidemic of 1967 and 1968. But as the environment calmed in the absence of FMD after the outbreak, old political stances reaffirmed themselves. Again Wood demonstrates, “Representatives argued that vaccination would hinder livestock exports, ‘convey to the world that FMD is endemic in Great Britain’, and ‘change the standing of this country, which, in the past we have been proud to call the stud farm of the world’” (Woods 2004: 129 emphasis added).

In fact, as FMD began to disappear from Europe completely, vaccination as a control method lost further ground when in the early 1990s the European Commission for the Control of Foot and Mouth Disease (EUFMD) “concluded that the economic justification for continuing mass vaccination was questionable and that member nations should abandon it in favour of a stamping-out policy” (2004: 133). Economics was one of the arguments Britain had been making since the 1950s against vaccination, and it appears their opinion eventually held sway over the continent. The adoption of the “stamping-out policy” has particular importance for Botswana:

[C]ountries wishing to export to the region also had to adopt a goal of national FMD freedom, favour slaughter over vaccination and restrict the importation of goods from infected or vaccinating nations . . . [this] disputed method of FMD control became set in stone, the basis for an international system of trade (Woods 2004: 134).

This is further substantiated through measures brought about by the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE).

The international animal health organization that sets international trading norms with respect to animal and animal products, to achieve the most favourable trading status (freedom from FMD without vaccination), no animals vaccinated against FMD within the last 12 months should be present on the territory of the country.
concerned. No distinction is made between wildlife and domestic livestock (Thomson, Vosloo, and Bastos 2002:145-146).

Both the OIE and the EUFMD, European controlled organizations, adopted policies that create additional strain on producer nations, based on a method of control developed by the British Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) that largely ignores vaccination. The trade imbalance which leaves developing nations like Botswana dependent on the importing European nations, allows organizations such as the OIE and EUFMD to dictate control methods which may be inefficient or unwise for the producer nations. For example, Britain repeatedly banned imports from Argentina over the course of the twentieth century any time that country refused to abide by British standards of FMD control (Woods 2004). It was only when the strain of war or economic hardship forced politicians to acquire more beef for Britain that import policies were lifted.

In 2008, Botswana exported P608,804 (ca. $100,000 US) in meat products (Central Statistics Office 2009). Most beef exports are headed for Europe and Great Britain but are routed through the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) who has a monopoly on beef exports. Of all meat sales recorded by the BMC for 2001 to 2002, the United Kingdom made up 28.9% , more than double BMC sales within Botswana for the same period (Central Statistics Office 2009). Germany came in third at 10.2% followed by the Republic of South Africa (2009). It is therefore not surprising that the United Kingdom, Europe, and the World Veterinary Health Organization—which these countries dominate—have a disproportionate voice and influence in Botswana’s policies regarding livestock production and commercial land-use.

In a kind of neocolonialism, Britain and Europe continue to impose their wishes on former colonies through international trade policies and import restrictions. An idea Wallerstein discusses when exploring dependence in a global capitalist system whereby “the market serves
effectively to reinforce the existing system of stratification” (Wallerstein 1974: 1). In essence, the Western nations, former colonizers, started out on top and they have ensured their continued dominance through a free market system that is not entirely free.

However, why did Botswana closely follow British control methods before the OIE or EUFMD instituted such policies? And why did Britain pursue a control methodology that ignored the benefits of vaccination, imposing this control method on others? This is where the issue of social evolution is particularly essential.

British imperialism operated under the notion that British governance and methods were superior to those of the indigenous populations within its colonies. This colonial mindset was entrenched in a racist ideology of religious and cultural superiority based on a belief in “social evolution” which placed Britain at the top of a social and intellectual spectrum that justified their imperial ambitions. Ferguson, pulling from nineteenth century theorists Morgan and Tylor,
defines social evolutionism through three key principles:

First, there is the central idea that different societies are to be understood as discrete individuals, with each society making its way through the evolutionary process at its own pace, independently of the others. Second is the insistence that all societies are ultimately heading toward the same destination; in this sense, human history is one story, not many. Finally, the social evolutionary schemes posited that differences between human societies were to be interpreted as differences in their level of development (Ferguson 2007: 142).

Ferguson also notes that this type of mindset in anthropology began to wane with the establishment of the Boasian school of thought in the early half of the twentieth century, but was reborn in new concepts of development and modernization after World War II. This affected the development of post-colonial relationships and trade agreements.

The idea of social and cultural superiority extends to FMD control methods as well. As Woods illustrates, the British were absolutely convinced that their methods for the control and eradication of FMD were superior to any other, that it even had a moralizing component that
raised their nation to a “higher plane” over those nations who used vaccination, including other European countries (Woods 2004). Ireland in the early twentieth century was still a colony of Britain, fighting keenly for its independence. The Irish did not utilize British methods for control of FMD; a fact British parliamentarians used as an indication of their obvious inferiority and reason for their continued subjugation: “Each side drew connections between Ireland’s capacity to understand and control FMD, and its ability to understand the principles of self-government and control of its own people” (2004: 23). During the 1950s and 1960s, Britain began the process of fencing off parts of Botswana for FMD control. Even after independence, however, the fencing continued to the detriment of thousands of wildlife who died as a result of their migratory paths being cut off (Boon and Thompson 2004; Taylor and Martin 1987; Spierenburg and Wels 2006; Owen and Owen 1984).

Mentioned in the last chapter, the new Botswana government extended the precedent set by the British by consolidating control over the land through a series of laws including: the Chieftainship Law, Local Government Law, and Tribal land Act (Comaroff 1984: 69). The Tribal Land Act (1968) established the use of Land Boards who took control of land distribution. The newly independent government internalized much of the ideology established during colonialism which depicted rural agro-pastoralists and tribal members as backward and unfit to govern themselves. The newly independent government continued to operate under many of the same ideas demonstrated during British colonialism, namely the superiority of Western methods over rural or tribal systems. Both Ferguson and De Boeck have demonstrated how Africans often find it necessary to adopt the methods, policies, and even ideologies of the West just to gain access into “a spectacularly unequal global society” (Ferguson 2006: 174-175; De Boeck 2006). After independence, Botswana pursued a strategy that would ensure its modernization,
and they associated modernization with their former colonizer, Britain. Because of this, Botswana’s FMD control methods closely mirrored the British system, even though the rest of Europe had not adopted the same methodology yet.

So the current method of FMD control in Botswana, with a separation between Vaccination and FMD Free zones and the lack of immunization in commercial cattle production, is at least partly the result of two forms of imperialism: Botswana’s continued dependence on Britain and Europe for the export of its beef, and a colonial mindset of cultural and intellectual superiority that has become internalized and perpetuated by the government where European methods, and specifically British methods of FMD control, are considered the model to follow despite any negative consequences.

And what are the negative consequences? First, FMD policies increase farmer losses due to eradication campaigns and isolate rural agro-pastoralists in the north by limiting their access to commercial livestock markets. Second, FMD policies have negative effects on both wildlife and the environment, creating soil degradation and loss of large portions of wild animal populations. Third, FMD policies have resulted in conservation efforts being limited to national parks and their surrounding environments, placing an uneven burden on populations living adjacent to such parks. For these populations, CBNRM is meant to provide a measure of compensation and economic development. However, CBRNM was never designed to solve the challenges created as a result of FMD policies, only create incentive for conservation. If real change is going to occur, the issues outlined in this chapter must be addressed. The next section examines how these issues are influenced in one way or another by the use of fencing as a control method for FMD in Botswana, and the paradoxical way in which their intentions have resulted in opposite results.
The Fencing Paradox

Suddenly, the wildebeest stopped short . . . Stretched across their path were strands of high-tensile steel wire—the Kuki foot-and-mouth-disease control fence, extending for more than 100 miles across the northern border of the Central Kalahari Reserve . . . The wildebeest were cut off from the emergency water and riverine habitat that for eons they had counted upon in time of drought. Nothing they had ever learned, none of their instincts could help them deal with this obstacle (Owen and Owen 1984: 295).

The system of fencing in Botswana now totals 2,500 km in length (Selolwane 2001). Erected mostly during the second half of the twentieth century, the fencing system is a physical symbol of the power structure within Botswana, and as illustrated previously, the international power structure with regards to the exporting of livestock. The fencing paradox is two-fold and has to do with the heavy utilization of fencing as the main control method of FMD in Botswana, its parallel use in the privatization of open rangeland for cattle production, and the supposed success of fencing when compared with its negative social and environmental consequences.

The First Paradox

First, when the government of Botswana developed a system that created a vaccination zone separate from the FMD free zone, they made the livestock within the FMD free zone more vulnerable were an FMD outbreak to occur. One point that has been argued is the usefulness of fencing in trying to contain a disease which can be spread via an aerosolized virus in the first-place (Owen and Owen 1980). In particular, however, the lack of vaccination in the FMD free zone means that if the virus were to make its way into this zone, the livestock would have no defense against it; whereas the livestock in the vaccination zone have both fencing and immunization to protect them from infection. This is also true for Britain, who as a result of their policy of limiting imports from FMD free nations believed they were protecting themselves in such a manner as to disregard the need for vaccination completely. Britain and Botswana found, however, that maintaining FMD free status without vaccination is an impossible task, and
that a strategy that limits the use of vaccination is inherently flawed. Both countries recently experienced FMD outbreaks in what were supposedly FMD free areas (Baipoldie et al. 2003; Mokopasetso and Derah 2005; Woods 2004).

In 2002 and 2003, FMD outbreaks occurred in Botswana in the Francistown District, located in the FMD free zone (Baipoledi et al. 2003; Mokopasetso and Derah 2005). In both cases, the exclusion of vaccination in the FMD free zone meant that all those animals even exposed to the outbreak had to be slaughtered before Botswana could regain its FMD free status and resume trade with Europe. Because of a strategy based on slaughter after the fact, instead of vaccination before the incidence ever occurs, thousands of extra livestock were destroyed. For example, in the 2002 case, sixty-six cattle were found to be infected but even after post-outbreak vaccination, a total of 12,197 cattle were killed and buried because they had occupied the infection zone. Even after clinical inspections had come back negative, they were still destroyed. In the 2003 case, twenty-six cattle were identified but 3,864 were destroyed (Mokopasetso and Derah 2005).

In 2001, Britain experienced one of the worst FMD epidemics in its history. Because they had failed to emphasize vaccination in their prevention methods, they ended up dependent on the only other method for the containment of FMD in their arsenal, eradication. The cost was severe, as over 10 million animals were killed in response to actual disease outbreaks numbering only 2,026. Of course the British system of FMD control is the same as in Botswana, and all those animals with any exposure to FMD are destroyed, whether they show symptoms or not. Despite farmer outcry and demand for vaccination, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food continued to follow the system they had had in place for over a century; the system which contributed to present global restrictions in livestock trade. As Woods illustrates, however, “In
2001, British farmers found themselves at the ‘sharp end’ of the policies that their government representatives had fought so hard to introduce” (Woods 2004: 150).

Therefore, the first fencing paradox is that in all of their efforts to prevent FMD infection through the control and isolation of livestock, Britain and Botswana actually set themselves up for greater risk than if they had pursued a methodology of vaccination and control. Designed to protect them from FMD, the exclusivity of the fencing policies they implemented instead cost them more in the end. An example from South Africa illustrates the dilemma facing farmers attempting FMD control without vaccination. In the case of an outbreak of FMD in South Africa in 2000, authorities implemented a policy of emergency vaccination: “The main reason for favouring vaccination rather than immediate stamping-out was the almost impossible logistic effort required to ensure complete bio-security during culling operations of such large numbers of animals in such a small area” (Bruckner et al. 2002: 757). It is obvious that fencing is not enough to protect livestock from FMD and instead breeds vulnerability in the form of large losses due to culling operations when an outbreak occurs.

**The Second Paradox**

The second fencing paradox has to do with fencing’s role in conservation, the commodification of nature through privatization, and the place of tribal agro-pastoralists within the greater socio-political power structure. Besides FMD control, fencing has been used for several reasons in Botswana, including the isolation of tribal people from national parks, and in the privatization of previously open communal rangelands. All fencing systems, however, have limited tribal access and control over wildlife. Mentioned earlier, Botswana’s independence resulted in a decrease in tribal authority, and an increase in the role of the national government in tribal affairs. Prior to independence, however, colonial governments across Africa had established a system of “fortress conservation” in which parks were established to preserve the
local wildlife (Phuthego and Chanda 2004). It was believed that villager poaching was largely responsible for the fall in wildlife numbers and fencing was used to secure the parks and promote conservation by the separation of local tribes from the wildlife over which they had once held authority. As large cattle producers grew in economic importance, so did the importance of fencing as a tool for increasing private land holdings.

Garret Hardin’s thesis, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” (Hardin 1968) was released only a couple of years after Botswana’s independence and provided development organizations, and the government of Botswana, the rationale they needed to expand the private commercial livestock sector of the economy, even at the cost of the rural agro-pastoralists who needed access to communal rangeland and water sources. Fratkin explicates, “[Development planners] saw the problem not so much as improving livestock productivity . . . but one of limiting the size of herds on rangeland, which could best be achieved by increased livestock marketing, using Western models of individual commercial ranches” (Fratkin 1997: 241). He goes on to point out that rural pastoralists are being undermined by state and private factions, with commercial ranches replacing pastoral households.

Discussed earlier, the government’s continued negative bias towards tribal agro-pastoralists is based on the faulty Malthusian and Hardin proposition that the “poor rural majorities who occupy communal areas [are] the major culprits in land degradation” (Selolwane 2001: 94). In response, fencing in Botswana has been used as a method of wresting control of communal rangelands from tribal groups by the government (whether colonial or independent) for their alternative purpose of nature preserves and commercial cattle production.

However, the second fencing paradox is found in that the fencing system that was designed to improve cattle production, control FMD, and reduce wildlife losses and
environmental degradation has in fact had the opposite effect. The negative consequences fencing has had on wildlife populations in Botswana has been acknowledged by multiple scholars (Boon and Hobbs 2004; Taylor and Martin 1987; Bigalke 2000; Spierenburg and Wels 2006; Owens and Owens 1984; Selolwane 2000; Grootenhuis 2000). In Botswana, it decimated migrating populations of wildebeest and buffalo, among other species. Owen and Owen illustrate: “In 1961, and again in 1964, as many as 80,000 wildebeest died in the area of the Kuki-Makalamabedi fence corner and between there and lake Xau” (Owen and Owen 1984: 301). Boone and Hobbs claim that “10,000 hartebeest [died] against the Ghanzi fences between 1981 and 1987” (Boone and Hobbs 2004: 149). Grootenhuis comments, “Migration of wildlife has never been implicated as having a role in the spread of FMD because buffalo do not migrate over large distances and other species are not involved in the maintenance of the disease.” He continues, “It is astonishing therefore that in Botswana, FMD control was the reason for stopping the world’s most spectacular animal migrations by extending veterinary cordon fencing on a national scale and at massive expense (Grootenhuis 2000: 85-86).

In addition to wildlife losses, fencing and privatization has led to overstocking by commercial livestock producers. In direct contradiction to Hardin’s “Tragedy of the Commons,” it is the large cattle ranches owned by the wealthy elite who are actually responsible for land degradation, but who are also the policy makers (Selolwane 2001; Bigalke 2000). According to Selolwane:

[L]arge cattle owners, among whom are the policy makers, have usually been reluctant to adopt good management practices such as sustainable stocking rates . . . fencing is essentially a land reform policy which expropriates land from the poor and benefits the rich who have been the major source of environmental degradation.

Therefore, the ones who are causing environmental destruction are the ones who are in power and place the blame on the rural poor who have no voice within the government.
In response to the falling numbers of wildlife, Botswana’s government pursued a separate agenda of wildlife conservation. Conservation efforts, however, placed greater importance on the wildlife than on the villagers living near these wildlife populations who must deal with risks associated with increasing wildlife populations. When examining the causes of wildlife depletion and environmental degradation, villager encroachment and poaching are minimal in comparison to governmental and private fencing controls. However the government refuses to acknowledge the role its fencing policies played in the destruction of wildlife. In fact, it has been acknowledged that the fencing systems crisscrossing Botswana actually contribute to poachers easy access to animals hemmed in by the blockages in their migratory paths (Owen and Owen 1984; Albertson 1998). Selolwane found that “The official perception is that drought conditions are the major source of wildlife depletion” (2001: 98). But as the statements by Owen and Owen have shown, the drought conditions were exacerbated when the migratory paths that would have allowed wildlife access to water sources were cut off. Instead the government maintains the colonial mindset mentioned earlier, depicting the rural agro-pastoralists as “resource degraders.” As a result, they focus their conservation efforts on parks and their adjacent areas. This allows the government to maintain its system of cordon fences for FMD control while still demonstrating their dedication to conservation. The agro-pastoralists living in those adjacent areas, however, suffer as a result.

Over time fences, that once symbolized tribal separation from wildlife and the loss of a vital resource, became the very tools which protected villagers and their livelihoods from the dangers wildlife now represent to both their farms and livestock. Spierenburg and Wels quote Krell with regard to the changing symbolism of fencing in rural communities stating that “Barbed wire has always functioned in that paradoxical zone, between protection and division”
The commodification of nature, as Mrozowski claims, resulted in a dualism of nature and society. The rural tribal populations that once equated their livelihoods with the wildlife they depended on, have now adopted that same dualism within their own cultures, seeing wildlife no longer as a valuable resource but as a hindrance to the agricultural production their economic system currently depends on. The fencing paradox is that park fences are used to protect wildlife from human impact and increase conservation efforts (Spierenburg and Wels 2006; Phuthego and Chanda 2004), but FMD fences are responsible for tens of thousands of wildlife losses through entanglement, migratory path disturbance, and increased poacher access. Additionally, modern conservation efforts working to counteract the effects of the FMD fences tend to increase wildlife populations in parks and their buffer zones near the rural villagers who had little to do with their original destruction but who must now deal with the negative consequences associated with wild animals living near their homes. Some of these consequences include the loss of livestock to predators, loss of crops to large herbivores, and the threat of FMD from buffalo.

The last sections of this chapter has attempted to demonstrate some of the issues associated with the control of Foot and Mouth Disease in Botswana and the international community. These issues include the consequences of FMD for commercial livestock, wildlife populations, and rural agro-pastoralists as well as broader socio-political ideals of social and cultural superiority and their impact on international trade policies and practices. The control of FMD is entrenched in a long history of progressive strategies from initial ambivalence to increasingly stricter livestock movement controls and eradication campaigns using fencing as a tool. Botswana, under British colonization, was incorporated into the international livestock trade and experienced increased investment in cattle and agricultural equipment as a result of
taxes their colonizer introduced (Bar-On 2006). This development facilitated the process that led to Botswana’s modern strategy of FMD control which relies predominately on fences and checkpoints. These processes have also led to environmental degradation and loss of wildlife that was then attributed primarily to communal rangelands and tribal poaching.

As this chapter has shown, the system of fenced disease control zones with limited use of vaccination is at least partly the result of greater political and cultural ideas of superiority expressed both during and after colonization. And the modern trade restrictions on the importation of vaccinated beef is part of that colonial heritage, with the British stamping-out policy now identified as the only strategy accepted by European nations. Economics was touted as the main reason British policy makers focused their efforts on movement control over vaccination. Their argument, however, did not take into consideration the dramatic cost of over-fencing the open rangelands of countries such as Botswana. Vaccination today only costs approximately one American dollar per cow annually (Grootenhuis 2000). When compared to the economic costs of maintaining excessive fences, staffing control points, and losses due to eradication campaigns during outbreaks, it is apparent that Britain and the OIE’s economic efficiency rationalization largely ignores the associated costs for cattle producing nations.

The negative effects on wildlife as a result of the extensive fencing that has been adopted in Botswana for livestock and FMD control and the privatization of communal rangeland has been well documented. Besides the negative impact on wildlife and the environment, however in a somewhat ironic twist, it appears that this fencing system and stamping-out policy has inadvertently made commercial livestock more vulnerable to FMD than if vaccination had been pursued. It has taken major recent outbreaks of FMD in Europe before the international bodies controlling trade realized their mistake in dismissing the necessity of vaccination and the risks
associated with its absence. However, trade restrictions have yet to be altered in a significant manner. And fences, the tool that has long been identified with the “protection” of wildlife, have now come to symbolize the increasing commercial influence over land use policies and the resulting endangerment to wildlife and environmental degradation. These land use policies are relevant to the development of CBNRM as it grew out of a conservatory reaction to the effects of such policies, and yet the success of CBNRM is restricted by the political forces that created said policies.
Figure 2-1. Map of Botswana showing Disease Control Zones. Source: Derah and Mokopasetso 2005, pg. 4
CHAPTER 3: HISTORY OF CBNRM

This chapter provides an overview of the history of CBNRM including its conceptualization and evolution in Zimbabwe as the CAMPFIRE Program. The example of the CAMPFIRE Program is provided as a reference point for CBNRM in Botswana and illustrates some of the challenges facing participatory natural resource management programs throughout Africa. Several other examples of such programs are presented from Cameroon, Mozambique, Kenya, and Tanzania. The chapter then examines the case of Botswana and how CBNRM was implemented in trying to avoid some of the pitfalls experienced by CAMPFIRE. I then conclude by examining where CBNRM has fallen short in its goals of devolution of authority to local village organizations and how successful CBNRM’s purpose of improving wildlife conservation is difficult to ascertain.

The Communal Areas Management Program For Indigenous Resources Program in Zimbabwe

The popularity of CBNRM began to develop in the 1980s under a program in Zimbabwe known as CAMPFIRE (Communal Areas Management Programme For Indigenous Resources). The Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management started development on CAMPFIRE in 1982 and it became part of the National Conservation Strategy in 1987 (Mamimine 2002: 88). Prior to CAMPFIRE the foremost method of wildlife conservation in Africa was through delineating sections of land into strict wildlife preservation reserves in what is known as the “fortress” approach. Brian Jones and Marshall Murphree explain that the problem with the fortress system of wildlife management is that it is biocentric instead of anthropocentric (Jones and Murphree 2004: 63). This system opposes traditional forms of wildlife management and excludes locals who then lose any vested interest in helping to maintain wildlife conservation. For rural indigenous populations living under the fortress method
of conservation, local wildlife assumed only negative value as it contributed to bodily injury and agricultural damages. Swatuk states, “Post-colonial indigenous responses to the traditional approach to conservation were predictable: opportunistic use of resources at best; deliberate extermination of species at worst” (Swatuk 2005: 100). CBNRM programs such as CAMPFIRE became the proposed solution to this dichotomy: “The protectionist approach is sometimes described as the ‘fortress’ style of conservation, CBNRM is therefore a reverse of this style” (Phuthego and Chanda 2004: 60).

In 1975, the government of Zimbabwe recognized that there was a need for greater devolution of wildlife conservation control to local populations. The Parks and Wildlife Act of that same year “conferred proprietorship of wildlife resources on the ‘owners or occupiers of alienated land’” (Murphree 1991: 6). While this created a booming wildlife ranching industry, it only benefited those individuals who owned their own property rights and had the financial capacity and infrastructure to realize the benefits of the act. Tribal groups living on ‘common property’ saw few, if any, of these benefits. The WINDFALL (Wildlife Industries New Development for All) program, implemented in 1978, was designed to resolve this issue by establishing a system for returning wildlife conservation benefits to local communities by “making meat from culls in the adjacent national parks available to the local inhabitants and by returning revenues from safari hunting to the relevant district councils” (Murphree 1998: 6). WINDFALL collapsed, however, when the local inhabitants failed to appreciate the link between the limited revenues that trickled down to them and those revenues’ origins in wildlife conservation (Metcalfe 1994: 164; Murphree 1998: 6).

CAMPFIRE, it was believed, would succeed where others had failed. It would “rectify the harm done by certain British colonial policies” (Child and Ward 1997: 3), and reduce rural
populations need for charitable donations of food and funding. Simon Metcalfe, who participated in the initial stages of CAMPFIRE, comments, “I became driven by a vision in which the Tonga people’s dependence on food aid, and their alienation from their environment, would be transformed into a culturally and biologically rich and sustainable future” (Metcalfe 1994: 165). The success of CAMPFIRE rested entirely on the premise of decentralization and devolution of government control to the regional and local levels. Chitsike defines it as the “transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resource raising and allocation to the districts, wards and villages, NGOs, private sector and to traditional authorities” (Chitsike 2000: 2). Districts responded positively at first, recognizing CAMPFIRE as both empowering and a new source of revenue, but the reality of a still heavily bureaucratized system soon set in.

The problem with CAMPFIRE had to do with the way devolution of authority was managed. Whereas previous control of wildlife conservation had been handled strictly by the central government, the Parks and Wildlife Act provided for what was termed ‘Appropriate Authority.’ Through CAMPFIRE, Appropriate Authority was granted to the Rural District Councils (RDCs). The Rural District Council Act of 1988 combined rural councils with district councils, increasing the size and autonomy of each district council. Appropriate Authority was supposed to streamline the process of devolution from the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM) to local producer communities by granting the RDCs the authority to “enter into contracts with private organizations for the exploitation of their wildlife, receive all payments directly and carry out their own problem animal control” (Chitsike 2000: 26). The RDCs were then responsible for devolving authority to the local producer communities once their capacity to manage contracts and revenue distribution was attained. This became the Achilles heel of CAMPFIRE. Because RDCs received little financial support from the central
government, they became reluctant to devolve their authority to the local Wards since the “RDCs would lose an important source of revenue” (Mamimine 2002: 96). RDCs continually found ways to delay devolution of their authority to the communities, such as claiming that Wards lacked sufficient capacity even though the CAMPFIRE program had assisted in the development of capacity building throughout producer communities in Zimbabwe.

The lessons of CAMPFIRE are relevant to CBNRM in Botswana. Although the CAMPFIRE program suffered from community isolation and micro-management by district-based elite, it also experienced success such as in the Kanyurira Ward where the community attained greater control over revenue distribution (Metcalfe 1994: 176-180). Conservation within these areas has improved as locals are beginning to link development with wildlife management. According to Child, Ward, and Tavengwa, the value of elephant bulls can be “worth as much as US$10,000 each to a community,” which means “much greater consideration is given before killing a crop-raider” (Child et al. 1997: 28). This is clearly illustrated through the dialogue of one local elder who stated, “We see now, that these buffalo are our cattle” (Murphree 1991: 8-9).

The importance of CAMPFIRE is considerable when compared historically to some of the other supposedly participation-based conservation schemes found in African countries like Tanzania and Mozambique. James Ferguson explains the problems of community participation-based conservation in Tanzania where benefits in the form of revenue were non-existent, and participation was really only a supplementary motivator in addition to increased military coercion (Ferguson 2006: 43, emphasis added).

Drijver provides two poignant case studies of nationally driven and environmentally focused projects in Africa including the Waza National Park in Cameroon and Kenya’s
Amboseli National Park (Drijver 1992). The Waza National Park is a traditional example of fortress conservation as “an almost completely centralistic environmental project” (Drijver 1992: 136). The colonial government established the park in 1968 in reaction to dwindling wildlife populations as a result of changing land-use activities and an increase in the cattle population. None of the local inhabitants were consulted during the process but were instead excluded from the park and the program. Those villagers formerly living within the boundaries of the park were completely removed and resettled along the park’s borders. The villagers lost access to needed land and resources and were forced to deal with the added threat of crop damage and loss of livestock by the park’s wildlife. Poaching became a significant problem as “whole groups of animals are shot with modern weapons and transported for sale in Nigeria” (1992: 137). Local Cameroonian act as guides for the poachers because they have little incentive to try and preserve the park. The case of Waza National Park demonstrates that “such centralistic nature conservation projects that ignore the socio-economic conditions of the local people may lead to the detriment of the very environment they are designed to protect or conserve” (1992:137)

The case of Amboseli National Park and Kenya’s attempt at community participation in natural resource management is more promising; however, it also ended in failure. Launched in 1977, Kenya developed a program to deal with the increasing population of Maasai villagers around the park. As pastoralists, increasing numbers of Maasai and livestock began to compete for local resources and natural wildlife numbers decreased. The program was aimed at the Maasai by making them joint landowners around the park as communal cattle ranches. In addition, they received part of the proceeds from tourism and “schools, health services and a community centre were to be constructed” (Drijver 1992: 138). For their part, the Maasai would combat poaching and tolerate wildlife on their ranches. However, an overly bureaucratic system
resulted in the delay of payments and the collapse of artificial water sources that were to be maintained by the government and for which the Maasai relied upon. When the economic incentives failed, the Maasai quickly returned to their traditional grazing patterns and poaching re-emerged. “The main reasons for its failure included the overreliance on financial compensation compared to other non-material factors and the insufficient attention to resource management and local interests and culture of the participants on whose goodwill the success of the project rested” (1992: 139).

The lessons of CAMPFIRE include the importance of “complete” devolution of authority and the value of revenue distribution. The evolution of Appropriate Authority and Rural District Councils under CAMPFIRE resulted in a bureaucratic stagnation where the “communities themselves are not actively participating in the planning and management process and appear alienated from both the trust and the wildlife on which they depend for their existence” (Metcalfe 1994: 176). The benefits to communities were rarely exemplified in direct revenue redistribution to the household, but were more often developed through community projects such as grinding mills. For CBNRM to be more successful, revenue must make its way into the hands of each household if individuals are truly going to benefit from its implementation. Direct revenue redistribution provides individuals with tangible benefits and keeps councils accountable to the populace whose interests they are supposed to represent (Child 2006). Botswana managed to avoid some of the bureaucratic difficulties that CAMPFIRE endured. Unlike Zimbabwe, the District Land Boards in Botswana developed a system of 10-15 year land-leases appropriated directly to local Community Based Organizations (CBOs), avoiding one of the pitfalls created by the role of RDCs under CAMPFIRE. CBOs form trusts and “have stronger legal proprietorship than wards in the CAMPFIRE Programme, and in this dimension Botswana can be said to have
more closely approximated the communal property rights regime ideal than Zimbabwe”

**Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana**

The evolution of CBNRM in Botswana began in 1989 with the establishment of the Natural Resources Management Project. The NRMP was developed under the joint supervision of the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the United States Agency for International Development. The purpose of the NRMP was to establish, train, and fund CBNRM projects throughout Botswana. Mentioned previously, the projects are based on land-lease concessions made by the District Land Boards to the Community Based Organizations. The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT), which includes the villages of Mabele, Kavimba, Kachikau, Satau, and Parakarungu, was the first CBO trust established under NRMP. Trusts must apply to the District Land Board for these leases to be granted authority over local wildlife and their corresponding hunting quotas, which are still determined by the DWNP. In addition to Wildlife Management Areas, the government has also divided the country up into 163 Controlled Hunting Areas (CHAs), which “overlay other forms of land use, thus one WMA may contain several CHAs or parts thereof” (Swatuk 2005: 102). Of the 163 Controlled Hunting Areas, only 42 have been zoned for community management, and out of those, only 14 leases have been issued or 8.6 percent of the total CHAs zoned (2005:102).

The engine of CBNRM in Botswana is the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA). JVAs are contractual agreements between village trusts and private businesses, generally hunting and photo safaris. Tara Gujadhur defines JVAs as “a business arrangement between a private company and a rural community for the commercial utilization of an area’s natural resources, be those animals, land or culture” (Gujadhur 2001: 15). The CBO is granted a lease from the DWNP which includes a specified quota for the number of animals in each species that can be
killed, and the CBO then sells the quota to the highest bidding safari operator. Whichever safari operator offers the most money can then enter into a JVA with the village trust. One example is Rann Hunting Safaris who used to have a JVA with the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust and was the first company in Botswana to sign a Joint Venture Agreement (CBNRM Forum 2002: Sec. 4). Besides the monetary benefits to the communities, JVAs also commit a portion of the meat from each kill to the village trusts. Rann’s hunting operations provided the Chobe Enclave with approximately 50 percent of the meat procured from their kills (2002: Sec. 4). JVAs provide communities with revenue, employment, food, and increased tourism.

In 1998, international participants in Botswana’s CBNRM project, including the World Conservation Union (IUCN) and the Global Environment Facility (GEF), helped establish BOCOBONET: “the Botswana Community Based Organization Network, which centralizes in one office documentation pertaining to CBNRM activities and experiences and acts as an information clearing house” (Swatuk 2005: 102). However, in 1999 the National Resources Management Project came to a close when USAID pulled its support for the project. USAID perceived a lack of interest by the Department of Wildlife and National Parks and the Agricultural Resources Board (ARB). Legislation providing CBNRM with government policy direction in Botswana sat at the feet of the government for nearly a decade without resolve, leading USAID to pull support (2005: 102-103). Other policies relevant to the formation of CBNRM in Botswana include: the 1990 Tourism Policy which “created tourism concessions, also in communal areas and laid conditions for the competitive process through which these concessions could be acquired,” and the 2002 revised Rural Development Policy which “identifies areas for private commercial development as well as areas for community-based development” (Arntzen et. al 2003: 35).
CBNRM in Botswana includes both material and non-material benefits. The majority of material benefits come in the form of revenue from JVAs which has exceeded one million Pula (ca. $160,000) in some CBOs, but is generally “around P1050 [or $175 U.S.] per annum per person” (Arntzen et. al 2003: 29). In the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, income from JVAs in 2006 reached P3.4 million (Child et. al 2007: 4). CBNRM has generated between 1000 and 1500 jobs, but that is mostly through Trusts and JVAs tend to employ only 200 to 500 individuals (2003: 27). Gujadhur provides insight into the other benefits generated through CBNRM including: self-confidence gained, cultural identity and social cohesion strengthened, indigenous knowledge systems recognized, equitable and participatory community decision-making encouraged, food security, and an ability to deal with outsiders (Gujadhur 2000: 19). Environmental benefits include: growing appreciation of the value of natural resources, apparent reduction in poaching, better relationships with conservation officials, preservation of savannah landscape and biodiversity, reduced need for rural agriculture in marginal areas and prevention of the associated agro-environmental problems (Arntzen et. al 2003: 33).

Despite Gujadhur’s arguments for its positive points, the problems with CBNRM in Botswana’s are multiple and varied. Although Botswana has not experienced the same challenges CAMPFIRE endured through RDCs, there have still been problems with devolution of control and benefits. Within the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust it was determined that while the CECT officials were heavily involved in its operation, the general public has minimal participation in the project and little knowledge of how the CECT operates or the composition of members’ rights (Child et. al 2007: 5). This sentiment mirrors CBNRM throughout Botswana as Swatuk confirms, “However, many residents do not fully understand the legal basis for their activities; neither do they understand their formal relationship to the land” (Swatuk 2005: 118).
Economic benefits rarely make it past trust officials and administrators and, unlike CAMPFIRE, no trust has a formal distribution plan. Individual households have not seen direct financial benefits and community members negatively affected by wildlife have not received compensation (Arntzen et. al 2003: 29). At the local level, officials involved in CBNRM retain greater levels of prestige within the community and tend to micro-manage the projects; a situation which hearkens back to the wealthy commercial farmers who became “prominent in local and district affairs.” That a minority of the populace within these communities are the only ones actively involved in CBNRM suggests that these individuals are merely the latest and most modern example of rural resources being utilized and expropriated to fuel the ambitions of a few.

In actuality, devolution of control by the government to local communities is quite limited. The fact that the DWNP still retains control over quota figures and land distribution to trusts illustrates the minimal control upon which CBOs are conferred. Nowhere is this more clearly demonstrated than in the landleases granted to CBOs, but with the DWNP retaining the right to terminate the lease with only six months’ notice. The wording in the document is so broad and vague that it permits the DWNP to terminate leases for almost any reason (Swatuk 2005: 104). Even after landleases are granted, the DWNP can still suspend CBO hunting quotas whenever it feels justified: “The suspension of CBO hunting quotas is another achievement . . . and will hopefully stimulate CBOs to establish better financial and organisational management structures” (Arntzen et. al 2003: 19). DWNP’s policies regarding the granting of landleases and hunting quotas illustrate “the continuing role of government as final authority in any land use decisions” (Swatuk 2005: 104).

Regarding environmental problems, poaching appears to be decreasing, but there has been little to no actual monitoring or record keeping by CBNRM projects. Wildlife related
damages to local villages continue while the benefits of CBNRM have not offered adequate compensation. Local knowledge systems regarding wildlife management numbers have been recognized, but are rarely taken into consideration by the DWNP when developing quota schedules. This reflects the level of disconnect between CBOs and the DWNP as communication regarding quotas has stopped and the DWNP continues to make its decisions based on a perception of declining wildlife numbers, which conflicts with CBOs perceptions of increasing wildlife. As a result, hunting quotas are decreasing leaving many CBOs frustrated (Arntzen et. al 2003: 33).

The CAMPFIRE Program in Zimbabwe and CBNRM in Botswana provide insight into the process of increasing villager participation in conservation and development strategies. While both programs have experienced limited success and endured criticism, they offer positive examples of how governments’ approaches to natural resource management are evolving, especially in comparison to such programs as the Waza and Amboseli National Parks presented by Drijver. However, CBNRM in Botswana still requires improvement. The limited nature of the quota system and the lack of transparency and local knowledge about the program are major hindrances to participation by local villagers. There is little devolution of authority over wildlife back to the villages and although there is a dialogue between local CBOs and the government, evidence suggests that it is mostly a one-way conversation with the central government delineating policies and the local communities falling in line or risk losing their source of income. The sale of hunting quotas provides some economic incentive, but it is not inherently sustainable. If the income from the sale of these quotas is not managed appropriately, then the communities and individuals negatively affected by local wildlife intrusions will remain ambivalent towards the program and the goal of conservation. The following chapter provides a
case-study in how mismanagement of funds as well as poor communication and transparency on the part of CECT has led to limited participation and economically unsustainable projects that have little relevance for village members.
CHAPTER 4:
ANTHROPOLOGICAL FIELD RESEARCH

This chapter synthesizes the results of my fieldwork among the Basubiya while conducting fieldwork in the Chobe Enclave and utilizes the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust as a case study for examining the role of CBNRM in Botswana. Included within the chapter is a section on the methodologies employed during the research and a dissection of the socio-economic patterns of the Chobe Enclave including how CBNRM is relating to individual livelihood strategies. The chapter then examines the success of CBNRM including community participation and the role of gender. Throughout the chapter I demonstrate that, in the case of CECT, CBNRM is falling short of its goals of providing a participatory system for natural resource management. Communication and transparency are limited and the importance of incorporating a framework for mainstreaming gender within CBNRM is still needed. The chapter ends with a discussion regarding sustainable projects, improving evaluation and monitoring techniques, and the need for scientific data on poaching numbers to accurately evaluate the success of CBNRM in promoting wildlife conservation.

Methodology

The methodology utilized during the research in Kavimba was the result of a combination of preconceived ideas during the planning stages in the U.S. and adjustments made “on-the-ground.” My original research goals intended to explore CBNRM through an analysis of the gender division of labor, household cash distribution and utilization, and the utility of CBNRM projects for each gender within the household based on resource allocation. Most research regarding CBNRM considers the male-headed household as a singular unit in its evaluations and therefore fails to recognize the possibility of gendered social relations within the household and how CBNRM may affect individuals of each sex in these households differently. Therefore my
methodology was largely based on assumptions about the type of access and amount of time I
would have within the Chobe Enclave. The original plan was to work with two geography
graduate students who had previously worked in the area. This would aid in establishing rapport
and gaining research informants. The aim was to then determine the gender division of labor
within several households and how the gender division of labor influences CBNRM conservation
strategies, as well as intra-household economic distribution and individual spending patterns. I
wanted to determine if CBNRM is beneficial to all members of each household. This strategy
had inherent flaws as it was based on the CAMPFIRE program which included cash distribution
at the household level. Because CBNRM in Botswana does not include cash distribution at the
household level, evaluating its program required a new approach.

After meeting with the Department of Wildlife and National Parks, the University of
Florida research team made the twelve hour drive north to Kasane. We spent a week conducting
interviews and surveys on the Namibian island of Impalila for the “Dashboard” analysis that
Professor Brian Child developed to monitor conservation trusts working in CBNRM. I
participated in several interview formatted surveys to better understand the Dashboard process
and gain some comparative insight on another CBNRM program in the area. I also travelled into
the Chobe Enclave with the research team during this week to begin making contacts. We met
with the elected Chair of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, Lucksom Sankwasa and
inquired as to CECT’s development and success since Dr. Child had visited and conducted the
Dashboard the previous summer. It was also during this time that Dr. Child introduced me to
Lucksom Masule, a Basubiya headman and longtime acquaintance of Child. Meeting Mr.
Masule proved to be the most beneficial consequence of my time in the Enclave.
Because of logistical and extenuating circumstances, I was unable to work with either of the geography graduate assistants I had planned on assisting and utilizing in building rapport. Instead, Child negotiated for me to work with Masule and begin learning the history and culture of the Basubiya. This worked greatly to my advantage as Masule spoke English fluently and was particularly enthusiastic about my interests and research. After this arrangement was made, I returned to Kavimba village the following day to discuss my living arrangements. Masule worked with me in this process and negotiated for me to live with his uncle, a man in his seventies with two wives and eighteen children. This was a fortuitous arrangement as I had hoped to stay with a local family and gain insight into the day to day operations and livelihood strategies of the Basubiya family. Although it took some cajoling to convince the head wife that I truly wanted to stay with their family and did not mind using the outhouse or eating with my hands, I was allowed to rent a two room cement block hut with electricity.

Shortly after this arrangement was made, the research team from UF left for the Kung! villages farther south participating in CBNRM, and I was left alone to begin my individual research. Considering time constraints, the fact that money was not being distributed to each household like in Zimbabwe, and the resources available to me, I decided to transform my methodology to one that sought to better understand the local culture and individual livelihoods of the Basubiya villagers as well as how the local version of the CBNRM program operated and if it spoke to the issues affecting the villagers livelihoods and individual needs and constraints. To accomplish these goals, I worked heavily with Masule at first, developing my knowledge of the local history and culture. Masule also helped me acculturate to Kavimba’s community, including introducing me to the Basubiya Chief, the tribal police, and the other headman.
My methodology was three pronged and consisted of in-depth informal interviews, participant observation, and collection of primary materials and documents. The interviews were conducted off and on over the course of four weeks and generally lasted anywhere from one to two hours depending on the participant. Thirteen structured interviews were completed with six females and seven males. The participants included my primary informant Masule, one of CECT’s tractor operators, a local pastor, a tribal administration custodian, a retired primary school teacher, a female entrepreneur, CECT’s accountant, a shop attendant, a cattle herder and piece worker, a female elder, a tribal police officer, a head nurse, and a public health official. These individuals were selected at random from the community during daily trips in and around the village. In the one case where a translator was necessary, I bargained with one of my informants to act as interpreter in exchange for one of my University of Florida short-sleeve shirts. All interview participants were asked to sign or vocally agree to the interview using an informed consent form. All participants were informed that the interviews were voluntary and those that did not wish to be tape recorded could still be interviewed.

Participant observation included all of my observations noted during my stay in the village, with particular reference to any CBNRM related activities including CECT and Kavimba Village Trust Committee meetings. Being able to live and stay in the community allowed for greater insight into the villagers’ day to day livelihoods, including the gender division of labor, and how their livelihoods are and are not affected by the CBNRM program. As a methodology, participant observation allowed me to develop a level of trust among the villagers as time passed and they witnessed my continued presence at soccer games, the local bar, church, village meetings, the tribal office, or just sitting around the campfire. Participant observation is often disregarded as anecdotal, but it can be a truly effective methodology as the researcher becomes
more in tune with his or her surroundings and can modify other aspects of the research such as more precise interview questions. In fact, some of my most poignant points taken away from my research came from my observations during the VTC meeting and something as simple as the order in which men and women sat and participated in the meeting.

In the collection of primary materials, I used documents from the CECT office. Among the primary materials collected, I obtained copies of the Community Natural Resource Management Lease between the Chobe Land Board and CECT, the Memorandum of Sublease Agreement between CECT and Akuna Mathata Wildlife Safari, the Republic of Botswana’s Community Based Natural Resources Management Policy Paper No. 2, the 2008-2009 Covering Notes for Recurrent Budget of Kavimba’s VTC, the agendas from both the VTC and CECT meetings, an Environmental Impact Assessment Study for a Pre-feasibility/feasibility on Utilization of the Water Resources of the Chobe/Zambezi River, and a draft of the Memorandum of Understanding made between CECT and Ngoma Enterprises for the funding and construction of a future lodge as well as related documents. Having not only access, but copies of these documents was extremely beneficial to my research and to understanding the macro and micro processes affecting the Basubiya and CBNRM in Botswana.

**Fieldwork Findings: Socio-economic Composition of the Chobe Enclave and Individual Livelihood Challenges**

To understand the relevance and success of CBNRM to the villagers of the Chobe Enclave requires an understanding of the residents’ livelihoods including demographics and the gender division of labor. Chobe residents are predominately Basubiya agro-pastoralists dependent on sales from livestock to supplement their crop production. The local soil is dry, sandy, and has poor yields. For female headed households, harvest yields can sometimes be even less than what the household needs for its own consumption (Barnhoon et al. 1994).
Despite the arid desert environment, Chobe resident’s close relationship with the Chobe River allows them to have two planting seasons versus the one planting season the majority of Batswana farmers rely on. The residents describe these two seasons as molapo and dryland. Molapo planting is conducted in the river basin following the flood recession in August, and dryland planting is conducted on the sandy soil up on the side of the plateau immediately prior to the November/December rains. Maize is considered the predominant crop of the molapo season and sorghum during the dryland season, but both are planted in each season. Other crops include cowpeas, spinach, melons, and millet, but maize makes up the staple starch in their diet (Barnhoon et al. 1994; Feldstein and Poats 1989). Maize yields for the molapo season are estimated at 225kg/ha whereas during the dryland farming it can be as low as 53kg/ha (Barnhoon et al. 1994: 97). Drought has been an increasing problem in the last fifty years. Masule explained how the yearly floods have been growing smaller almost yearly and Muese, a young cattle herder, noted the negative affect recent years of drought have had on cattle and crops.

**On-Farm Activities**

Farming tasks are divided along gender lines with men responsible for land preparation including clearing of trees and ploughing. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the household gender division of labor and seasonal calendar. Women are responsible for planting, weeding, and harvesting although it is not unusual for men and women to share in each other’s tasks, especially as there is a limited amount of available labor with the rapid urbanization that is occurring in Botswana. There are also numerous female headed households, forcing many women to hire available male labor and traction. Inputs are minimal and usually consist of manure and very little chemical fertilizer. Ploughing used to be done predominately by cattle; tractors, however, have taken over much of that responsibility. Each village has one or two tractor operators paid for by the Village Trust Committee, the local branch of the Chobe Enclave.
Conservation Trust (CECT). Although these tractors are subsidized through the CBNRM program, they still charge a minimum of fifty Pula for their services, predominately for ploughing and transportation of firewood. Because of the cost, the tractors are generally utilized by farmers with more available income first. Female headed households who do not have the available income at the beginning of planting season must wait until the wealthier farmers have had their fields plowed with the CECT tractor and thereby miss the optimal time for plowing. As a result, female headed households have fewer yields and less income to put toward the next planting season.

Other household activities are also divided along gender lines. Men are responsible for the care of the livestock, particularly cattle, goats, and donkeys and boys generally do the milking. Men herd the cattle from their kraals in the morning down to the river where they spend the day grazing. Then in the evening the cattle are brought back up to the kraals for protection against predators. Women are primarily situated in the domestic sphere and are responsible for cooking, fetching water, and washing clothes and dishes. Women are also responsible for some construction and housing repair as well as collecting firewood. Men do most of the construction that utilizes modern materials such as cement, and boys also collect and chop firewood. Almost of the all of the interview participants confirmed the traditional division of labor; however, a young police officer acknowledged the changing role of gender as education and wage labor influences the roles available to young men and women. “Things are changing,” was his response when asked about the roles of men and women, explaining that both men and women are now wage earners within the household. This is not to suggest that men and women are on an equal footing within Chobe. On the contrary, there is indeed a great deal of inequality as illustrated by a young female dry-goods shop attendant, “The man’s role is a good role, the
best. He divides duties, disciplines, and gives advice. The woman’s advice is not always followed. Not much respect by men.”

Off Farm Activities

Off-farm activities are an important form of subsistence and income. These activities include fishing and hunting fowl for men and crafts and beer brewing for women. The formal industry is an essential part of household production as “nearly half of the average income is earned from formal activities” (Barnhoon et al. 1994: 102). Both men and women are involved in wage labor activities, especially the tourism industry, and include tour guides, custodians, the government (tribal affairs, police officers, etc.), and the food industry: “Productive activities in the area include fisheries in the main channels and the Linyanti swamps, and employment with a logging company in the Forest Reserve or with a safari company” (1994:102). One interview participant had worked for tourist operators near the city of Maun and the Okavango Delta. He returned to Kavimba after his employer shifted him from one entry level position to another, including waiter, boat tour guide, and mokoro poler, with no chance of advancement. Another participant works for the Tribal Administration within Kavimba village. She had also worked for many years in the lodges and tourism industry. When asked why she took her job with the Tribal Administration and gave up her work in Kasane she responded:

“I just felt there was a difference between the company work and the government. In the company work, if you make a mistake you may be excused maybe two, three times. But for the government industry, they can take a long time to mould you, they do understand. Like now, when I started working in Kasane I was with my younger sister who comes after me . . . Then it happened that she passed away, and she had five kids.”

For this participant, working for the Tribal Administration allowed her to work at a job that was more accommodating to her situation, caring for her children and the children of her deceased brother and sister.
Within the villages men engage in wage labor activities such as land clearing and piece work (construction). Women may brew their own sorghum beer and sell it, but female entrepreneurs have also acted as “middlemen.” Travelling into Kasane to purchase large quantities of the maize-based and commercially produced beer identified as Chibuku, they will then bring it back to the village for resale at a slight profit. This method is much less labor and time intensive and provides single female household heads with another source of income. For one informant, Chibuku sales were her main source of income and livelihood as a single mother living in a one room hut and growing no crops. She recognized the challenges of life as a single mother in Chobe, but also had a favorable mindset toward her home village. When asked if she would ever consider leaving she responded, “I was born here, I’ll die here.”

Available traction and the needed labor for ploughing are the most important agricultural variable when it comes to farming success (Feldstein and Poats 1989). This is especially true for dryland farming as ploughing early during the rains will result in a better harvest. Women, especially single mothers who are head of their household, often have limited access to traction whether in the form of cattle or tractors as these are the male domain. This is particularly relevant since “In the Chobe Enclave around 40 per cent of all households (around 1,000 in total) are headed by women” (Barnhoon et al. 1994: 94). Instead they must hire the necessary labor and traction for their ploughing, but only gain access to such traction after others have completed their own ploughing. Even in the case of the VTC tractor, those who have the money to hire the tractor upfront gain access to it first, leaving women to wait until later in the season before their ploughing can be completed. Also, women more often lack the needed capital for seed and transport for planting. Kumansa described the challenges of living on the income of a single female poignantly when explaining why she only has tea in the morning before going to work.
“Just tea, for breakfast. Because, you can't have anything you want here for breakfast, because the money is too little. So we have to be very careful when using your money . . . Because every Tebe, to me is something. Every penny. So I have to buy tea.”

Men in general have greater cash income producing resources. Cattle were the main industry and export in Botswana up until the discovery of diamonds in 1967. It remains an important export. Cattle sales continue to provide substantial income for many Chobe families. Cash flow is negotiated by the household head, whether male or female, but men are responsible for cattle, the single-greatest agricultural form of income. Women can sell beer, but beer sales often do not outweigh the value of the labor expended in the process (Feldstein and Poats 1989). Some women own cattle, but must rely on relatives or pay for their care. Women who do own cattle usually own only small numbers of cattle. None of the women I spoke with had more than ten, whereas male cattle barons generally have a minimum of thirty. Therefore female income is minimal, and they often have more expenditures than men.

**Livestock in Chobe**

The constraints facing Chobe residents as agro-pastoralists are numerous. The challenges discussed so far include the limited amount of available labor as result of urbanization, the limited access to traction by the poorest households, the poor productivity of the local soil, and the lack of available inputs such as chemical fertilizers. Two other constraints include limited access to markets and the challenges of livestock diseases such as Foot-and-Mouth Disease (FMD) discussed in chapter 2. Crop and livestock sales are limited to local markets as the nearest town, Kasane, is over an hour drive away and has a population of only about seven thousand. While commercial cattle production is very successful in the southern half of Botswana, where they export to the United Kingdom and Europe, Chobe residents are restricted in their available cattle trade. Because of their location in relation to the Chobe Park, fear of
FMD spreading from nearby wildlife requires that the local livestock be vaccinated annually. Their location, both in terms of distance from the Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) controlled markets and within the vaccination zone translates into reduced income for Chobe pastoralists. According to the 2003 Annual Agricultural survey, the difference in price for one head of cattle can be as much as 450 Pula between pastoralists in the south and those in Chobe (Republic of Botswana 2003: 47). And the quantity of total cattle sold is greatly reduced by the Enclave’s rural isolation within the vaccination zone.

**Chobe Education**

Access to education was another concern expressed during the interviews. Although education for children at the primary level is available within most of the villages, for secondary education they must travel to Kachikau or outside of the Enclave. Any education is a relatively recent occurrence in the Chobe Enclave, as many did not have access to it until the twentieth century. And access to education for females is even more recent, occurring in the last fifty years as many of the elder women have little to no education. Additionally, all residents with children attending school must pay school fees and while primary education is subsidized for poorer households, everyone attending secondary or higher must pay the full price. Therefore, many of the interview participants listed school fees and supplies among their primary expenses. And in some cases primary education is all that a child will receive. This is reflected in the statistics as only 30.6% of all student enrollments in 2004 were at the secondary level (Central Statistics Office 2006).

Ndavo, who is seventy-five years old with nine children (3 still in school), stated that education was better in the past when he was a student. Nkuni, an HIV positive single mother

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3 Some names have been changed to maintain anonymity.
who finished secondary education, indicated that she would like to go back to school but cannot afford it. Kumansa is finishing a degree in accounting from the University of Botswana, but wanted to study agriculture. Because there were no openings in the agricultural department, she had to study accounting instead. In fact, only 25.6% of all 2004 enrollments in the College of Agriculture at the university were women (Central Statistics Office 2006). And Mbwensee, the daughter of a mother infected with AIDS, had her education paid for by her uncle but works for minimal wages at one of Kavimba’s dry-goods shops and spends her free time caring for her younger siblings. These examples demonstrate both the challenge of gaining a decent education and the challenge of finding employment that utilizes that education in a meaningful way. Mbwensee spends most of her wages on food and school fees for her siblings.

**Chobe Health**

Illness is a major challenge for all of Chobe’s residents. The health officer at Kavimba’s clinic discussed the situation bluntly, outlining the challenges of providing healthcare in such a rural setting. AIDS is the greatest challenge, especially since at nearly 30%, Chobe has the highest rate of infection in the country (Republic of Botswana 2005). According to the officer, AIDS victims fall into “conflict with lodge managers when they have to take off work to visit the clinic.” With a rate of infection over 25 percent in Chobe, AIDS has had an impact on almost every family. Unombe, a seventy-four year old single mother living with her only daughter, lost both of her brothers to the disease. The biggest difference between now and when she was younger, “People didn’t used to get sick as often. There are more diseases now, sexual diseases.” Other physical symptoms and illnesses common to Chobe residents are the common cold, tuberculosis, hypertension, and muscular skeletal diseases including symptoms related to back and knee injuries accrued through ploughing, land-clearing, collection of firewood, and trench digging (for drought relief). When asked about his life and challenges Ndavo replied,
“Life is good as long as you are healthy. I eat well, sleep well . . . As long as you don’t get sick.” Ndavo has lost a son and several cousins to AIDS over the last thirty years.

The isolation of Kavimba and the Chobe Enclave creates further challenges for health officials as distance and communication become limited, especially in the evening. The health officer explained that even calling for an ambulance is challenging since the clinic does not have a telephone and the phone shop closes after 7pm. For the ambulance, traveling to the hospital in Kasane at night poses a real threat as it requires the driver to pass through the middle of the Chobe National Park when elephants cross the road and the ambulance may be traveling up to 180 km/hr.

Community Based Natural Resource Management’s Success: How is the program speaking to Chobe resident’s livelihoods?

Researcher: “So what do you think the purpose of CECT is?”

VTC Officer: “The purpose of CECT. To help us use our natural resources. And to control them. Because without CECT we are going to kill these animals.”

The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust has been in operation for almost two decades. What has it accomplished in that time period? What do Chobe’s residents think of CECT and the VTC projects? Is the program really participatory? After discussing their livelihoods, the second half of the interviews were dedicated to examining CECT and how the participants felt the program was running and how it could improve.

CECT can generate between two and three million Pula a year through wildlife quota sales to hunting safari’s. This does not include income from photographic safari’s which have been subleased out by Akuna Mathata Safari’s. While conducting my research, CECT was negotiating to lease the photographic area themselves, which they hoped would bring in additional income. After deducting some of the income from the quota sales for administration costs, the rest of the money is distributed among the five villages. Administration costs can be
considerable, however, thirty percent or more of the total budget. Speaking with one VTC officer, I was told that each village trust generally receives approximately 100,000 Pula each year from the budget. Out of a budget that can top 2 million Pula, most of the money is not making it down to the village members.

**Local Participation in Community Based Natural Resource Management**

The purpose of CBNRM and CECT is to be participatory, but one of the greatest concerns discussed through research and monitoring has been a lack of communication and general apathy by community members. The results of Child’s Dashboard surveys from 2007 indicated that villagers were uninformed on the processes of CECT including how it operates, where the money comes from, and how it is spent (Child et al. 2007). The Dashboard was developed by Child to be a monitoring mechanism that CBOs like CECT can utilize to keep track of the overall health of the program. The “dashboard” refers to the dashboard of a vehicle which alerts the driver when something has gone wrong. Child’s Dashboard alerts CECT administrators when the program needs maintenance in certain areas such as improved communication.

Figure 3 charts the answers from a question concerning villager’s knowledge regarding the source and amount of income generated through CBNRM. Disaggregated by gender, the chart shows how more than seventy percent of male responders stated that they knew all or some of the information regarding income generated by CECT. However, forty-five percent of female responders stated that they knew nothing about income from CBNRM. Figure 4 charts the villagers’ knowledge regarding the source and value of the hunting quotas sold by CECT to the safari operator. Again, sixty percent of male responders stated that they knew all or at least some of the information regarding the value of hunting quotas whereas fifty percent of female responders stated that they knew nothing regarding the value of such quotas. It is evident
that even simple information such as source of income for the VTC projects is not being clearly communicated to village members. The figures demonstrate a gendered component, with men making up the majority of those surveyed who feel they have all the information regarding CECT and income generation and women making up the majority of those surveyed with no information at all. These sentiments were also reflected in the interviews. One interviewee, a VTC officer, admitted:

**Researcher:** Do you like CECT?

**VTC Officer:** Now days I like it . . . At first I didn’t know anything about CECT. Now I am in VTC . . . I know about CECT. I know how it helps. I know how it works.

**Researcher:** Do you think most people understand it?

**VTC Officer:** No.

**Researcher:** Do you think there is a way to explain it better?

**VTC Officer:** They were supposed to but they didn’t . . . Because it is something, they need to know it.

The VTC officer demonstrates the problem with transparency and accountability. Those Chobe residents who are involved with CECT understand its purpose and potential, however they make up a small percentage of the overall population. It was not until this individual became a VTC officer that she recognized the importance of CECT and CBNRM. The level of public knowledge and understanding of CECT is reflected in the sparse participation in local meetings.

Other interview participants recognized a need for more transparency and greater communication. Unombe, the seventy-five year old mother living in Kavimba, had no knowledge of CECT at all, despite living in the village that contains CECT’s headquarters for the entire Enclave. Communication is a two-way problem, as evidenced by Mueze’s comment that “People are dying of hunger and shelter but the VTC doesn’t know.” He identified the role
CECT plays in creating better communication with the government, but that there is a lack of information and communication between CECT and the villagers.

Currently, communication between CECT and the residents of Chobe requires their participation. Participation is limited, however, and there is a high degree of apathy towards CECT. What is impeding Chobe residents’ participation in CECT? The problem is threefold and includes issues with location, time, and language.

**Location**

CECT is designed to be a participatory program, but it is inherently bureaucratic. CECT is made up of officers and members from each village who meet annually at its headquarters in Kavimba. These so-called public meetings are located within an enclosed space that limits the number of people present to approximately thirty. CECT only meets with village members once or twice a year, rotating its meeting location among the villages each time. These villages are spread out over many kilometers meaning villagers must find a means of transportation to attend. CECT at one time had its own shuttle buses, but they were considered unnecessary and auctioned off. Instead, residents must rely on local shuttle services that are often late or never show. Other options include hitch-hiking or donkey pulled carts. VTC meetings are located at each village’s *kgotla*, the traditional tribal meeting center and male dominated forum. The constraints of such locations—whether because of distance, space, or traditional patriarchal authority—mean that large portions of the population, particularly women, have limited access and therefore minimal opportunity for participation in CBNRM related activities. The limited nature of these meetings also contributes to the lack in dissemination of information regarding CECT to the village members.
Time

Time is another major constraint contributing to limited participation and lack of communication. The average CECT meeting can last for five hours or more at a time. The meeting I attended lasted for more than six hours, had no break or intermission, and ran from 10am till 5pm through lunch without stopping. When asked if this was a usual occurrence, a CECT member stated, “Oh yes, and sometimes longer.” VTC meetings are generally shorter, but multiple interviewees commented on time and the length of meetings as an impediment to participation. If people cannot afford the time to attend the meetings, participation is all but impossible.

Language

Ward Goodenough discusses the importance of language in understanding culture. He comments on the inefficiency of using two or more languages within one society (Goodenough 1981). It is interesting, therefore, that CECT and the VTCs utilize three languages within their meetings, reports, and operations. The Basubiya, a minority within Botswana, make up the majority of the Chobe Enclave. Their language, Subiya, is prominent within four of the five villages. Kachikau, a Tswana settlement, is the only village among the five that speaks predominantly Sestswana instead of Subiya. However, the government of Botswana requires that all public documents be expressed in English and Setswana. During our multiple conversations, Masule expressed the dissatisfaction he and others have felt in regard to the ghettoization of the Subiya language within Botswana and the inability of public officials to utilize Subiya in their operations. The inefficiency of three languages became visibly evident during the CECT meeting where the minutes and agenda were printed in English and the meeting was discussed in Setswana. Additionally, the VTC meetings also utilize English agendas, minutes, and budgets, but are discussed in Subiya and Setswana. The first hour of the CECT
meeting was spent arguing over English grammar in the agenda and minutes. These examples illustrate the inefficiency Goodenough describes when utilizing multiple languages. Three different languages are being utilized within the Chobe Enclave and only those who can read both English and Setswana have access to CBNRM related documents, even though Subiya is the language most heavily utilized in day to day affairs. This inefficiency can also partly explain the problems of participation, communication, and transparency CECT is experiencing with Chobe’s residents. Because only a minority of students in Botswana ever attain a secondary education, the ability of average rural citizens to participate in parliamentary procedure printed in a foreign language is minute. When participation requires education and literacy in multiple languages, including parliamentary procedures, miscommunication and community apathy are to be expected. When asked if CECT documents should be translated into Setswana or Subiya, all interviewees responded positively.

Management of Funds

Lack of communication and mismanagement of funds were the two concerns expressed by most participants. Generally, leadership and the excessive costs of officer allowances was identified as the biggest problem. Kavimba’s VTC budget provides several examples including members sitting allowance of 16,000 Pula, stationary costs of 10,000 Pula, and advertising costs of 4,000 Pula. At approximately 6 Pula per US dollar, these costs are equivalent to $2,600, $1,600, and $600 for one VTC in a village of approximately 600. When it comes to funds, however, budget allowances is a minor issue in comparison to the greater problem of sustainability in regards to CECT and VTC projects. Kavimba’s VTC projects include one tractor, a phone and internet shop, a camp-site, and most recently brick making. The problem is that the combined employee salaries for these projects top 85,000 Pula and no project brings in enough income to support itself. Without the income from the quota sales, none of these projects
would be maintained. This creates a vulnerable situation where CBNRM is creating some benefits but no real economic development. Income generated through CBNRM needs to be invested in projects that are sustainable and utilitarian. One example suggested by an informant was the need for local butchers. CECT could help finance the establishment of a butcher shop so that local livestock can be butchered and sold within the villages instead of families having to purchase an entire cow or travel to the town of Kasane to purchase meat. Such a project would be economically viable and provide a needed service that could be utilized by all generations, as opposed to the internet shop which is consistently out of service and only utilized by a minority of the populace.

CECT is in the process of negotiating the financing for a new lodge near the western entrance of Chobe Park. The plan is to work with Ngoma Enterprises in a joint venture where CECT would provide seventy percent of the funding for the construction of a new lodge. According to the current draft agreement, the Trust would secure funding not to exceed 2.5 million Pula ($416,000US). The draft contract with Ngoma Enterprises could yield significant opportunities for employment, training, and job advancement of Chobe residents. Under section 3.2, paragraphs two, three, and four state:

ii. The Private Sector Partner [Ngoma Enterprises] shall provide its technical expertise for the formulation and implementation of the management policy of Ngoma Lodge, which shall include but not limited to, sole discretion in marketing and day to day running and operation of Ngoma Lodge.

iii. The Private Sector Partner hereby commits itself to provide training and technical assistance to members of the Chobe Enclave conservation trust in such areas as business planning and operations, tourism management, hospitality management, and marketing with the goal of transferring such skills to community members and building their capacity to operate Ngoma Lodge.

iv. The Private Sector Partner shall enjoy a wide discretion in the recruitment and employment of staff; however, first priority must be given to recruitment, employment and in-service training of members of the enclave community so that
they may attain internationally recognized standard of competency and employment.

If these statutes remain unchanged in the signed agreement, and if Ngoma Enterprises fulfills its responsibilities, this project could prove to be very fruitful, sustainable, and beneficial to Chobe residents. Several interviewees stated that, “development means jobs.” Currently, the projects pursued by VTCs such as Kavimba have resulted in few jobs and none that are sustainable. The lodge is a promising opportunity, but CECT has yet to secure the needed funds and is applying for grants with several national and international donors such as the African Development Fund.

Kumansa, an employee of CECT, made an important point. According to her, even if the lodge does come to fruition, it will not help the poorest because they do not have the necessary education.

“There are many poor, and the rich people are the ones who want to build because they will gain many things from that lodge rather than the community. I think at first we need to build what people need. Before doing all this stuff. So if you can see here, the AIDS, many young people have died and left their kids. I think they should build something for those kids to keep themselves busy.”

Kumansa would instead like to see CBNRM face the needs of the poorest people including employment, nurseries, education, and orphanages for HIV positive children. This sentiment was expressed by multiple interviewees including Nkuni who would like to see more done for disabled Chobe residents, including a man with a crippled foot who has difficulty getting water from the public tap.

Community Based Natural Resource Management and Gender

The ideal situation for women’s participation in Botswana should be one of equality of opportunity to use and benefit from natural resources, and of equality of opportunity to decide on and manage natural resources (Cassidy 2001: 25).
The above quote comes from an informational paper on Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana with specific regard to gender and female participation. Cassidy is commenting on the challenge of women’s participation in CBNRM at the community level in a society that is historically dominated by men in leadership positions. The issues raised by Cassidy and the Gender and Development literature have relevance for women’s roles and participation in the primarily rural and male dominated development projects associated with CBNRM in Botswana. Why is gender important to CBNRM? Rojas explains, “Gender is central to this community-based approach, affecting how communities, households and institutions are organized and, in turn, how they relate to the environment around them” (Rojas 2000: 3). The transition to a capitalist economy and the corresponding increase in cattle production has importance for both CBNRM and gender because of the changing distribution of power that resulted from this shift in the economy.

Discussed in chapter 2, with the transition to a capitalist economy and the emphasis on livestock production, more and more communal land was re-appropriated by the government for conversion to private cattle ranches that resulted in increased land degradation and loss of wildlife to vast networks of veterinary cordon fencing. As the cattle industry grew, so did their power and influence: “There exists what is locally known as ‘the cattle lobby’, which exerts considerable influence over government policy. This lobby is made up of wealthy cattle owners and ranchers who include many politicians and civil servants” (Jones 1999: 6). Traditionally men were responsible for livestock, and the increase in the cattle market solidified their dominance in the public sphere. Women, whom had limited access or control over resources to begin with, were relegated to an even lower social status in a system that celebrated the role of men in the livestock trade.
The economic potential of natural resources also has implications for gender roles in Botswana. In the gender and development literature, and in many development organizations, economic efficiency is argued as a rationalization for incorporating women into development projects (Moser 1993; Spring 1995). March, Smyth, and Mukhopadhyay define the efficiency approach in “that it is inefficient to ignore women in planning a distribution of resources. [The efficiency approach] aims to create projects and programmes with the most efficient allocation of resources” (March et al. 1999: 25). However, in Community Based Natural Resource Management, such an argument is flawed because the traditional gender division of labor has men and women responsible for separate natural resources.

Because CBNRM deals so intimately with wildlife and nature, it is necessary to examine the gendered manner in which men and women relate to the environment in Chobe and Botswana as a whole. Men are responsible for wildlife and “living” wood, whereas women are predominately responsible for inanimate natural resources such as fruits and berries, palm leaves, roots, etc. CBNRM programs vary in their income generating strategies. Some utilize veld products for processing and sale, which falls heavily under women’s control. In CBNRM programs such as the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, however, the only income generation is through the sale of the DWNP allocated hunting quota of specific wildlife. Because wildlife are traditionally under the male domain, programs such as CECT automatically imply that men should be running the boards and committees. The only counter to such an assumption would be if their constitution specified gender equality, which CECT’s does not (Cassidy 2001).

Mentioned earlier, the value of elephant bulls to Safari hunters can be as high as $10,000. The increasing value and importance of wildlife for communities transfers into greater social pull for men. Cassidy comments, “Men’s resources are now worth disproportionately more than
women’s resources, which could have the effect of sidelining women’s status in terms of natural resources use and management” (Cassidy 2001: 26). The efficiency approach then, is not a viable argument in promoting gender equity in CBNRM programs. Other arguments and strategies must be implemented from the top, such as policies that incorporate gender mainstreaming and budgetary allotments to the purpose of promoting gender equality.

Men have tended to dominate the public sphere in Botswana based on traditional gender roles that place women in the private and domestic sphere and men in leadership positions. The government of Botswana is now the sole authority responsible for the progress and success of CBNRM in its country. Therefore, the government is responsible for seeing that women are integrated into leadership positions within the different CBNRM programs. The government has made progress toward mainstreaming gender in the public realm and in its offices. The Women’s Affairs Division/Department was created in 1981 under the Ministry of Labour and Home Affairs and in 1998 the National Gender Programme Framework was published. Some of the main functions of the Women’s Affairs Department include: to coordinate all women’s activities at the local and national level, to disseminate information to women on all aspects of development, and to increase women’s knowledge and level of awareness (Rathapo 2000: 303). “Elsewhere in Government proactive measures include larger subsidies for women farmers, and preferential terms for women seeking financial assistance for enterprise development” (Cassidy 2001: 11). However, female literacy is only 70.3% and family law still subordinates married women to their husbands (Rathapo 2000).

Jahan comments on the pertinence of adequate resources, including funding, to ensure institutional strategies are effective in integrating women at all levels of office (Jahan 1995). At the 52\textsuperscript{nd} Session of the Commission on the Status of Women, Assistant Minister Matlhabaphiri
discussed some of the more recent steps Botswana is taking to increase its gender mainstreaming, including increased funding, starting with:

[T]he process of gender responsive budget initiatives as an important strategic tool for gender mainstreaming in the Public Sector. The gender mainstreaming strategy has been carried out in six Ministries and five additional Ministries will be covered during the 2008/2009 Financial Year . . . In addition, the Government’s commitment to the promotion of gender equality and the empowerment of women is demonstrated through the six fold increment of the Women’s Affairs Department budget. The budget increase has moved from US$200,000 to US$1.2 million for the Financial year 2008/09 (Matlhabaphiri 2008: 1-2).

Although the Botswana Government has made progress on women’s issues and gender mainstreaming, including additional budgetary commitments, the pursuit of gender mainstreaming in CBNRM programs has yet to be seen or realized. Cassidy remarks on the draft of the CBNRM Policy before it was confirmed by parliament by noting that the policy makes no specific mention of gender anywhere in the document and that “While the policy talks about equity, it does not recognize that most communities intrinsically have inequalities” (Cassidy 2001:9). The final CBNRM Policy confirmed by parliament makes no mention of gender inequalities anywhere in the document, although Jagt and Rozemeijer purport that the equal representation of men and women in trust committees is “considered to be in the spirit of the CBNRM Policy” (Jagt and Rozemeijer 2002: 58 emphasis added).

When CBNRM was first starting out in Botswana, it was classified under the Natural Resources Management Project with USAID working with the DWNP to oversee its operations. But even with the funding and expertise of USAID, which dedicated over fourteen million dollars to the project (USAID 1994), the monitoring and evaluation was poorly handled and represents the low priority to which the government of Botswana relegated the program. Jahan outlines the need for evaluation and monitoring such as that used by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in ensuring female integration in a project including:
(a) the consultation of women from the study-group during project design, (b) female participation in implementation, (c) female barriers identified and overcome; and (d) WID expertise utilized (Jahan 1995: 50). “Lack of field data is a major problem for WID assessment . . . hence it is difficult to measure progress towards gender equality of women’s advancement” (1995:53). The DWNP appointed only one sociologist to monitor and evaluate the program and that sociologist was “relatively junior” (Jones 1999: 26). The monitoring and evaluation process in no way allowed for specific attention to gender issues such as female consultation or participation in implementation. One sociologist of a junior position cannot possibly address all of the social issues, including gender, for a project of this magnitude. This is a problem Chambers discusses in that those professionals most closely associated with the necessary skills for monitoring gender disparity and integration within development projects, sociologists and anthropologists, are also generally lower on the totem pole of rank and status in comparison with their more specialized and “scientific” colleagues in the computer sciences and physics (Chambers 1997: 34). It is then not surprising that final NRMP report “concluded that the sustainability of the M&E system within DWNP would depend on the extent to which the department is able to increase the staffing of its sociology office” (Jones 1999: 26). It is clear that the integration of women and the measurement of how much progress women are making in CBNRM projects is not a priority within the DWNP or the Ministry of Environment, Wildlife and Tourism.

This section has discussed some of the social constraints facing women in Botswana and in CBNRM in particular. Most of these constraints have to do with access and control. In their Gender Analysis Framework, Feldstein and Poats utilize resources analysis to identify male versus female access and control including land and livestock as well as knowledge (Feldstein
and Poats 1989). As this paper has demonstrated, however, the gender control of resources is not limited to land or livestock, but also natural resources including wildlife, plants, and veld products. In CBNRM, access and control are limited for both genders and even more so for women. The process of devolution of authority over wildlife and natural resources does not grant ownership, but only specific user rights. In essence, they have very little control over the wildlife. And the limited access and control CBOs do retain, is generally consolidated by the local officials and administrators which are predominately men. “Organisations that include all community members tend to be dominated by men. Decisions are made by outspoken leaders, who are usually men, and voting takes place in the kgotla, which is dominated by men” (Cassidy 2001: 19). Social pressure often prevents women from attending meetings and training which may require them to stay overnight away from the village and therefore women are again limited in their access to committee and board membership because of traditional rules regarding appropriate female behavior (2001: 27). Cassidy also found that in the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust, even though a third of the members of the Village Trust Committees and the Board were women, most of them were from male-headed households: “This means that the needs and interests of female-headed households are less likely to be taken into consideration when decisions are made by the committees” (2001: 21). These comments echo my own observations from attending the Kavimba VTC meeting. Out of a village of more than five hundred, only approximately thirty individuals showed up for the meeting. Women sat on the floor at the back of the kgotla (ceremony shelter) and the men sat up front in chairs. The board had only two females, the secretary and vice-secretary, and the men dominated the conversation.

An example of how this process can affect the outcome of revenue distribution and its gender implications comes from my research among the villagers of Kavimba. One of the
projects the VTC purchased was a tractor. They hired and trained male staff to operate the tractor and charge villagers fifty Pula for its services in ploughing fields, collecting firewood, etc. The problem is that many poor households, especially female-headed households, cannot afford the fifty Pula at the beginning of the ploughing season, and therefore those who already have superior income are able to gain access to the tractor first. Early access to ploughing along with the irrigation provided by private water taps allows the wealthy to continue to increase their agricultural productivity while the poorest remain impoverished because of their limited access to ploughing and irrigation. Even though CECT brings in one to two million Pula annually through its sale of the hunting quota, food security is still among the greatest challenges facing local villagers. One of Kavimba’s injured tractor operators expressed his plight, “I sleep hungry, my children sleep hungry.” And one of CECT’s employee’s cannot afford anything more than tea for breakfast.

Although access and control over CBNRM activities and benefits is intended to be equitable through the “democratic” meetings held at the public kgotla, Moser explains why this is rarely the case. “Even where planners use more direct methods of advertising, such as meeting where eligible applicants are likely to live, domestic responsibilities often prevent women from attending . . . Real consultation with women often demands house-to-house consultation” (Moser 1993: 104). Because women are relegated to the domestic sphere, they place priority in their reproductive responsibilities, caring for children, cooking two to three meals a day, and cleaning, all activities that prevent them from attending public forums. The CECT meeting I attended lasted almost six hours and ran through lunch with no breaks. I consulted several of the officers and discovered that this was not at all unusual. The length and forum of such meetings makes it almost impossible for women to maintain active participation. How is a woman who may have a
nursing baby or children returning from school supposed to sit through a meeting that lasts six hours without any breaks? And many residents of the Chobe Enclave, both male and female, still have little knowledge or understanding of how CECT even works (Child et al. 2007).

When it comes to community based organizations in Botswana, Cassidy states that “Benefit distribution changes from being a matter of livelihoods to being a political affair, and at community level often ends up having more to do with power and decision-making (Cassidy 2001: 17). One of my informants, a CECT employee, stated that the CBO meetings have become a “lightning rod” for politicians to voice their platforms and stir up dissent in order to gain support. It is not surprising then that the meetings last so long and the majority of the residents claim few if any benefits from the program. The main purpose of CBNRM is to increase wildlife conservancy, but the CBOs have very limited access or control over their local wildlife and women have even less access and control over the benefits accrued from wildlife than men.

Discussed in the previous section, even the language in which the government forces CBNRM to operate limits people’s access and control. I worked with a retired school teacher who was attempting to establish a brick making association for local women but who had to develop a constitution written in English first. Parliamentary style English is difficult even for native speakers, but this woman utilizes English as her third language. Access by the rural populace, it seems, is not the priority of the government. And in Botswana’s patrilineal society, school fees can mean the difference between whether boys and girls both attend school or only boys. If girls are not receiving as much education as boys, then they are even more limited in their access and control over CBRNM procedures later on in life because of the constraints of language and education. Currently, CBRNM activities are dominated by local elites with the
most education and resources. How are the voices of poor female-headed households heard in such a system?

The gendered dimensions to CBNRM in Botswana are varied and reflect many of the socio-historical roots of established gender roles throughout Botswana society. Despite the efforts by the government to increase gender equity in the public realm, the conflicting motivations of CBNRM and the lack of gender specificity in the national policy on CBNRM results in a program that is male dominated with little female input, especially from female-headed households. Even though substantial economic progress has been made both in CBNRM and the country of Botswana as a whole, Botswana retains one of the largest disparities in wealth levels among its population; “it has one of the biggest gaps between rich and poor in the world. In 1991 64% of the population were estimated to live below the poverty line, compared to 45% 15 years earlier” (Jones 1999: 6). And food security is still one of the biggest issues facing rural Batswana today.

As Rojas and Cassidy noted, each gender has separate connections and authority when it comes to natural resources and that affects how men and women interact with the environment and with each other. Because CBRNM projects such as CECT rely only on wildlife as their source of income, men are disproportionately favored over women as a result of their traditional relationship to the environment. This is an issue neither the DWNP nor USAID recognized or addressed when CBNRM was first conceptualized. Conservation was the primary goal, not equitable gendered development.

Finally, the evaluation and monitoring of CBNRM has been rather loose. While the national policy requires Technical Advisory Committees (TAC) to oversee CBO operations, my informants claimed that the TAC had had little influence and early monitoring of the NRMP was
delegated to a single junior sociologist. CBNRM evaluation and monitoring in Botswana is in need of an overhaul, starting with the government and the national policy and working its way down to the local TACs. Child’s Dashboard evaluation and monitoring system provides a sample template but it also needs to better address the issues of gender access and control with regards to politics and natural resource management. The Dashboard provides the tools for the monitoring of gendered components within CBNRM, but its analysis fails to address the issues surrounding female participation discussed here. Gender needs to be given a specific place within the CBNRM machinery, and monitoring tools such as the UF Dashboard need to incorporate gender disaggregated statistics if they are going to be truly representative of the problems and issues facing rural villagers and CBO members. Only when equitable gender participation is recognized by both the DWNP and local leadership as a primary concern will CBNRM fulfill its purpose as truly a community based natural resource management program.

Summary

The three-pronged approach utilized during my fieldwork allowed me to analyze the livelihoods of the Chobe Enclave and the ability of its residents to participate in CBNRM and perceive CECT’s influence within the general population. The lives of Chobe villagers are composed of a range of activities both on the farm and off that allow them to sustain themselves in a highly varied and unpredictable environment: “Batswana—the people of Botswana—react to unpredictable climatic conditions by spreading risk across a variety of economic activities” (Poteete 2003: 535). These activities are divided along gender lines and include agriculture, wage labor, domestic responsibilities, hunting and fishing, and tribal matters among others. Urbanization has had a tremendous impact on these communities as well as challenges in accessing education and emergency health services. Unemployment is high, particularly among youths and transportation can be sporadic.
The success of CBNRM must be measured against the challenges facing the lives of village members and its effects on wildlife conservation numbers. The results of my fieldwork demonstrate that after analyzing CECT’s role within the Enclave, a lack of participation and transparency throughout the village VTCs has severely limited CBNRM in producing positive outcomes for its members. The projects funded through CECT do not have mass appeal and are not economically self-sufficient. There is a lack of sustainability in all of the projects. Those projects pursued by CBOs such as CECT must represent solutions to socio-economic problems facing village members and at least some of the projects should be self-sustaining after a period of time, requiring little to no more capital investment by the CBO. Otherwise, CBNRM may become another system of patronage for which communities such as the Chobe Enclave become dependent.

Gender is a major concern within CBNRM. This chapter illustrates the many ways in which gender needs to be considered within the CBNRM framework and how it has been largely ignored by policy-makers and the implementers of CBNRM. New strategies for increasing female participation, access, and control over natural resources need to be addressed as well as the uneven economic burden many women face as single mothers and heads of households. Improved monitoring and evaluation techniques are also needed, particularly more resources need to be allocated and the use of gender disaggregated data introduced.

Overall, the greatest measure of CBNRM’s success is whether or not it is accomplishing the goals of conservation and economic development. When it comes to economic development the answer is decidedly no. Income from quota sales is being eaten up in administration costs and unsustainable projects. And now there is even less money for CBOs such as CECT as a result of the government’s new CBNRM Policy. The policy includes stipulations requiring
sixty-five percent of CBOs’ revenues made from the sales of the hunting quotas be re-allocated into a National Environmental Fund for the government to use on conservation projects throughout the country, leaving only thirty-five percent with the CBO (Republic of Botswana 2007). There is too little money coming in, and what is coming in is about to be cut by two-thirds. Regarding increased conservation, the verdict is still out. Residents admit to more positive attitudes toward wildlife, but there has been no scientific study to measure the number of poaching cases and how wildlife populations have responded since CBNRM’s implementation. I also heard testimony from residents claiming that poaching still occurs, but only in other villages. The importance of considering motivators beyond economic incentives in promoting conservation needs to be considered. Following these results, it appears that CBNRM has had limited success and needs significant adjustments if it is going ever going to truly be participatory and speak to the needs of Chobe residents.
| Chapter 4-Figure 1  
Gender Division of Labor | Males | Females |
|-------------------------|-------|---------|
| **Crop production**     | • Land Preparation including ploughing and field maintenance  
                         • Inputs - Minimal, usually kraal manure | • Planting, weeding, and harvesting  
• Inputs - Minimal, usually kraal manure |
| **Livestock**           | • Tend and milk cattle  
                         • Tend Donkeys  
                         • Utilize donkeys and cattle for ploughing | • Tending Chickens and preparing them for meals |
| **Household Production**| • Gather Firewood (Boys)  
                         • Construct/Repair (Usually more modern materials and methods, i.e. concrete) | • Gather Firewood  
• Fetch Water  
• Cook  
• Wash Clothes, dishes, etc.  
• Construct/Repair |
| **Off-Farm Activities** | • Wage Labor (urban migration, land clearing, piece work, etc.)  
                         • Fishing, Hunting (fowl) | • Wage Labor (urban migration, housework, crafts, etc.)  
• Beer Brewing |

Figure 4-1. Gender divisions of labor. Source: Author
Figure 4-2. Seasonal calendar. Source: Author
Figure 4-3. Chobe Dashboard: Level of knowledge regarding the source and amount of income from Community Based Natural Resource Management. Source: Data obtained from Child et al. 2007 (Chart constructed by author)

Figure 4-4. Chobe Dashboard: Level of knowledge regarding the source and Value of hunting quotas. Source: Data obtained from Child et al. 2007 (Chart constructed by author)
CHAPTER 5: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

The last chapter provided a case study of the Chobe Enclave and the numerous and varied issues affecting the success of CBNRM for both CECT and Botswana as a whole. Chapter 5 provides a final summary of the research findings including a discussion of CBNRM as a tool for the devolution of authority, the role of CBNRM as a development project and its potential sustainability, the lagging participation in CBNRM by local villagers and issues regarding its relevancy, and finally its impact on conservation. Through this discussion the research questions posed in chapter one are revisited and resolved. The chapter also examines the challenge of competing motivations in program implementation and questions over local versus centralized authority. The purpose of CBNRM as an incentive based program with economic development taking a backseat to the primary goal of wildlife conservation is acknowledged. Concluding remarks review the historical structures of inequality discussed in Chapter 2 and their importance in contextualizing rural agro-pastoralists within the history of Botswana and how these structures and a corresponding lack of trust and confidence in the central government need to be addressed before CBNRM can become a successful program among the rural populace.

Devolution of Authority: Is Community Based Natural Resource Management really devolving authority over wildlife back to local villages?

**Researcher:** “What do you think of the Botswana government? Do you think the government approves of CECT?”

**VTC Officer:** “They do, ‘cause like this money that comes from CECT. It is from the government.”

Community Based Natural Resource Management in Botswana is an idealized concept. The promise of increased community participation in rural development while at the same time increasing wildlife security is generally welcomed as an ingenious solution to the conservation ills of Southern Africa. I have argued, however, that in the case of Botswana’s CBNRM
program, such a promise has only been partially realized and has yet to address some of the basic social and political inequities that must be recognized before any true progress can be achieved. The above quote confirms that even those Chobe residents who are heavily involved in CBNRM equate the money that flows into their communities with a kind of governmental patronage, not from natural resources or local wildlife over which they have authority and ownership. Because the project was originally conceived and developed by outside planners, CBNRM in Botswana fails to recognize the historical structures of inequality that have granted a minority of the populace with the majority of the wealth and power. This results in a program that attempts to grant authority to rural communities without first addressing the government’s negative and paternalistic attitudes toward this section of the population. The research revealed two main issues contributing to limited devolution of authority over wildlife back to rural populations such as CECT. The first and most poignant has to do with the narrow way in which devolution occurs. Because community trusts only gain access to wildlife resources through a leasing system, final authority over the wildlife remains with the government and community trusts are really only provided with increased access over their natural resources. They have not received any significant increase in the measure of power or control they have over these natural resources, let alone a legitimate authority. The limited devolution of authority through multiple leases, including hunting quotas that are defined and established by the DWNP, represent the lack of trust the government of Botswana has in the capabilities of local populations to manage these resources. Therefore, the second issue related to the devolution of authority has to do with trust, or the lack thereof, between the government and community trusts as the former sees the latter as backward and primitive, incapable of managing their resources in an appropriate manner. This issue of trust is reflected in the multiple stages of CBNRM, from
conceptualization to implementation, and most recently in the establishment of an Environmental Fund which delegitimizes community trusts even more by severely limiting their funding.

Twyman examines CBNRM by comparing “planner-centred” versus “people-centred” implementation of projects, arguing that while proponents of CBNRM emphasize local people as the main contributors and benefactors of projects (people-centered), more often than not the projects are conceived of and implemented by outside agencies (planner-centered) (Twyman 2000). It has also been claimed by planners that indigenous and traditional ecological knowledge (TEK) systems are being voiced and recognized through CBNRM (Phuthego and Chanda 2004; Gujadhur 2000). Phuthego and Chanda state, “The on-going efforts by the Botswana Department of Wildlife and National Parks to integrate TEK into wildlife utilization indicate that it has a significant and noteworthy role to play in the sustainable management of wildlife resources” (2004: 73).

CBNRM projects throughout Southern Africa, however, have made similar claims while at the same time delineating indigenous knowledge to a periphery position within the project. Walley confirms this in her research regarding a CBNRM project on Mafia Island in Mozambique where: “Overall, the disdain for popular knowledge expressed by both Euro-American and Tanzanian experts within the park offered possibilities for reproducing status hierarchies that carried both national and international dimensions” (Walley 2006: 209, Emphasis Added). The same has been demonstrated in Botswana where despite Phuthego and Chanda’s claims of indigenous knowledge and opinion being incorporated by development planners, Twyman counters with his own evidence indicating “undertones of subordination and manipulation” which ensured that only the DWNP’s views would be utilized because these were the “avenues . . . supported by the government and these were the ones most likely to be
successful” (Twyman 2000: 328). The success of community participation in conservation is therefore dependent on who really has authority over the project (generally the government) and what their motivations and goals for the project entail. Murphree sums up the issue succinctly: “it is about power, about centre-periphery relationships, about resource and value allocations. It is, in other words, about politics” (Murphree 1998: 29).

The historical forces of colonialism and post-colonialism in Botswana that resulted in the displacement of tribal groups and the transition to a market economy has led to rural poverty and a heightened level of urbanization as migrants seek wage labor as a substitute to traditional forms of agricultural subsistence. Since independence, the government has continually demonstrated its lack of interest in wildlife conservation and related CBNRM projects, most recently evidenced by their decision in 2001 “decr
eeeing that district councils should manage the communities’ revenues in trust” (On-Bar 2005: 378). This further demonstrates the government’s continued disdain for tribal systems and people, beginning with laws such as the Chieftainship Law and Tribal Land Act through which they were able to wrest control from the chieftaincy, and explains why they refuse to devolve control of CBNRM to the local communities. Viewing these communities through the ideology of “primitive mind,” they do not trust local communities to manage their own environment: “As agro-pastoral modernizationists, Tswana policy-makers are understandably puzzled by the focus on resource conservation through the preservation of ‘primitive’ ways of life” (Swatuk 2005: 119).

**Development and Sustainability: Is Community Based Natural Resource Management a successful motivator for the prevention of poaching?**

CBNRM fails to recognize the inherent contradictory motivations of its planners. Its primary purpose is conservation, not poverty reduction or development. Jones and Rozemeijer state:
It is important to note that the development of CBNRM in Botswana was triggered primarily by the need for improved conservation of natural resources, rather than the need for community empowerment or economic development in rural areas. Economic benefits were regarded by DWNP [Department of Wildlife and National Parks] as a means of achieving conservation, not the goal. The primary intention of CBNRM has never been to give communities ownership over land and resources, though some kind of ownership is necessary as an incentive to conserve the land and resources (Jagt and Rozemeijer 2002:52).

The importance of this statement is that because of the mixed motivations behind CBRNM in Botswana, the development projects have never been clearly outlined. The government is mainly concerned with improving its reputation with wildlife conservation and sees CBNRM as the mechanism to accomplish that goal. How the projects are carried out receives less attention, a fact represented in the vagaries that proliferate the government’s official Community Based Natural Resource Management Policy which was finally confirmed in 2007, almost two decades after the program was started (Republic of Botswana 2007).

CBNRM relies entirely on economic incentives, but much like the case of Amboseli National Park and the Maasai, economic incentives alone are not enough to guarantee a conservatory mindset. When the material incentives disappear, it is unrealistic to expect conservation will continue. Because little has been documented comparing poaching numbers before and after the introduction of CBNRM, it is impossible to accurately measure the affect CBNRM has had on conservation. However, witnesses acknowledge that poaching still occurs, at least within the Enclave. The Dashboard indicated that villager respect for wildlife has increased which demonstrates that continued education regarding the importance of wildlife conservation and the unique role of Botswana and its native fauna is another approach that must be nurtured in consort with CBNRM to promote the preservation of local wildlife and limit the number of animals lost to poaching.
CBNRM in Botswana continues to require additional funding from NGOs and IOs without which the benefits to the CBOs involved would be minimal. Benefits accrued provide only supplemental income and resources to the members involved. Administration costs are high, and the most common complaints point to poor leadership on the part of CECT officers who are made up predominately of elites. These developments have raised questions regarding the sustainability of CBNRM without financial and material assistance. As chapter 4 demonstrated, the projects pursued by some community trusts, specifically CECT, are unsustainable without the continued funding from quota sales and their relevance for local livelihoods is minimal, indicating that they have limited influence in promoting wildlife conservation. Now that government policy has changed to incorporate the introduction of an Environmental Fund, the funds available to keep previous projects running are now going to be cut by two-thirds. Many established projects may need to be disassembled and CBOs are going to have to re-evaluate how they develop and maintain future community projects with more limited resources.

**Participation and Relevancy: Are there any unintended consequences to this strategy of natural resource management?**

CBNRM in Africa has struggled to survive under the multitude of local, regional, national, and international organizations involved in its process, and each with their own set of values and motivations which leads to contradictory goals and purpose. It is difficult to persuade members in a community to forego their individual interests and cooperate as a collaborative unit. It is now understood that “community” is a loosely defined term and “needs to be recognized when facing the challenges of implementing [CBNRM] programs” (O’Connell-Rodwell et al. 2000:390). This also has implications for CBNRM as a whole. If local communities are struggling to collaborate, it is even more difficult to create cooperation among
the varied national and international organizations involved. This problem is reflected in CBNRM programs throughout Southern Africa such as the Moribane Forest Reserve in Mozambique where “government agents held multiple and not entirely compatible goals with respect to CBNRM projects” (Schafer and Bell 2002: 417). The unintended consequences of CBNRM as a strategy for natural resource management are therefore reflected in the lack of relevancy it has had for community members and the corresponding poor participation at the community level.

Chasca Twyman defines the problem in terms of how projects attempt to incorporate communities’ participation. Jones and Murphree differentiated between biocentric and anthropocentric conservation policies, emphasizing the importance of anthropocentric policies that incorporate the people with whom wildlife share their territories versus biocentric policies that are designed to exclude those same rural populations. However, even though CBNRM focuses more on human involvement, it does not guarantee that human participation in conservation will reflect the views or needs of the members involved. James Fairhead and Melissa Leach (Fairhead and Leach 2007) found that conservatory programs led by outside partners generally result in diverse and conflicting views regarding how the project should be implemented and whose knowledge is utilized in the process:

Contrasting definitions of the environmental problem contain particular images of local practices and justify contrasting development paradigms, commonly amounting to repression of, as opposed to support for, local techniques and institutions (2007: 21).

Because projects rarely take local community members’ needs into consideration, focusing more on promoting a conservation-based mindset, Swatuk has described CBNRM as “akin to bribery” (Swatuk 2005: 100). These sentiments are reflected in the passivity of community members and lack of participation beyond CBNRM administrators. Chapter 4
demonstrated some of the causes for the gulf between community members and CECT administrators including the use of English and Setswana as languages of power and authority as well as issues over female access and the challenges of education, employment, and food security which continue to plague rural populations and for which CECT has yet to address in a meaningful way.

Community members were not part of the initial stages of conception and planning and therefore have only had input after-the-fact. This has resulted in the projects having little relevancy for community members beyond the administrators. Gujadhur agrees, stating that “Community projects need to make a meaningful contribution to the living conditions of the majority of community members to enhance the conviction that natural resources management and conservation is worthwhile” (Jagt et al 2000: 27). Migration reduced the number of men in these rural communities and consequently it is “chiefly weaker groups, therefore, particularly the elderly and women burdened by reproductive responsibilities, who remain the targets of training, [and] for whom new skills acquisition is a daunting task” (Bar-On 2005: 377).

The lack of concern with communities’ opinions or needs has resulted in a program in which the community members find the benefits minimal while risk to their personal property and health continues. Even so, community members claim a high level of support for CBNRM. However, until these deficiencies are addressed, actual community participation will remain low as members perceive the project as out-of-touch and irrelevant to their needs and livelihoods.

**Conclusion**

CBNRM was not created to answer the problems associated with colonialism, nor the political and social issues bound up in national economics and the livestock industry. But it is uniquely intertwined with both legacies despite its original conceptions and purpose. Why? Because CBNRM is a lesson in the challenges facing any program, group, or organization who
attempts to challenge the established authority and their agenda. The colonial heritage of Botswana established a capitalist economy heavily reliant on the commercial cattle industry and exports to Britain and Europe. Emphasis on commercial cattle production, modernization and Westernization, both during colonization and after independence, directed the government’s policies on land use, including the construction of the FMD fences, greater privatization through fenced cattle ranches, and the gradual erosion of tribal tenure over communal rangelands and wildlife. These land use policies are a reflection of both national and international views of the role that Botswana should play in international trade, and leave little room for the place of agro-pastoralists or herds of migrating wildlife. This brings up the issue of trust. The legacy of colonialism in Botswana has resulted in an independent government that is primarily concerned with modernization and commercial production, has a history of decreasing and diluting local tribal authority, and has continually re-defined and redistributed communal lands and property. Based off of the last hundred years, rural villagers have little reason to trust their government and fulfill any rational or social obligations and expectations conceptualized during the formation of the CBNRM program.

The CBNRM program is plagued with problems not only because many of the people it addresses distrust it, but many more have little knowledge or understanding of how it works and are therefore ambivalent towards it. CBNRM was conceptualized outside of the communities it operates within, and only after implementation were the local’s voices heard. Consequently, the apathy demonstrated by community members is a “result of development efforts that do not take account of local priorities, local livelihood dynamics or local concerns and past experiences” (Twyman 2000: 331). Drijver states, “Only when motivation is identified, can a better understanding of how and under what conditions participation might be intensified” (Drijver
1992: 134). In the case of CBNRM, authority over wildlife that was wrested from local villagers during colonialism remains vested with the independent government.

If CBNRM is ever going to find real success in Botswana, the policy-makers must understand the historical roots of poaching and the general animosity toward wildlife that is exhibited by villagers and develop a program that addresses the disparity in local versus federal control and the issues of trust and distrust that have accumulated over time. CBNRM can have a truly positive impact in Botswana, but planners must first understand the historical forces that created an impoverished rural populace diametrically opposed to the local wildlife which threatens their livelihoods and existence. The current system, which provides only nominal compensation in exchange for conservation, in no way speaks to the historical wounds created during colonialism and post-colonialism. So far the government has ensured that final authority regarding CBNRM remains securely vested at the federal level. If it is going to succeed in Botswana, CBNRM must find a way to truly empower local communities. As for now, “participatory resource management programs such as CBNRM will [only] be localized when and where they serve or do not threaten dominant interests” (Swatuk 2005: 119).

Because this was primarily a qualitative study of CBNRM in Botswana, more multidisciplinary studies are needed to verify the findings. In particular, future research is needed in the area of microeconomics and household finances to evaluate how individuals are spending their limited income and how CBNRM can better address in-discrepancies between household needs and their available resources. In addition, more research is needed to determine CBNRMs quantitative effect on wildlife population numbers. What are the modern poaching trends since CBNRMs inception? What other tools can CBNRM utilize beyond economic incentives to stimulate local interest in wildlife conservation?
COVERING NOTES FOR RECURRENT BUDGET 2008-2009

ентрьО EMPLOYEE’S SALARIES: P85,560.00

The figure covers all operational V.T.C workers which at the moment are eight [8] and due to the 15% increment across the board brings the figure to where it is now.

- One tractor driver @ P1, 380 x 12 months = P16,560.00
- One tractor assistant @ P920.00 x 12 months = P11,040.00
- One phone operator @ P920.00 x 12 months = P11,040.00
- One phone operator reliever @ P747.50 x 12 months = P8,970.00
- One phone shop cleaner & reliever @ P747.50 x 12 months = P8,970.00
- Two camp-keepers @ P862.50 x 2 x 12 months = P20,700.00

MEMBERS SITTING ALLOWANCE: P16,000.00

The given amount rates for both scheduled and special meetings which is

6 scheduled meetings @ P 200 x 10 members = P 12,000.00
2 special meetings @ P 200 x 10 members = P 4,000.00

MEMBERS TRAVEL AND LUNCH: P5,000.00

Caters for members and workers doing duties outside their village e.g. members going to kasane to withdraw and deposit cash workers going to buy fuel e.t.c

STATIONARY: P10,000.00

The stationary will be used for both office and operating V.T.C projects.

TRANSPORT HIRE: P9,000.00

The amount will be used to hire transport for members going to buy V.T.C goods and those supervising during ploughing seasons and camp-site construction.
APPENDIX B
KAVIMBA VILLAGE TRUST COMMITTEE BUDGET HANDOUT PAGE 2

➢ PHONE-BILLS: P20,000.00
Since the phone can’t raise enough finds to run itself, the amount will be used to pay for all phone bills.

➢ BANK CHARGES: P1,000.00
The amount will be used to pay for all handling charges at the bank for all v.t.c accounts.

➢ LOCAL NIGHT OUT: P1,000.00
The amount will be used to pay all v.t.c members and workers during committee duties outside their area and spent a night there.

➢ POST BOX RENTAL AND COURIE: P350.00
The amount will be used to pay for the box (box 134) rented by v.t.c and any other goods ordered by courier.

➢ WORKMAN & MEMBERS INSURANCE: P6,000.00
The amount will be paid to any insurance company so as to cover both workmen and members and members for any accidents while carrying v.t.c duties.

➢ ADVERTISING AND PRINTING: P4,000.00
Even though the phone shop is being run by the v.t.c all printings done by v.t.c should be paid for, for proper oversight of the business. To find/see if it is making profit.
➢ TRACTOR LUBRICANTS, FUEL AND MAINTANANCE: P50,000.00

Due to high-rise in fuel. The amount will be used to buy diesel for the tractor to carry duties of the community i.e. ploughing and loading sand, firewood, poles etc and general services of the tractor including parts.

➢ LEASE RENTAL: P1,000.00

The money will be used to pay for all land right V.T.C have.

➢ ELECTRICITY AND WATER: P1,100.00

The amount will be used to pay v.t.c water bills at the camp-site and buy electricity units for both camp-site and phone shop.

➢ REFRESHMENTS: P5,000.00

To buy snacks and drinks for members and ex officio members during meetings.

➢ PROTECTIVE CLOTHES: P5,000.00

To buy over-rolls for tractor driver & assistant and baots. To buy knob carries, touches, jackets [coats] and boots for camp-keepers and uniform for phone attendants.

➢ PROPERTY INSURANCE: P10,000.00

To insure all v.t.c buildings and furniture for in case of fire e.t.c insure tractor for in case of accidents and other v.t.c goods.

➢ DONATIONS: P10,000.00

To quick –start one member from the community and donate to other clubs in the village.
REFERENCES LIST


BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

John “Landon” Denkler was born in 1984 in Hannibal, Missouri. Landon grew up in rural Ralls County, surrounded by farmland belonging to his great grandfather John Landon Watson for whom he was named. After graduating from Hannibal High School in 2003, Landon attended the University of Central Missouri in Warrensburg where he earned his Bachelor of Science in History and graduated with honors in May of 2007.

Following graduation, Landon entered the University of Florida’s graduate program in anthropology where he concentrated his studies in applied anthropology and African Studies. During his graduate studies, Landon conducted fieldwork for two months among the Basubiya Tribe of northern Botswana and also worked as a Graduate Hall Director for four and a half semesters in Residence Life.

Currently, Landon is working fulltime for Jewish Vocational Service in Kansas City, Missouri as a Refugee Specialist and Job Developer. He is also in charge of two development projects including a Burmese Women’s Weaving Microenterprise and a Refugee Community Garden Project. Landon received his Master of Arts in cultural anthropology from the University of Florida in December of 2009 and plans on eventually continuing his graduate education at the doctoral level.